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ECSA REVIEW

IGC 2000 Watch (Part 4): Long Live the IGC Desmond Dinan and Sophie Vanhoonacker

THE IGC IS OVER; long live the IGC. There will be another one in 2004. The Germans are already calling the next IGC the “competences conference” because, among other things, it will attempt to delineate power in the EU between the “Brussels” and national levels of government, thereby allowing so-called constitutional regional authorities (such as the Länder in Germany) to protect their own governmental authority vis-à-vis the national and EU levels. If not a Nice leftover, this issue could be called a Nice spillover, as impending enlargement inevitably triggered discussion outside the IGC about the EU’s overall direction and future constitutional form. Annex 4 of the Treaty outlines an agenda for the 2004 IGC that includes the status of the Charter of Fundamental Rights, simplification of the Treaties, and the role of national parliaments in EU decision making. Nevertheless, the German government insisted in the closing stages in IGC 2000 on a future conference in large part to ensure that the Bundesrat (the upper house of the German parliament in which the Länder are represented) would ratify the Nice Treaty. For their part, the Länder are less interested in protecting their position in the EU than in enhancing it within the German federation, although both goals are closely linked.

The possibility that there would be a treaty to ratify received a boost in early December, a week before the Nice summit. A short statement by German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder, after his pre-summit meeting with French President Jacques Chirac, hinted that a deal would indeed emerge. “We have agreed,” Schroeder is reported to have said, “that we will agree.” Up to that point there was considerable speculation that the summit would collapse because of French insistence on maintaining equality of weighted votes with Germany, despite Germany’s population being almost twenty-five million more than France’s. The reweighting of votes turned out to be the most contentious issue in the closing stages of the IGC, especially during the summit itself, and not only between France and Germany or between the big and small member states.

As Schroeder implied that it would, Germany accepted parity with France: 29 votes each, along with Britain and Italy, the other two countries traditionally in the “big” member state cluster. This concession to Chirac may have seemed magnanimous, but was a small price for Schroeder to pay for maintaining Franco-German harmony, especially as the introduction of a demographic safety net of 62% of the EU’s total population for a qualified

majority gives Germany significantly more voting weight than France. Surprisingly in view of its insistence before the summit on emerging from Nice with as many votes as France, Spain accepted two votes fewer, presumably in return for concessions elsewhere, notably the temporary continuation of unanimity for the distribution of structural funds. That left the real row on reweighting, in the final hours of the summit, between two “small” countries: Belgium and the Netherlands. Belgium’s last-minute effort to maintain parity with its Benelux partner demonstrated that national pride is not the prerogative of large member states, particularly France. It also showed that the “big-small” member state divide masks equally deep divisions among the small member states themselves.

The changes with respect to qualified majority voting (qmv)—the reweighting of votes, the raising of the qualified majority threshold from 71% to 73.4%, the introduction of the demographic safety net, and the new stipulation that a qualified majority of weighted votes correspond to a simple majority of member states—will have an effect on the dynamics of Council decision making. The larger member states will have relatively greater voting power than they currently have and will find it easier to put together coalitions to form qualified majorities and, especially, blocking minorities. As was pointed out frequently during the IGC, the EU rarely if ever splits over policy issues along big-small member state lines. Therefore the reallocation of votes agreed to at Nice strengthens the large member states individually rather than collectively. Conversely, the smaller member states emerged from Nice individually relatively weaker. One thing, at least, is certain: because it is by far the most populous member state, Germany will be the most sought after coalition partner in the course of EU legislative decision making.

As promised in Amsterdam, in return for greater voting weight in the Council the large member states gave up the right to nominate a second Commissioner (as of 2005). Like the modalities of reweighting, the Commission’s eventual size remained unresolved until the Nice summit. The large member states’ call during the IGC for a Commission having substantially fewer Commissioners than there will be member states caused a revolt of the small countries. This broke out spectacularly over dinner at the Biarritz summit on October 13. In defense of one Commissioner per country, small member states cited the Commission’s fragile legitimacy and the political necessity of maintaining representation on the EU’s executive body. The latter argument called into question the Commission’s supposed independence of national governments, but (*continued on p.20*)

Enlargement of the European Union: Impacts on the EU, the Candidates and the “Next Neighbors”

In this Forum, five ECSA members examine the progress and prospects of EU enlargement to the east and south, asking about the impacts of the enlargement process on the existing members of the Union, the candidate countries, and the “next neighbors” of an enlarged EU.

Helen Wallace

FURTHER ENLARGEMENT HAS—sort of—become the next strategic goal of the European Union (EU). The conclusions of the European Council in Nice recently reaffirmed “the historic significance of the European Union enlargement process and the political priority which it attaches to the success of that process. ... It endorses ... the strategy proposed by the Commission ... The roadmap for the next 18 months will ease the way for further negotiations ... and will place the Union ... in a position to welcome those new Member States which are ready as from the end of 2002 ...” The “roadmap” had been clarified by the Commission in November 2000, and the Treaty of Nice, agreed in December, makes adjustments to the EU institutions to cater for up to 27 members.

These reassuring declarations suggest that there is now a clear pathway to the enlargement process. On the EU side some of the practicalities of prior reform have been addressed and the candidates have been given the glimmerings of a timetable for their accession, subject to “differentiation” among them in relation to “each country’s merits” ... and their scope for “catching up.” Indeed, it seems, there has been a marked change of tone and tempo on the part of the EU, compared with the ambiguities and hesitations of previous months. Yet this smooth and soothing language in the declaratory policy of the EU masks a number of fundamental questions about the character of the enlargement process, its consequences for the EU as a form of “deep” integration, its impacts on the aspiring candidates, and the potential effects on not-yet—or perhaps never—candidates among the next neighbors in Europe.

The contributions to this ECSA Forum address some of these questions and highlight further issues that need to be addressed both empirically and theoretically. It seems rather clear that to get a grip on these questions requires us to step outside the conventional discussion of what has, after all, been so far a west European integration process. Critical to the analysis of EU enlargement these days are issues that relate to: (a) processes of domestic or “in-country” transformation, especially in the post-Communist countries; (b) how the EU defines collective interests vis-à-vis its region and projects power and influence over its near-abroads, both candidate and non-candidate neighbors; and (c) whether or not our core definition of Europeanization should be elided with “EU-ization.”

Domestic transformation

One important strand of both the practice and the study of west European integration is the way in which it may generate—or be shaped by—the processes of domestic transformation. But we need to relate our understanding of this process better to the circumstances of post-communist transformation. In Central and Eastern Europe, as Bridgid Fowler discusses especially in relation to Hungary, the “return to Europe” is as much a process of leveraging domestic transformation as one of satisfying the tough EU criteria for accession. As she explains, much more attention needs to be paid to the interweaving of EU conditionality with the other “in-country” influences on the dynamics of post-communist transformation. Moreover, we cannot assume that an EU-derived template will make for a good fit with local circumstances—or that EU policy-makers are able to make nuanced judgements about what makes best sense for the differentiated circumstances of individual candidate countries.

Next neighbors

Over the past decade the EU has faced a radical rearrangement of its near-abroads. The impacts can be seen in EU enlargement policy, in the development of a common foreign and security—and now defense—policy. Lykke Friis and Anna Murphy comment on the tricky policy issues presented by the pattern of developments in South Eastern Europe, not only post-Cold-War but post-Yugoslav-war. As they point out, the perspective of eventual accession for this additional group of countries was perhaps unavoidable for an EU with responsibilities as a regional power. But the confusion between foreign policy and enlargement policy clutters up practice with ambiguities and inconsistencies, not least since the further east and south-east the border of the EU moves the more potential aspirants for EU membership emerge. Similar problems are evident in the tangled development of the EU-Turkey relationship, currently going through yet another period of reciprocal antagonisms over the terms of the Accession Partnership and the relationship between EU defense autonomy and NATO. Nor should we forget the continuing political difficulties about the accession of Cyprus to the EU.

Europeanization or EU-ization?

All of our contributors comment on the EU efforts to export “its” template further east across the continent. As Ulrich Sedelmeier comments, this generates broader tensions between “material interests” and the normative dimension in the construction of EU enlargement policy. He suggests that we need to make a better job of drawing together the conceptual work on “Europeanization” with a more fine-grained understanding of transformation in the aspirant members of the EU. It is not hard to understand why EU policy-makers and publics would prefer that their newly accessible neighbors should become more like “one of us,” whether inside the club or in the near-abroad. “EU-ization,” as defined by the *acquis communautaire*, has become the chosen instrument for hastening this process. Yet perhaps there is a prior underlying process of Europeanization—both substantive and normative—that needs to be undertaken. It is interesting to note that in the exceedingly bad-tempered final phases of the Nice European Council successive French

presidency proposals sought to allot lower political weights to the candidate countries within the EU institutions, because, it was said (and heard) “these countries” should not—even after membership—be accorded parity. For the candidate countries, in both reality and substance, Europeanization may be much more important than EU-ization, and this is surely at least as important for the next neighbors, whether or not they ever become plausible EU members.

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Brigid Fowler

THE DESIRE TO “return to Europe” has been one of the dominant forces for change in the Central and East European countries (CEECs) since the late 1980s. Membership of the EU is seen in the region as an integral part of this goal. The prospect of membership in European institutions, within a benign regional political and security environment, is the key difference between the situation of the CEECs in the post-communist era and their unhappy previous experience of independent statehood between the two World Wars. The prospect of an institutionalized “return to Europe” also makes for an important difference between the CEECs’ post-communist experience and democratic transitions outside Europe. For most of the CEECs, the need to satisfy sometimes tough conditions to win membership in European institutions has acted as an “anchor” of democratizing and marketizing reforms since the revolutions of 1989-90.

Owing to the nature of the EU, its post-Single Market *acquis* and the accession process designed for the CEECs, the EU has achieved an especially large influence over candidate states. Just as the prospect of enlargement is by now suffusing all aspects of the EU (Wallace and Wallace 2000), the prospect of EU accession has influenced virtually every aspect of post-communist change in the candidate countries. In the policy sphere, the EU’s preference is for the candidate states to adopt and implement as much as possible of the full EU *acquis* prior to membership, but the nature of EU conditionality for the CEECs has awarded the Union influence across a range of fields and processes more extensive than that falling under EU competence in the existing Union (Grabbe 1999). This is one reason why the relationship with the EU has been experienced as profoundly asymmetric by the CEECs, especially those closer to EU membership. Asymmetry fuels both criticism of the Union in the CEECs and fears towards both the left and right ends of the political spectrum about the impact of accession on the new members. However, in their game of accession politics with the EU, the CEECs lack leverage: any threat not to conform to EU preferences fails to advance CEEC elites’ own goal of speedy accession, instead presenting new grounds for the EU to be cautious about enlargement. Despite these strains, the consensus on EU membership extends to almost all political forces in the CEECs,

helping to create a highly constrained policy environment for political competition in the new democracies. However, some parties’ declared support for EU membership collides with their actual policy preferences (for the Polish case, for example, see Blazycza and Kolkiewicz 1999; Millard 1999).

There are several methodological and empirical difficulties involved in seeking to untangle the precise impact of the EU accession process on the CEECs from the multiplicity of other forces, institutions and actors involved in the “return to Europe.” As regards general transition “success,” for example, there are a set of chicken-and-egg problems. Not all post-communist states, even among those unambiguously European in geographic terms, have sought to “return to Europe” (Yugoslavia and Croatia until recently). The openness to EU influence is thus historically and logically to be explained prior to an investigation of its consequences. Even within the universe of CEECs coming under EU accession conditionality, diversity has arguably increased rather than decreased in the last decade. Two cycles of mutually reinforcing factors can come into existence in the CEECs: a weak economic transition, democratic fragility and distance from EU accession on the one hand, and transition success, democratic consolidation and proximity to EU accession on the other. But how and where these cycles start is not necessarily clear. Was the EU’s 1997 exclusion of Romania from the initial accession negotiations, for example, cause or effect of the country’s transition weaknesses and the failure of the administration just voted from office?

Another source of complexity is that the EU has not been a consistent, unitary or unambiguous actor in the CEECs. The fact that both the institutions and policies of the EU are “moving targets” represents a serious difficulty for CEEC policy-makers preparing for accession; the vagueness of some of the accession criteria and requirements is another, although whether vagueness ultimately gives the EU or the candidate states more room for maneuver is worthy of investigation. Moreover, the influence of the EU is not wholly captured in the written documentation of the *acquis*, the Accession Partnerships and so forth that have been the official guides for policy-makers in the CEECs since 1995. My own current research on adjustment to EU regional policy in Hungary suggests that policy “went further” than it might have needed to in an effort to satisfy (perceived) EU preferences and secure not just accession but a successful and speedy accession; that EU actors other than the Commission in Brussels were important players; and that work on legislation aimed at conforming with EU requirements may have been underway before Hungary applied for membership in April 1994.

The politics of EU enlargement also interfere with policy-makers’ public claims about the relationship between accession and post-communist change, which therefore cannot be taken at face value. CEEC elites have an interest in claiming to both the EU and domestic audiences that post-communist change has been implemented in line with, and in order to meet, EU membership conditions. By implying a moral obligation on the EU, such claims offer CEEC elites one of their few sources of leverage over the Union, while also—assuming domestic support for EU membership—providing a means of blunting domestic opposition

to the changes in question. For their part, EU actors have an interest in claiming that EU conditionality is acting to enhance economic and political transition, rather than their own leverage over the CEECs and the accession process.

Overall, the picture emerging at least in the states closest to EU accession is of a set of highly complex and dynamic interrelationships, in which the EU influence is mediated through a range of other factors, both domestic and international, and embedded in much wider processes of change. In ways which will be familiar to students of Europeanization in existing member states, initial domestic conditions, national cultures and traditions, bureaucratic and party politics and issues of sequencing and learning are shaping the impact of the EU in the CEECs, sometimes reinforcing existing features as much as changing them. This helps to explain diversity of outcomes among the candidate states, despite the toughness and extent of EU conditionality. Domestic politics and policies are increasingly viewed through a “European” prism, while the EU is beginning to be understood and constructed in terms of domestic policy priorities (see Hughes et al 1999) and political competition. The “fight for Europe” in the politics of the CEECs can take the form of valence competition over parties’ ability to deliver EU membership or responsibility for setbacks in the accession process; this was the pattern even in Meciar’s Slovakia (Henderson 1999). Alternatively, elites in the CEECs can seek to differentiate their interpretations of the EU and the relationship with it in ways which chime with their various domestic political preferences and appeals; thus for the dominant party in the current right-wing Hungarian government, EU membership is a means of protecting small and otherwise endangered cultures.

Under these circumstances, accession may not be a shock for the CEECs so much as a point, albeit a very important one, in an ongoing process of multifaceted change and European integration in a broad sense. Accession’s impact for each new member state will depend partly on its location in time, relative to these ongoing processes, and space, relative to the accessions of other candidate countries. However, the entry terms to be negotiated in coming months will also make a difference; the EU is likely to pursue trade-offs whereby the CEECs accept less favorable membership terms in return for earlier accession. This is likely to present governing elites in the CEECs with a dilemma: they seek early EU entry in part to gain retrospective justification for reforms implemented, but entry terms perceived as unfavorable will provide a new source of complaint for rival elites and perhaps publics increasingly critical of the EU. Especially if the entry terms limit tangible immediate gains for the mass of the populations in the CEECs, elites are likely to be the most obvious beneficiaries at the moment of accession. They will achieve influence over EU policies and institutions which have been shaping the CEECs’ development for well over a decade—hence what might be called the “EFTA argument” for membership, being made increasingly by CEEC leaders for both their domestic and EU audiences. However, the final achievement of the “return to Europe” in institutional terms, in the perspective of both the last decade and the last few centuries, will in turn trigger new processes of political and psychological adjustment.

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Lykke Friis and Anna Murphy

IN VIEW OF THE gloom and doom that sometimes surrounds EU enlargement debates—despite it being 11 years since the fall of the Berlin wall, enlargement to Central and Eastern Europe has not happened—it would seem obvious that the EU should concentrate on finalizing accession negotiations with the twelve countries concerned rather than extend membership promises to even more countries. It is striking then that since mid-1999, there has been a renaissance in EU membership due to its use as a tool of EU foreign policy. The perspective of EU membership has been given to five South Eastern European countries (Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and Macedonia). In view of the difficulties in the accession of the existing queue of candidates, we ask whether this promise can be dismissed as cheap talk and whether it has any impact on the on-going EU enlargement process?

The renaissance of EU membership

The perspective of membership for the five South Eastern European countries was part and parcel of the so-called Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe. It was agreed in turbo-charged negotiations completed in less than four months (April-June 1999) (Friis and Murphy 2000). The Pact was a response to the humanitarian crisis in Kosovo, which also threatened to undermine the German coalition government and the EU’s credibility as an international actor. Precisely because it had to react so quickly—and because membership was judged to be the only available tool that could make a difference in the region—the EU extended the perspective of membership to the countries of South Eastern Europe. Considering the EU’s difficulties in just taking in the first candidates for EU membership, this decision was contentious. The French, in particular, tried to dilute the membership perspective as much as possible, for instance, by blocking German attempts to refer directly to the enlargement article of the Amsterdam Treaty (art. 49) in the Stability Pact. In the final compromise, the member states agreed that the EU “will draw the region closer to the perspective of full integration of these countries into its structures through a new kind of contractual relationship, taking into account the individual situation of each country, with a perspective of EU membership on the basis of the Amsterdam Treaty and once the Copenhagen criteria have been met” (General Affairs Council 1999).

This dilution was underlined by statements from even the main promoter of the Pact, German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer: “If you talk about the general prospects for integration, that’s what the Stability Pact is proposing, but it doesn’t go into too much detail. We’re certainly not talking about accession dates.” (quoted in Friis and Murphy 2000: 101).

Just cheap talk?

Attempts to dilute the membership perspective could easily lead to the conclusion that the Stability Pact was just cheap talk

uttered in a moment of crisis, i.e., the EU did not really mean what it said. Even if this was the case, we argue that this promise, however vague and conditional, cannot be withdrawn. Instead, it will force the Union to increase its level of engagement with the region and to advance the on-going enlargement process. Evidence of these effects can already be seen.

All of the South Eastern European countries interpreted the Stability Pact as a promise of EU membership. For them, membership is the *sine qua non* of EU policy towards the region. This perspective was given substance in the stabilization and association agreement with Macedonia, agreed in November 2000. It is framed around Macedonia being a "potential candidate" for EU accession. It constitutes another rung in the membership ladder and a precedent for South Eastern Europe. We can now expect countries such as Macedonia and Croatia to actually apply for membership as a means to copperfasten EU commitments. This would echo the evolution of EU policy towards Central and Eastern Europe where William Wallace observes that "it is too late to ask whether such an extensive enlargement of west European institutions is really desirable. Promises have been given, expectations raised, prestige committed, in all of the accepted applicants" (Wallace 2000).

Secondly, the promises to South Eastern Europe have already had a knock on effect on the overall enlargement process. First, the Stability Pact commitments raised concerns among the so-called second wavers in the enlargement process, i.e. those six applicants that were not invited to accession negotiations in December 1997 (Latvia, Lithuania, Bulgaria, Romania, Slovakia and Malta). Bulgaria, for example, feared that extending the membership perspective to South Eastern Europe could effectively relegate it to the same position as Albania and Macedonia. In order to diffuse this concern, which could undermine reform efforts in the candidate countries, and to reinforce the credibility of the EU's commitment to these countries, the European Council in Helsinki (December 1999) invited these six candidates to open accession negotiations with the EU. The decisions to do more for both the South Eastern European countries and the second wave enlargement candidates also triggered concerns amongst some of the first wavers (Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic, Slovenia, Estonia and Cyprus). Would they now have to wait for the slowest ship in the convoy before joining the EU? The EU addressed those concerns by agreeing a target date of 2002 by which the EU should finalize its institutional reforms to allow for enlargement. The knock on effects also reached to Turkey. By upgrading ties with the countries of South Eastern Europe and all membership candidates, Turkey would, by default, be further distanced from the EU. Hence, Turkey (also due to an improvement in bilateral ties with Greece) obtained the status of "accession candidate" at the Helsinki summit. Finally, and perhaps not too surprisingly, the inclusion of South Eastern Europe within the circle of potential EU members raised expectations in countries, such as Ukraine and Moldova: if those countries can join, why can't we?

The EU after the Renaissance

No matter how vague and conditional the EU decision to extend the membership perspective, the genie is now out of the

bottle. It cannot be dismissed as cheap talk. Nor can it be isolated from the on-going enlargement process. For the foreseeable future, the EU will have to manage a long and differentiated queue of accession candidates, complete negotiations on entry terms and conditions, and develop measures that can bridge the long waiting-period for countries like Albania and Macedonia who have been offered a loose membership perspective. As has been argued above, the EU now has to ensure the credibility of the membership promise (both to achieve the underlying objectives of building peace and stability and to maintain the credibility of the EU itself) by developing closer ties with all of the countries concerned.

This process of strengthening ties with countries prior to accession but within the conditioning framework of membership also alerts EU scholars and theorists that the external dimension of EU-governance should not be ignored. By framing its relations with outsiders in terms of the perspective of membership, by establishing structures and stepping stones towards accession, the EU can more effectively govern beyond its territory. Similarly, the effects of that process on the EU system of governance are also apparent prior to the actual accession of new candidates (Friis and Murphy 1999).

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Ulrich Sedelmeier

WELL OVER TWO YEARS into the accession negotiations with the first CEECs, it is still very difficult to predict the likely impact of enlargement on the EU and the applicants. The concrete modalities of enlargement are contingent upon a number of interrelated processes on the EU's enlargement agenda (Friis and Murphy, forthcoming). These processes include internal institutional and policy reform; accession negotiations, which will determine how quickly the CEECs will enjoy the benefits of full membership and how rigidly and rapidly they have to align with the EU's regulatory regimes; as well as policies for the wider eastern and South Eastern European region, which include arrangements to soften exclusion effects between candidates that do not join at the same time (and their neighbors).

Some of these processes are still open, and even an assessment of the outcomes that we have is not straightforward. Prior to the European Council meetings in Berlin (June 1999) and Nice, it was not taken for granted that the EU could agree on policy reform and institutional reform respectively. However, while agreement on Agenda 2000 and the Nice Treaty reforms were important in allowing enlargement to go forward, most commentators also suggest that these decisions merely postpone confronting the tough challenges that lie ahead.

Despite these uncertainties, we should not overstate how unmapped eastern enlargement is. We have certain clues as to

the emerging patterns of how the EU has handled the processes on the enlargement agenda. For example, we can observe rigidities of the incumbents and attempts to shift the adjustment burden onto the applicants, but also that despite the apparent difficulties, the process has not been blocked.

I would therefore suggest that we should first try to obtain better conceptual understanding of the key factors that shape these emerging policy patterns. A theoretical understanding of enlargement should allow us to understand not only which factors affect the EU's decision to enlarge, but also the substantive policy outcomes of the various enlargement-related processes and thus the likely impact of enlargement. In the broadest terms, it makes a difference whether we have to understand the EU as a club or whether certain factors facilitate an accommodation of the would-be members' preferences.

We have no "enlargement theory" as this subject has been so far neglected in theoretical studies of the EU (cf. Friis 1998; Schimmelfennig 2000; Wallace forthcoming). However, we can formulate hypotheses on the basis of generalizable (mid-range) theories. What we need are more systematic analyses that test their explanatory value in the various processes related to enlargement. For example, some excellent contributions to Keohane, Nye and Hoffmann (1993) systematically test the relative importance of institutions, state strategies and domestic politics on different aspects of the evolving relationship between the EU and the CEECs. Unfortunately however, since then there have been no comparable systematic analyses.

Some more recent theoretical studies have questioned whether eastern enlargement can be fully explained through material factors alone. Fierke and Wiener (1999) have emphasized the significance of the "promise" of the CSCE Helsinki Process for both NATO and EU enlargement. Frank Schimmelfennig (1999) has focused on the relevance of liberal democratic norms and the instrumental use of arguments referring to these norms. My own work (Sedelmeier 1998, 2000) suggests that the discursive creation of a specific role of the EU towards the CEECs has led, on the one hand, to a principled advocacy of the CEECs' preferences inside the EU. On the other hand, it has constrained the scope for open opposition on purely self-interested grounds against the principle of enlargement and accommodating the CEECs' preferences in EU policy. Since this discursively constructed role has been primarily a constraint on opposition to enlargement, it has not always overcome countervailing material interests on questions of policy substance. In this sense, it would explain why EU policy has been so incremental and not very generous, but also why, albeit incrementally, policy continues to evolve towards enlargement, and why it has done so despite the major difficulties with agreeing internal reforms and despite the ability of each member government that is concerned about the effects of enlargement, to block the process.

In order to advance our conceptual understanding of enlargement, analyses emphasizing social norms would need to specify more clearly the causal mechanisms through which they have an impact on policy, and under what conditions they lead to policy outcomes that are different from alternative explanations. A better understanding of the EU's enlargement policy should

also significantly improve our understanding of the impact of the EU on the applicants, which depends to a large extent on the EU's accession conditionality. However, to understand how a particular conditionality affects institutions and policies in a specific applicant country, further conceptual work is necessary.

Current research on the EU's impact on the CEECs consists mainly of in-depth empirical studies by lawyers and economists from the region. However, this literature is often technical and descriptive, and rarely comparative across sectors and countries (for certain exceptions, see e.g. Inotai 1999). In order to provide more cumulative and generalizable results, this research could benefit from drawing on the conceptual insights from two distinctive bodies of literature.

First, certain conceptual analyses of systemic transformation more broadly have examined, for example, how different institutional legacies have led to distinctive models of capitalism across various CEECs (e.g. Stark and Bruszt 1998). In principle, these insights should be also applicable to analyses of the distinctive impact of the EU. Second, the insights from conceptual research on the impact of "Europeanization" on domestic change in the member states (Börzel and Risse 2000; Knill and Lehmkuhl 1999; Radaelli 2000), have not yet been applied to the CEECs (but see Grabbe 2000; Goetz 2000). However, as the applicants prepare to take on the obligations of EU membership, the domestic effects of transferring policies and institutions to them are in principle comparable to the effects of the EU on its current member states.

The conceptual frameworks employed in the "Europeanization" literature will need to be adapted to take account of—but might also allow us to better appreciate—the distinctiveness of the case of the CEECs. For example, there might be a much more fundamental mismatch between CEECs' transformation trajectories and the socio-economic models reflected in the EU's regulatory regimes. The power relations between the EU and the CEECs are very different from the situation of current members. There is also a greater variation in the interactions between EU and CEEC policy-makers which might then allow us to analyze how different diffusion mechanisms affect implementation.

In sum, we might not need, or even want, a theory of enlargement. Mid-range theories of institutions, domestic politics, inter-state bargaining, norms, or Europeanization might allow us to understand the enlargement process and its impact on the candidates. But we need to test their explanatory value more systematically. Empirically, such research can build on comparative insights from other enlargement processes and from disaggregated observations within eastern enlargement. Conceptually, it would benefit from cross-fertilization between currently fairly distinctive bodies of literature. At the same time, we should be careful about using off-the-shelf concepts and guard against approaching the distinctive case of the CEECs with preconceived, overdeterminate research frameworks.

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EU Committee / Amcham

The EU Committee of American Chamber of Commerce in Belgium (known as Amcham) represents the interests of European companies of U.S. parentage to EU institutions. They also publish useful guides to doing business in the EU such as annual editions of the *Business Guide to EU Initiatives*, the *EU Guide to Consumer Affairs*, and the *EU Information Handbook*, and do limited student presentations in the summer on how the EU works and how American lobbying fits in with the legislative procedure. For more information visit www.amcham.be

Book Reviews

John Peterson and Elizabeth Bomberg. Decision-Making in the European Union. Basingstoke and London: Macmillan, 1999, 336 pp.

WRITING A GOOD TEXTBOOK is always a challenge. Writing a good textbook about the European Union is even more of a challenge because of the enormous complexity and changing dynamics of the emerging European polity. John Peterson and Elizabeth Bomberg took up the challenge and set the stakes rather high. Not only do they want to provide “a clear, enticing, user-friendly text that is useful to students and non-specialists” (p.1), they also strive to “make an original scholarly contribution to the literature on EU politics and policy-making” (p.1). They score better on the first than on the second account.

Peterson and Bomberg choose a decision-making approach as the conceptual lens through which they analyze political processes and their outcomes in the European Union. They look at decisions rather than policies, arguing that “all policies are the product of decisions about what to do, how to do it, and how to decide what to do” (p.4). The first chapter sets out the analytical framework of the book, which is largely based on Peterson’s earlier work. Three types of decisions are distinguished, which differ with respect to the dominant actors, bargaining modes, and final outcomes. After a brief introduction of the EU’s main institutions, decision rules and informal norms in the second chapter, Peterson and Bomberg present an analysis of various policy sectors, which follows the pattern set by their decision typology. First, the historical, political and economic context is described, in which EU decisions are taken. Second, the “history-making” decisions are examined, which result from intergovernmental bargains and define the decision rules and procedures, the relative powers of the institutions involved, and the major policy goals to be achieved. Third, “policy-setting” decisions are analyzed, which are negotiated among the Commission, the Council, the Parliament, and sometimes the European Court of Justice, and establish specific policies. Finally, the “policy-shaping” decisions are dealt with, which are dominated by policy networks and determine policy details and policy options to be considered.

The analytical framework effectively structures the various policy chapters. It provides a red thread throughout the book and will enable students to systematically compare different policy sectors. The policy chapters cover seven key areas—the Internal Market, External Trade, the Common Agricultural Policy, Cohesion Policy, Environmental Policy, Research and Technology, and the Common Foreign and Security Policy. They leave out others, such as the Economic and Monetary Union, Justice and Home Affairs, Social Policy, Telecommunication, Transport, and Energy, or only briefly touch upon them. But there is only so much a book can do, and the authors made sure that the different policy types are represented.

Peterson and Bomberg certainly accomplished their first objective. Decision-Making in the European Union is a great textbook, which aptly demonstrates how national, supranational, and subnational actors and institutions combine in the making of European decisions. Its style is clear and user-friendly. Various exhibits of particular policy episodes and focused case-studies of key events, such as Bosnia, the Amsterdam Treaty, the chocolate, banana and beef wars, or Agenda 2000, bring the EU alive and do an excellent job of enhancing the reader’s understanding of how the EU ticks. I would not hesitate to assign the Peterson/Bomberg book for a course on the EU at the upper-undergraduate and graduate level. I would also strongly recommend it to knowledgeable journalists, policy-makers, and non-specialists with a certain understanding of the EU. Decision-Making in the European Union is not an intro-level textbook, though. It requires some basic knowledge about the EU. The general presentation on institutions, rules and norms in Chapter 2 is rather short. The theory chapter is also quite demanding because it introduces a whole variety of theoretical concepts, which can be rather confusing to students with only cursory knowledge about integration and decision-making theories and policy network approaches.

As regards the second objective of the book, Peterson and Bomberg claim to make an original scholarly contribution to the field of EU studies by providing three new insights. First, “the EU resists ‘meta-theorizing’” (p.252). The authors argue that the three types of decisions require different theories to explain and predict their outcomes. History-making decisions are best captured by liberal intergovernmentalism and neo-functionalism. For policy-setting decisions, neo-institutionalism works best. And policy-shaping decisions are most effectively accounted for by policy network approaches. Mixing different theories and concepts can give rise to problems, which Peterson and Bomberg themselves acknowledge. Liberal intergovernmentalism and neo-functionalism are substantive integration theories. Neo-institutionalism is a macro-theoretical approach, which accommodates a variety of sometimes competing claims about the role of institutions in social life. Policy networks, finally, are conceptual tools, which have to be embedded in some theory to deploy explanatory power. The synthetic approach is also problematic because the authors claim that their three types of decisions mutually impact upon each other. Conceptualizing and explaining such interaction effects, however, requires a coherent theoretical framework, which spans across the different levels of decision-making.

Second, Peterson and Bomberg conclude that studying EU decision-making should focus on agency rather than structure, because “it is frequently the political agency of actors which determines outcomes as much or more than the rules or structures that constrain them” (p.255). The plea for an actor-centered approach is not new (see the works of Fritz Scharpf and Gary Marks, for example). I was also a bit puzzled by it because Peterson and Bomberg emphasize the role of identities (pp.254, 267), interests (p.11), and processes of socialization (pp.255, 267) in EU decision-making. Their arguments are much more in line with a constructivist institutionalism, which assumes that

actors shape and change institutions according to their interest and identities as institutions shape and change actors' interests and identities.

Third, Peterson and Bomberg claim that changing EU institutions tends to be easier than changing EU policies. Policy stalemate caused by conflicting sectoral interests is often only overcome by "history-making" decisions that change the way in which policy decisions are made (p.257). This argument is somewhat counter-intuitive given the great difficulties of the member states in agreeing on a reform of the EU institutions or its budget to prepare for enlargement. It would also disconfirm Fritz Scharpf's joint decision-trap, which denounces the incapacity of political actors to reform decision-making institutions that produce inefficient policies.

While I find the theoretical arguments not entirely convincing, this does not impinge on the overall quality of the book. A textbook is not an exercise in theory building, as the authors themselves point out in the introduction (p.3). Decision-Making in the European Union is certainly one of the best textbooks on the EU available.

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Sylvester C.W. Eijffinger and Jakob de Haan, European Monetary and Fiscal Policy. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2000, 199 pp.

SYLVESTER C. W. EIJJFINGER AND Jakob de Haan, two top Dutch economists affiliated respectively with the University of Tilburg and the prestigious CEPR, and the University of Groningen, have written a textbook which combines advanced economic research and a straightforward understanding of the fundamentals of EMU economics, and tries to meet the needs of undergraduate students as well as the interests of central bankers.

The book, consisting of seven chapters, starts with a brief introductory chapter of about 28 pages on the origins of European monetary integration, and goes on in the six remaining chapters to address monetary, financial and fiscal issues in a comprehensive package which covers all principal notions, definitions, and research. The chapters center on central banking, monetary policy, fiscal discipline at the national and European levels, financial integration and financial market structure, EMU and international policy coordination. Each chapter contains an introduction, an outline of the problem, a brief mathematical analysis, and a conclusion that discusses the salient topics and makes a subject-specific assessment. A bibliography and a very useful index are icing on the cake for this book.

If European economics is better known as political economy, European monetary economics is the core-business. In Europe, it has taken some decades for monetary theory, as opposed to Keynesian economics—as Padoa-Schioppa admits—to be translated from intellectual recognition to political acceptance and finally to recent implementation as a European "monetary

constitution based on price stability and central bank independence" (Padoa-Schioppa, "Eurosystem: New Challenges for Old Missions," 15 April 1999, www.ecb.int). Academic research and the lessons of experience make a powerful case in favor of the new mood: price stability and central bank independence. These two correlated topics are the centerpiece of this book.

Following the abandonment of dollar/gold parity and the collapse of monetary exchange rate policy enshrined in the Bretton Woods arrangements, the fiduciary nature of monetary systems has shifted attention to the reliability of economic agents, and especially to political monetary authorities (Treasury and Finance ministers). Political monetary authorities are prone to generate a "time inconsistency dilemma," which manifests itself in the gap between the optimal policies that would be announced to the public and the policies that would be carried out if, in fact, those beliefs and expectations were acted upon. Time inconsistency arises because the authorities may not follow through if their announcements are believed and acted upon by private agents. In a time inconsistency situation, central bank adaptation to governments' instructions can accommodate a trade-off of inflation for employment, as far as more inflation reduces wages and increases the propensity to hire workers. This situation, however, is only half the story. If central banks and political governments can "surprise" financial markets by accepting more inflation than anticipated, in a world of rational expectations, holders of financial and monetary assets are believed to anticipate governments' and central banks' opportunistic behavior. An amplification feed-back is likely to be set up. As Eijffinger and De Haan observe: "No matter which factors exactly cause the dynamic inconsistency problem, in all cases the resulting rate of inflation is sub-optimal" (p.39).

The "inflationary bias" has to be stopped in order to eliminate or reduce the monetary factor in the economic dynamic. The most important and successful device is not strictly economic, but "institutional." The creation of an independent and conservative central bank is the badly needed "divorce" between political governments and monetary authorities which solves the inflationary bias of political governments, and offers the necessary incentive to central bank officials to "stick" to price stability.

Against the conceptual and theoretical background of central banking studies, the authors analyze and assess in Chapters 2 and 3 the extent to which academic wisdom has nurtured the statutory rules of the European (System) of Central Bank(s), and the adequacy of ECB monetary policy. The ECB has been granted the power to follow the principle that it established in the "stability-oriented strategy" adopted in the last months of 1998, and which was based on a two-pillar monetary policy. The first pillar designs a below-2% increase in inflation on a yearly basis as measured by the Harmonized Index of Consumer Prices (HICP) that does not include asset inflation. The second pillar refers to a reference value of 4.5% for annual M3 (monetary aggregates) growth. This is based on the view that inflation is ultimately a monetary phenomenon. The authors stress the argument that the ECB's monetary policy has to be conducted independently of short-term political considerations, and in this

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context, the authors assess European monetary policy positively. The up and down movements of Euro interest rates have reflected the market's assessment of risks to price stability in the overall economic situation. As the authors argue, if monetary union is to be viable, it is necessary to accept the fact that monetary conditions may not be tailored to the specific needs of each individual component of the Euro area.

Chapters 4 and 5 are dedicated to EMU fiscal policy at national and European Union levels. In Chapter 4, the authors set out the reasons put forward by some member countries, in particular Germany, to continue a fiscal policy restraint after Stage 3 of EMU. The fiscal discipline entrusted in the Pact of Stability and Growth, states that a below-3% public deficit target should be enforced by means of the so-called excessive deficit procedure. The authors analyze the most compelling arguments in favor of the Pact of Stability. Firstly, an excessive deficit (or excessive borrowing) of a member country may create an inflationary debt bailout risk for the ECB. Further, excessive borrowing may cause interest rates to rise and can affect the exchange rate of the Euro. The need to subscribe to a "fiscal deficit" discipline is indeed a second best choice. The literature provides some evidence that there are various reasons why financial markets fail to impose "market discipline" on excessive public borrowers. One depends on the lack of credibility of the no-bailout clause enshrined in the ECB statute, another on the fact that ECB can be put under scrutiny by the "challenging behavior" of a member country. "So, from a political economy point of view," the authors argue, "it can be concluded that under the current circumstances a safety-first strategy with respect to fiscal policies of member countries can be beneficial" (p.106).

Chapter 5 centers on one of the most controversial fiscal subjects: the budget of the European Union. As the authors admit, the budget in absolute terms is tiny when compared to the GDP of EMU countries; EU spending in 1999 was around 86 billion Euro, amounting to 1.7 per cent of EU Gross Domestic Product. Since 1970, the EU budget has evolved from member countries' direct contributions to a so called "own resources," that is to say, customs union duties on goods imported from outside the

Union, agricultural levies, and a share of the VAT revenue raised in each country. Since 1988 the EU budget is partly finance by a fourth "own resource" that is to say, a contribution limited to 1.27% of a member country's Gross National Product. A comment (p.113, Box 25) notes the proposal to introduce a "fifth own resource." This chapter includes a detailed analysis of overall EU spending, and shares of the most important categories are synthesized in figures and boxes (pp.111- 117). EU budget reforms as proposed by the European Commission in Agenda 2000 are assessed (pp.122-127). Section 5.3 discusses whether the EU budget should endorse a European-wide stabilization policy. The authors find that arguments raised against some kind of insurance/stabilization scheme outweigh those in favor. They observe that it is unlikely that such a scheme would be "politically acceptable to the EU member states" (p.137).

Financial integration and financial market structure are, indeed, leading EMU problems which have to be solved. Chapter 6 analyzes the EMU financial landscape under five major headings, which include money market integration, monetary transmission mechanism, equity markets, pension fund reform and European financial markets, and bank restructuring. The authors argue that the EMU exercises a significant "liberalizing" and restructuring impact on each of them. The most intuitive is the influence that the EMU should exercise over the pension schemes, which are part of the major European continental model of the welfare state. On page 156, the authors list three constraints which the EMU should propose for a radical reform of the pay-as-you-go pension schemes shared by all the Euro countries, except the Netherlands and Ireland. The Pact of Stability and Growth, often mocked as superfluous or even dangerous, is a major disciplining factor, that has an influence on the generous and unsustainable pension systems. According to the authors, it restricts "scope for governments to run large deficits" (p.156). Financial markets and rating agencies are likely to impose market discipline on government debt by raising higher long-term interest rates. Price transparency and tax competition increase pressure on governments as high taxes on employers for social security lead firms to relocate their activities "where such taxes are lower" (p.156).

The final chapter deals with the international implications of the EMU and the likely international positioning of the Euro (Section 7.1.3). As the authors argue, the status of an "international currency" is not the outcome of a "political willingness" but of market assessment. The status of an "international currency," however, will depend to some extent on the economic policies of the European monetary and political authorities whether or not they decide to bear those "substantial costs (responsibilities)" that, as the authors argue, an international currency has to be prepared to face. Provision of international liquidity can be bought at the price of putting internal "monetary aggregates" under strain, and although they are offset by "seigniorage" gains, they can turn risky when there are international financial crises. If this happens, the currency which plays an "international role" will be affected by exchange rate turbulence which in turn will affect the level of capital mobility, and the level of economic activity as well. This can explain why

the German mark or the Japanese yen have never tried to make the full transition from a regional to an international currency. Another important question to ask is whether the Euro, which has replaced the German mark, is likely to become international. The answer depends on what kind of economic model the Euro member governments, domestic social parties, and corporate actors would prefer. If the Euro participant parties choose a “path-dependent” model, straining to ensure the continuation of the present “social market economy” centered on a strong export performance combined with generous social entitlements, the Euro is likely to be for some time to come only a good enough “regional currency,” and the natural and logical consequence would be a weak Euro. If, instead, Euro-land countries undertake more radical and effective structural adjustments in key sectors ranging from competition policy to the labor market, the Euro will probably be able to compete with the US dollar and its weakness (or strength) will depend on the business cycle, as is the case for the US dollar. At the moment, the strength of the United States’ economy relative to the Euro-zone—a factor outside the ECB and any monetary policy instrument, including exchange rate intervention—is contributing not only to limiting the Euro at its regional level, but also to a weaker Euro at a world level as well. In sections 7.2-7.3, Eijffinger and de Haan address two related topics: international policy coordination and target zones. The authors raise doubts about the effectiveness of exchange rate intervention. The interventionist policy, threatened by representatives of France and Germany in the first six months of 1999—as they warn—can only add “weakness” to the credibility of the EMU monetary authorities. As the authors argue, a further factor contributing to Euro weakness originates in the threatened “exchange rate orientations” which the Council of Ministers want to give to the ECB authorities. Uncertainty regarding when intervention in exchange rate policy is likely to occur, and whom it will affect, is a further source of Euro weakness and ECB vulnerability to political interference.

This book is an excellent tool for teaching EMU economics, and raising the level of EMU economics in the research-field of international political economy. Students and scholars will appreciate the explicit assessment the authors make of complex economic issues, and their unbiased stance in the study of EMU economic and political interplay.

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Fergus Carr and Andrew Massey (editors). Public Policy in the New Europe: Eurogovernance in Theory and Practice. Cheltenham, UK and Northampton, MA, USA: Edward Elgar, 1999, 284 pp.

THE PREMISE MUCH MORE than the argument in the introduction to the eleven chapters of this edited volume by Carr and Massey is that institutions of government and governance can only be fully comprehended using a “multi-theoretical perspective which applies a heuristic analysis within a multi-level context” (p.ix).

This is of course a fairly broad—and safe—point of departure. Surely theory pluralism is of value, but are all theories equally useful, and under what circumstances should we adopt one theoretical approach over others? These are questions one might reasonably expect to find answers to in a book that purports to advocate theory pluralism. Or if, as the authors claim, really “anything goes,” then some stronger arguments to that effect would have been necessary to convince this reader.

In Dimitris Chrysochoou’s review (Chapter 1) of classical and new approaches to the study of the European integration from functionalism, federalism, transactionalism, neo-functionalism, international regime analysis, and interdependence theory, we are told that the EU might best be classified as a “confederal consociation.” The author does not come out strongly in favor of any particular approach except to emphasize the importance of departing from state-centric analyses of the EU and being somewhat uncritical of newer approaches to the EU including Marks, Hooghe and Blank’s multi-level governance model and Wessel’s fusion-thesis.

The public administration and policy traditions are used in the book’s second theory chapter entitled “Public Policy in the New Europe” to discuss the context of “Eurogovernance.” Massey (Chapter 2) argues that European government should be studied within the context of Eurogovernance, that is formal and informal structures that in important ways influence policymaking such as international regimes, policy networks and paradigms. Network theory in particular is useful to that end because it highlights power and resource dependency as well as “softer” means such as diplomacy, negotiation and problem-solving. The chapter concludes with reflections on accountability and responsibility aspects of Eurogovernance such as the penetration of the policy process by non-governmental actors.

The eight empirical chapters in the second part of the book—“Policies: States and Institutions”—offer appraisals of recent developments in rather narrow policy areas and link up to varying degrees with the theme of Eurogovernance. Peter Starie aims to *explain* the changing nature of macro-economic management and governance in the “new” Europe (p.45) and what we get is a competent, but rather descriptive account of the history of macro-economic management in the EU including EMU, with some considerations about the possible impact of CEE enlargement. Starie makes the point that there may be a “governance deficit” due to the lack of coordination between the centers that make monetary policy and those attempting to coordinate fiscal policy. Mike Mannin, writing on “The Politics of Structural Funding: Arenas and Agendas” (Chapter 4) argues that multi-level governance (MLG) and policy network theory offers a more accurate empirical description of policy-making reality in the structural funds field. The author is fully aware that choice between integration theory, such as neo-functionalism and MLG boils down to whether one aims for descriptive accuracy or explanatory power.

What follows in the next four chapters on EU police, immigration, health and environmental policy areas are, in my view, some of the most interesting parts of this book. Here the emphasis is not only put on description of the recent policy history

but offers in addition a stocktaking of recent institutional developments of the EU and, particularly interestingly, its linkages to other international organizations. Paul Norman (Chapter 5) covers the most recent transformation of governance in the area of police policy-making and cooperation, including how policy networks link the Council of Europe to the EU and G8. Mark Mitchell and Dave Russell (Chapter 6) point to the discrepancy between the development of an EU immigration regime and the absence of a corresponding evolution in citizenship and nationality policies. The completion of the Single European Market, the end of the Cold War and pressures from northern member states to adopt more stringent regimes in the south of the Union account for the strengthening of governance in the immigration policy field. In Chapter 7, Graham Moon writes on "The Health of Nations: Structures and Discourses in Pan-European Health Policy." The author argues that health policy is an obvious area for international governance but that currently the making of health policy remains firmly with domestic politics. Concerns with subsidiarity and multi-sectorality may constrain a need for some degree of policy convergence to support transition in Eastern Europe. Next to Structural Funds policy, the environmental policy area (Chapter 8) offers a particularly strong case of the evolution of a supranational governance—or in the more cautious wording of Anna Syngellakis, "the evidence suggests that Community environmental policy has reached a balanced degree of Europeanisation" (p.181).

The two penultimate chapters relate to the external dimension of the Union. In his contribution on "Eurogovernance and Eastward Expansion of the EU: Formal and Substantive Democratic Reform," Adam Fagin (Chapter 9) questions the readiness of potential EU member states (e.g. Czech Republic) to adopt and implement the governance system prevailing in the EU. A host of legal, cultural and fiscal constraints combined with an underdeveloped voluntary sector seriously inhibits the sort of transition foreseen by the Commission and the member states. Janet Bryant, Theresa Callan and Fergus Carr (Chapter 10) argue that the evolution of the CFSP pillar in the EU—"Eurogovernance"—was a response to the post-Cold War European security agenda. Key European security institutions (NATO, OSCE, EU) have moved towards greater complementarity with extensive policy networks ensuring ongoing consultation between these institutions.

The quality of this book lies more in the appraisal of developments in a diverse group of policy areas, including more specialized ones such as health and immigration policy. Another contribution is the recognition that Eurogovernance is embedded within a wider international context with policy networks extending to G8, NATO, WHO and the Council of Europe, to give examples. At the theoretical level the contributions are "discursive" in their use of theory and less coherent than the general theme of Eurogovernance might suggest. There is certainly an endorsement of policy network theory and MLG, but the explanatory power of these approaches vis-à-vis, for instance, integration theory is not seriously addressed.

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


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The EU14's "Sanctions" Against Austria: Sense and Nonsense Gerda Falkner

The background

THE AUSTRIAN POLITICAL SYSTEM had since World War II been characterized by two major parties. Social Democrats (SPÖ) and Christian Democrats (ÖVP) were each embedded in a stable socio-political subculture. The Freedom Party (FPÖ) under Jörg Haider having steadily increased its votes since 1986, the elections in October 1999 finally resulted in three parties of approximately the same weight. Of the 183 seats in the lower house of the Austrian Parliament, the SPÖ won 65 (33%; 1995: 38%), the FPÖ 52 (27%; 1995: 22%) and the ÖVP 52 (27%; 1995: 28%). This result allowed for another "grand coalition" between social and Christian democrats as well as for a center-right government, while a center-left government between SPÖ and Green Party (14 seats or 7%; 1995: 5%) was not feasible (and the Liberal Party failed to win any seats this time).

Who voted for the FPÖ, and why? Most importantly, a reorientation occurred among workers. In this group, the FPÖ could, within 13 years, double its proportion twice. The traditional worker's party, the SPÖ, was in 1999 only voted in by 35% of workers (1986: 57%). The FPÖ furthermore became the strongest party among the male electorate (32%; SP 31% and VP 26%, Grüne 5%; among women, the FPÖ scored 21% only) and among those under 30 years old (35%; 25% SP, 17% VP, 13% Grüne). Against frequent expectations, various "protest motives" were more important than the FPÖ's anti-migration policy (47%). The prime motives of voting FPÖ were to fight against misgovernment and mismanagement (65%), to promote change more generally (63%), and to sanction the members of the former grand coalition government (36%). This created a kind of dilemma: On the one hand, the result of the elections can be read as expressing a desire for change. On the other hand (and this was often neglected internationally), 63% did *not* vote for the FPÖ. However, only one form of stable (non-minoritarian) government except another grand coalition was possible, and this included the FPÖ, which had not been considered a suitable member of government by large parts of the political elite (including the ÖVP) until then (all data from Plasser, Ulram and Sommer 1999).

Against this background, it is crucial to know that the SPÖ had been in government for 30 years and the grand coalition between the dominant parties, the SPÖ and ÖVP, since 1986 (after WW II, there had already been a grand coalition government until 1966). In addition, the Austrian system of corporatism connected the major (and basically monopolistic) interest groups of labor and industry closely to the SPÖ and the ÖVP, respectively. Under these conditions and under an economic system with relatively high levels of state influence in the economic, cultural and even academic systems, it was a frequent public complaint that party patronage flourished and mismanagement grew. (It should be

noted, however, that Austrian economic performance indicators are nevertheless good in international comparison.)

Another frequent concern was that the grand coalition government managed to keep the FPÖ out of government (many considered that it was too right-wing, populist, and unstable in its positions), but only at the price of adapting its actual policies to FPÖ views. Even Jörg Haider himself once stated that the Social Democratic Minister for Internal Affairs acted as an ideal policy executor for the FPÖ. Out of fear of losing votes, political statements by the FPÖ were often hardly commented on by the grand coalition parties. They tried to keep contested topics such as migration and Eastern enlargement of the EU out of the public debate, instead of facing the challenge of winning the citizens' agreement against populist attitudes. It was against this background that even some Austrians who were strongly opposed to FPÖ standpoints questioned the usefulness of another grand coalition government. In any case, negotiations between the SPÖ and ÖVP in early 2000 soon broke down.

The "sanctions"

A few days before the Austrian center-right government was formed on 4 February 2000, the Portuguese Council Presidency issued a statement "on behalf of 14 Member States." It announced that "the governments of the fourteen Member States will not promote or accept any official bilateral contacts at political level with an Austrian government integrating the FPÖ; there will be no support for Austrian candidates seeking positions in international organizations; Austrian Ambassadors in EU capitals will only be received at a technical level."

In a communication on government formation in Austria, the European Commission stated that it shared the concerns of the Fourteen and would, as the *guardienne* of the Treaties, continue to watch over their provisions and values (*Agence Europe* 2 February 2000). The notion of values was innovative in this context. The relevant Treaty provision speaks about principles: "The Union is founded on the principles of liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law, principles which are common to the Member States" (Art. 6.1 TEU). While under the Maastricht Treaty, any "European state" could still apply for EU membership, applicants now have to respect these principles (Art. 49 TEU).

So far, the TEU includes no provision to exclude existing members for reasons of non-respect of the principles laid down in Article 6. However, membership rights may be suspended, according to a detailed procedure. Determination of "the existence of a serious and persistent breach" by the Council needs unanimity (except for the votes of the government concerned) on a proposal by one third of the Member States or by the Commission, and the assent of the European Parliament—all this after "inviting the government of the Member State in question to submit its observations." Only if such a breach is formally established, the Council may (by qualified majority) "suspend certain of the rights" deriving from the application of the Treaties to the Member State in question, including voting rights.

It is important to note that this procedure was at no point initiated in the Austrian case since the almost uncontested view

was that Austria was not “in serious and persistent breach” of the Treaties’ basic principles. The other EU governments’ concerns were, however, that this might be the case at some point in the future, under a government including the FPÖ. Hence one crucial issue concerned the distinction between actual breaches of principles and potential future breaches. Another tricky issue involved the difference between acting against such principles as human rights in actual deed versus “only” using verbal insinuations in such directions (e.g., in electoral campaigns). There is no easy answer to these questions. In any case, such concerns seem legitimate in a close political community where the members of national governments make up the main decision-making body and can block many crucial initiatives, even unilaterally. From this perspective, reacting to the Austrian government formation made sense.

However, there are good arguments for questioning the sensibility of the specific form of reaction. Considering the EU provisions in force, it would have been a clear breach of the Treaty provisions if “EU sanctions” had been decided on against Austria. Many even thought that the Fourteen’s “bilateral” action was premature because the Union’s basic rules contain not only the clear procedures for potential sanctions outlined above, but also provisions on the respect of the national identities of the Member States (Art. E TEU), on abstaining from any measure which could jeopardize the attainment of the objectives of the Treaty (Art. 10 TEC), on the promotion of the Common Market and of solidarity between the Member States (Art. 2 TEC), and, very prominently, on non-discrimination for reasons of nationality (e.g., Art. 12 TEC).

Apart from the fact that the Fourteen’s “bilateral” measures seemed questionable, therefore, at least in the spirit of the Treaties, their design has also been harshly criticized. The Presidency, an institution of the Union and the Communities, was used to proclaim the multi-national (but not “European”) decision (on legal aspects see Pernthaler and Hilpold 2000). Strategically, the open-ended character and the lack of an exit option other than a breakdown of the Austrian center-right government was striking. Content-wise, the second measure (non-support of Austrians in international organizations) has been discussed most controversially since one of the EU’s major policies is non-discrimination on grounds of nationality. Point two of the “sanctions” could, however, affect persons who had never in their life voted for the FPÖ or who even protested against the center-right government.

The effects

As widely reported in the media, the Fourteen developed an exit strategy five months after the imposition of the “sanctions.” It should be noted that the Austrian government had threatened to seek legitimization for blocking EU reforms, in a domestic referendum. The report of three “wise persons” of 8 September criticized the FPÖ (e.g., for methods of campaigning and for intimidation of political critics via litigation in court) but confirmed the general opinion that the new government had not acted against European values. On that basis, the “sanctions” were immediately lifted without follow-up procedure or qualification.

What this episode actually meant for both Austria and the EU remains to be seen in the longer term (for a profound early analysis, see Schneider 2000). Meanwhile, the Commission president reportedly does not believe that “sanctions in this type of case can provide better results than serious, open and in-depth dialogue” (*Agence Europe* 13 July 2000) and the Portuguese Prime Minister stated that the “sanctions” had done more harm than good (*Der Standard* 23 June 2000). However, the Fourteen’s communiqué of 12 September approved that “the measures ... have been useful” but should be lifted (*Agence Europe* 14 September 2000).

In any case, it seems that the Austrian center-right government came out of this episode rather more strongly and more unified than was initially the case. This indicates that the Fourteen may, after all, not have attained their desired effect inside Austria. It is also much too early to judge if the strategy to no longer exclude the FPÖ, but rather “domesticate” it by sharing government responsibilities, will attain the goals of its protagonists. What always made this strategy seem risky is near monopolistic private ownership of certain kinds of print media that are rather open for populism, on the one hand, and predominantly state-owned TV, on the other hand, where manifold intervention pathways for the new political elite exist (and are, reportedly, being used). As to other European countries, more thorough studies are needed to clarify if the “sanctions” were useful in the fight against racist or neo-fascist movements, or if they rather furthered internal polarization and rising EU skepticism on this very issue (as the Danish “No” to the Euro suggests).

Will the measures, hastily imposed and withdrawn without any change in the Austrian government, strengthen European integration? Many have welcomed the advent of a more “political” union and of mutual concern about each other’s political representatives and values. Indeed, thoughts about the future of human rights, the basic freedoms and democracy seem timely enough—considering not only the Austrian situation but also right-wing and populist upswings in Belgium, Italy, Germany, and in some applicant states. The form and proportionality of the Fourteen’s “sanctions,” however, could easily be challenged by others, arguing that the Union must be first in respecting the procedures agreed in its basic Treaties (in the more and or less narrow sense), in furthering dialogue instead of confrontation, and in working towards non-discrimination on the grounds of nationality.

Last, but not least, it should be mentioned that the episode underlines the “new institutionalist” argument about the longevity of established political patterns. Quite obviously, nationality is even more “sticky” than it may have seemed until recently (at least to integration specialists). While those acting at the EU level actually wanted to strengthen *European* values and identity, discrimination on grounds of nationality quickly came alive once high-ranking politicians had opened the door for it. To give just a few examples, Brussels taxi drivers denied transport to Austrians; Austrian school children seemed no longer acceptable in Paris as part of a school exchange program; and Austrians

(continued on p.20)

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Conferences

January 29-30, 2001: "A Very Intergovernmental Conference?" Maastricht, Netherlands. Organized by the European Institute of Public Administration, this seminar will be conducted in English and French and will give participants insight into the background and implications of the decisions taken at Nice. For information e-mail Araceli Barragán at a.barragan@eipa-nl.com.

January 30, 2001: A Jean Monnet Seminar on "Constructing Security Partnership in Europe, Asia-Pacific and the Mediterranean," Catania, Italy. Organized by the University of Catania and The EU-China Higher Education Cooperation Programme. For experts, researchers, and doctoral students, topics include the changing nature of security and security agreements, building EU's defense policy, and more. For information visit the Web site <http://www.fscpo.unict.it/EuroMed/cjmhomeengl.htm>.

February 1-2, 2001: "Scandinavia and the EU," Seattle, WA. Sponsored by the University of Washington EU Center. For info. visit <http://jsis.artsci.washington.edu/programs/europe/euc.html>.

March 1-2, 2001: "Nice and After: Enlargement and Reform of the European Union," London, UK. Organized by the University Association for Contemporary European Studies (UACES), this conference will discuss the 2000 IGC, the new charter of fundamental rights, the reforms introduced by the Treaty of Nice, and more. Contact by e-mail admin@uaces.org.

March 29-31, 2001: "Democracy and Integration in an Enlarging Europe," New York, NY. 18th Annual Graduate Student Conference sponsored by the Institute for the Study of Europe, Columbia University. Topics may include democratization within EU institutions, EU and NATO enlargement, Europe's role in post-conflict reconstruction in the Balkans, and minority groups and development of civil society in a greater Europe. For information e-mail Elizabeth Lynch at ea141@columbia.edu.

April 20-22, 2001: "Challenges to Political Parties in Europe Since 1870: A Multidisciplinary Retrospective," Cambridge, MA. A graduate student workshop organized by the Center for European Studies at Harvard University. The conference will examine changes and constants in the continental party system since the late 19th century and suggest original approaches for examining European parties and politics. For information e-mail Lisa Eschenbach at imeschen@fas.harvard.edu.

May 11-13, 2001: "European Identity and Nationalism," New Brunswick, NJ. A multi-disciplinary graduate student conference sponsored by the Center for Russian, Central and East European Studies, Comparative Literature Department, and Political Science Department at Rutgers University. Anthropology, cultural studies, history, literature, and political science will be represented. For information e-mail crcees@rci.rutgers.edu.

Calls for Proposals

"What Moves European Integration Forward?" 5th European Conference of Sociology of the European Sociological Association, August 28-September 1, 2001, Helsinki, Finland. Papers are sought for sessions on "European Integration in the World System," and in particular on the topics of theorizing European integration, state-building in Europe, conceptualizing major trends in European integration, and European integration in light of global competition and global governance. Send paper abstracts to Patrick Ziltener by e-mail zaibat@soziologie.unizh.ch. Deadline: January 30, 2001.

"Conditions and Patterns of Governance in Historical Comparison," Conference of the Working Group on Governance in Transition of the German Political Science Association, March 30-April 1, 2001, Bonn, Germany. This conference aims to assess empirically and analytically the connections between the change in conditions for and corresponding patterns of governance, and to employ longitudinal analysis to investigate these relationships from a historical perspective. Send proposals with concrete summaries to Christoph Knill, one of the group organizers, at e-mail knill@mpp-rdg.mpg.de. Deadline: January 31, 2001.

"The State of the Union in 2001," 31st Annual Conference and 6th Research Conference of the University Association for Contemporary European Studies (UACES), September 3-5, 2001, Bristol, UK. UACES invites proposals for panels and papers on European integration or any aspect of the European Union. Proposals from post-graduate research students are particularly encouraged as are contributions from all academic disciplines. For details on the proposal process, please contact by e-mail admin@uaces.org. Deadline: February 19, 2001.

"Regionalism in the European Union," Conference of the Regionalism Policy Network of the European Union Center of Georgia, April 20, 2001, Atlanta, Georgia. This multidisciplinary conference will examine the impact of EU integration on regional patterns of political, economic, and cultural development. For more details or to send paper proposers and offers to serve as panel chair/discussant, contact William M. Downs at e-mail polwmd@panther.gsu.edu. Deadline: March 15, 2001.

ECSA invites proposals for the ECSA Poster Session to take place at our 2001 Seventh Biennial International Conference. Poster presenters will present their original research paper on any aspect of the European Union or the European integration process, by displaying a visual representation of their own design and construction that incorporates the main ideas, arguments, and supporting material of their research paper. Poster presenters must appear with the poster, and be prepared to answer questions about the work and to make a 5-minute presentation of the research upon request. For details please visit the Web page: <http://www.ecsa.org/posters01.html>. Deadline: March 15, 2001.



NETWORK OF EUROPEAN UNION CENTERS

News and Notes for Winter 2001 www.eucenters.org

➤ On December 1 the Wisconsin EU Center held a three-way transatlantic videoconference with participants from across the United States, Brussels, and Sweden. Using split-screen technology, those at physical sites in Madison, Borås, Sweden, and Brussels engaged in "A Transatlantic Labor Dialogue Videoconference: Building Closer Relations between European and American Workers." The Center holds a regional outreach event on February 12 with the Wisconsin World Trade Center in Milwaukee. Correspondent for transatlantic affairs at *Handelsblatt* in Germany, Christoph Nesshoever, will talk on "The EU and the New Economy in Europe: Implications for Transatlantic Relations." Nesshoever will also do a live Webchat to connect with business leaders and legislators.

➤ December 4: The Harvard EU Center Colloquium, "International Trade in Cultural Goods," addressed the cultural and commercial challenges to European cinema in the age of movie industry globalization. Speakers: Nick Powell, Klaus Eder and Patrice Vivancos (European Film Academy), Willie Hèlin (European Commission), Colin MacCabe (British film critic), Alexandre Saada (independent producer), Laurent Burin des Rozières (French Embassy in the U.S.), Yiannis Bacoyiannopoulos (Ministry of Culture of Greece), and others. December 5: speakers Pasquale Pasquino (CNRS, Paris) and John Ferejohn (Stanford). December 12: Andrew Moravcsik (Harvard) and Bill Friend (George Washington University) discuss the Nice Summit. January 18-19 Conference: "After Kosovo: Humanitarian Intervention at the Crossroads," organized by Peter Hall (Harvard) and Elizabeth Kiss and Robert Keohane (both of Duke).

➤ In December the North Carolina EU Center launched a new working group on the historical political economy of Western Europe. The group is co-chaired by Thomas Oatley (UNC Political Science) and Roland Stephens of neighboring North Carolina State University, and has members at several universities across the U.S. Guest speaker Layna Mosley (University of Notre Dame) launched the group with a talk on "Private Banks and Sovereign Debt in the 19th Century," followed by Caroline Fohlin (California Institute of Technology) speaking on "Financial System Development in Historical Perspective," on December 8. The group's long-term plans are to produce an edited volume of papers which will be presented at a conference in 2001.

➤ The Missouri EU Center awarded its first Certificate in European Union Studies in December. Student research during the Program's first year includes an examination of EU environmental policies in the Basque area, the development of the EU's Rapid Reaction Force and its ramifications for EU-NATO relations, and the advancement of human rights under the EU's current enlargement policies. On February 22, graduates of the Program will meet with Fraser Cameron, Head of Political and Academic Affairs for the European Commission Delegation to the U.S. Dr. Cameron will provide the keynote address to students, friends and supporters of the EU Center, as well as meet with representatives of the EU Student Organization.

➤ In December at the Pittsburgh EU Center, Hartmut Behr, University of Mainz, spoke on "Democracy in Europe: The Construction of a Political Body?" and Pascal Delisle, Georgetown University, spoke on "National Sovereignty and Monetary Integration in Europe." In January, Pascaline Winand, Université Libre de Bruxelles, gives several talks at Washington & Jefferson College, the World Affairs Council, and the University of Pittsburgh, on "Eisenhower, Kennedy, Johnson and European Integration: Will the Present be like the Past?," on the EU-U.S. relationship, and other EU topics. In February, Denis MacShane, member of the UK Parliament House of Commons, speaks on "The New Politics of the EU," and Bernd Wagner, University of Augsburg, speaks about "Eco Audits and the Firm."



NETWORK OF EUROPEAN UNION CENTERS

News and Notes for Winter 2001 www.eucenters.org

- ✧ December 12: The European Union Center in New York sponsored Andreas Nachama, Executive President of the Jewish Community in Berlin, talking on "The Rebirth of Jewish Communities in Germany and the Challenge of Xenophobia in Europe." December 14: the New York EU Center hosted George Cunningham, Head of Press and Public Affairs, Delegation of the European Commission in New York, speaking on "Enlargement of the EU after the Nice Summit." January 16: The Center sponsors its annual "State of the European Union" lecture with Richard Duque, Consul General of France, speaking. February 5: the EU Center co-sponsors a Casa Italiana event in The Future of Europe Lecture Series, with Professor Francesco Giavazzi (Università Bocconi, Italy), giving a talk entitled, "Enlarging an Unreformed Europe."
- ✧ January-February: The EU Center of Seattle's activities for winter include a conference on "The European Union and Scandinavia," taking place February 1 on the University of Washington campus. The conference brings together a prominent group of American and Scandinavian experts to examine the common challenges facing Scandinavia, the specific national debates within each country over their relationship with the European Union, and the prospects for greater collective influence within the EU since the accession of Sweden and Finland in 1995. The EU Center welcomed in January our latest group of European students studying on the Trans-Atlantic Track of the Euromasters graduate program as well as our new EU Fellow, Christopher Docksey, from the Commission's Legal Service.
- ✧ February 7-8: The European Union Center in Georgia is collaborating with the Southern Center for International Studies in hosting a "European Summit." The summit will convene former heads of state and government to discuss the future of Europe. Confirmed speakers include Valéry Giscard d'Estaing and Carl Bildt. In January, the Center launches its second Internet-based course, "Introduction to the European Union." This course is part of the Center's certificate on EU Studies in which 27 institutions of the University System of Georgia participate. The course enrollment is already fully subscribed. In mid-February, the Center will conduct its third workshop of the academic year for high school teachers, designed to inform secondary-level educators about the EU and its policies.
- ✧ February 23-24: The EU Center at Illinois is cosponsoring with the Peoria Area World Affairs Council a conference in Peoria, "European Union and the United States: Economic Superpowers." Major speakers come from the U.S. Department of Commerce and the Swedish Embassy. Panelists include Center director Larry Neal, Robert Culshaw, British Consul-General in Chicago, and Fraser Cameron from the European Commission Delegation in Washington. During the spring semester, the Center will cosponsor a weekly lecture series on globalization issues in addition to its visiting speakers for the ongoing multidisciplinary, team-taught, graduate seminar that focuses on EU-U.S. policy issues.
- ✧ Both the Claremont Colleges and the University of Southern California, consortial partners in the European Union Center of California, were independently awarded funds by the California Department of Education to create two new California International Studies Project sites: the Claremont International Studies Education Project, housed at Pitzer College (one of the Claremont Colleges), and the Center of Active Learning in International Studies at the University of Southern California. The mission of these newly created institutions is outreach to, and focused training of, K-12 Social Science educators in International Studies. The EU Center will provide the EU-focused aspect of the training curriculum. Immediate plans for cooperation include a teaching sequence on the Future of Europe, in conjunction with a joint EU Center-UCLA conference in Spring 2001.

Falkner/Austria Sanctions (continued from p.15)

were excluded from various sports and cultural events in other Member States.

At the same time, the debate on the “sanctions” was largely shaped in terms of “the outside world” against “us Austrians” in the country concerned. This served the purposes of the center-right government and many media, but even the opposition parties often seemed caught in the web of the new mainstream feeling of “national identity” which culminated when “we all” were supposed to feel happy about the lifting of the sanctions. The episode has indeed shown that despite the EU’s long-standing tradition of fighting discrimination on grounds of nationality, even the highest-ranking politicians and many citizens are once again very ready to jump on this bandwagon without sparing it too much thought.

Post scriptum: At the Nice Summit (7-11 December 2000), the EU15 decided that the Union can in the future already intervene if there is a *danger* of serious breach of Treaty principles (by addressing appropriate recommendations or setting up a Committee of Wise Persons to report on the case). That the Member State in question must be heard before this was welcomed by the Austrian government which had promoted the introduction of such an “active prevention strategy.”

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Dinan and Vanhoonacker / IGC Watch 2000 (Part 4)

(continued from p.1) played well domestically (it was one of the few issues in the IGC that attracted public attention). By contrast, the large member states’ willingness occasionally to forgo any representation on a restricted Commission, as part of an equitable rota system, suggested to some of the smaller countries that their larger counterparts wanted to weaken the Commission’s authority. Would France take seriously a Commission in which it was not represented? The deal struck at Nice maintains the formula of one Commissioner per member

state up to a ceiling of twenty-seven Commissioners/member states, with the introduction thereafter of a rota whose modalities have yet to be specified (this implicitly constitutes a Nice leftover).

The remaining Amsterdam “leftover”—the extension of qualified majority voting to areas hitherto covered by unanimity—was also unresolved as the Nice summit began. Between them, the member states were unwilling to relinquish unanimity in most areas under discussion. Britain, Ireland, and Luxembourg, for instance, refused to budge on taxation. France agreed to extend qmv in the common commercial policy, but only after winning an exemption for the audiovisual sector on the grounds of cultural protection. Altogether, about thirty areas were moved from unanimity to qmv, including a few that are not legislative. These include the selection by the European Council of the Secretary General of the Council Secretariat (who is also the High Representative for foreign and security policy) and, surprisingly, of the Commission president and the president’s proposed college of Commissioners. These changes may be more significant for the precedent they set regarding the use of qmv in the European Council than for their impact on the Council Secretariat and the Commission. Overall, the agreement reached on qmv was disappointing, but hardly surprising. After all, a process such as the IGC that allows member states to veto moves to life the veto in areas where they wish to retain the veto is unlikely to yield much success.

Closer cooperation came late onto the IGC’s agenda and was implicitly linked to the possible extension of qmv (closer cooperation would allow groups of member states, thwarted by the exercise of a national veto, to press ahead themselves in relevant policy areas). It was surprising, therefore, that closer cooperation was successfully wrapped up (with the exception of its application to defense policy) well before the Nice summit began, at a time when the extension of qmv was still up in the air. Concern about the possible impact of closer cooperation on EU cohesiveness quickly gave way in October and early November to appreciation of its potential for greater integration, to the benefit of all member states. Agreement among member states to remove the de facto national veto on closer cooperation and to permit its implementation with a minimum of eight member states proved unexpectedly easy to reach. Closer cooperation is the most intriguing element of the Nice package, both in the way that agreement on it was reached and the use to which it might be put. Governments may not have been dissembling when they claimed that they did not know exactly how closer cooperation would work. Far from providing a vehicle for the emergence of a “pioneer group” or *avant garde* (as advocated by Chirac and German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer, respectively), closer cooperation may simply facilitate movement in a variety of policy areas among groups—rather than a single group—of like-minded member states.

Other institutional changes included the raising of the ceiling of 700 members in the European Parliament (set in the Amsterdam Treaty) to 732. Despite this increase, the sizes of most national delegations of existing member states were cut (Germany’s was the notable exception) in order to facilitate the

inclusion of delegates from the acceding member states. A larger EP is likely to be even more unwieldy than the present parliament, and smaller national delegations (both absolutely and relative to the EP's new size) are unlikely to bolster the institution's appeal among national constituencies in current member states. The EP's powers remain largely unaffected by Nice, the member states having brushed aside the EP's demand that the co-decision procedure should apply to all legislative decisions taken by qmv (whether in the existing or revised treaties). The Nice Treaty finally does away with the cooperation procedure, which after Amsterdam was applicable to only four aspects of EMU decision making. In a further rebuff to the EP, member states agreed to change the decision making procedure for these four issues to consultation with the EP, not co-decision.

Was the IGC worth it? If you believe the official line, that the IGC was necessary in order to prepare the EU institutionally for enlargement, then clearly the IGC was not worthwhile. As in enlargements past, the modalities of institutional representation for the acceding states could have been decided in the accession negotiations themselves. More important, the institutional reforms agreed to in Nice will not make an enlarged EU any easier to operate, with the possible exception of the provisions for closer cooperation. Nor will the EU's institutional mechanisms be any easier for EU citizens to comprehend. The real significance of the IGC is that, having been linked explicitly to enlargement, agreement in Nice—any agreement in Nice—became politically imperative for the EU in order to signal to itself, to the applicant countries, and to the rest of the world that it was serious about accepting new members. Failure at Nice would have been a political disaster for the EU.

Short of a root and branch treaty-based reform—a political impossibility in the EU—the key to improving the EU's functionality during and after enlargement is large-scale internal institutional reform. This is already underway, but is progressing slowly. It began in the Commission after the Santer resignation crisis in early 1999. It began at about the same time in the Council, when member states finally confronted the Council's manifest procedural problems. A short passage in the Nice Presidency conclusions calling for an acceleration of internal reform, as well as two reports presented to the Nice European Council—a Commission report entitled "Better Lawmaking 2000" and a joint Presidency-Council Secretariat paper on making the codecision procedure more effective—are arguably as significant for the manageability of the EU after enlargement as are the institutional innovations in the Nice Treaty.

The IGC, and especially the Nice summit, provided plenty of evidence of member states behaving badly. The large member states, in particular, seemed to be ganging up on the smaller ones. This raised the specter of rampant intergovernmentalism in the EU, and of a small clique of large countries seizing political control. This is a misleading impression. First of all, IGCs are by definition intergovernmental and member states should be expected to behave accordingly. Second, the real reason for the IGC was to strengthen the voting power of the larger member states to compensate them for the relative loss of their voting power as a result of enlargements past and in anticipation of

enlargements future. In return, the larger member states agreed to give up their second Commissioner. This was the bargain struck in the closing hours of the Amsterdam summit in June 1997 and publicly proclaimed in protocol number seven of the Amsterdam Treaty.

The large member states have been duly compensated, perhaps not as much as they would have liked or perhaps more than the smaller member states would have liked. Either way, this does not presage the end of the "Community method." For a variety of reasons unrelated to IGCs, the institutions' roles are constantly changing in the EU system. In some areas the role of a particular institution may be strengthening, in others weakening. In as much as it describes the triangular relationship between the Council, Commission, and EP, the Community method is dynamic, not static. Any observation of it should also take into account the growing importance of the European Council, an institution that, because of the Commission president's participation in it (remember Jacques Delors' triumphs in the European Council?) and because of the Nice Treaty's introduction of qmv into its deliberations, is by no means strictly intergovernmental.

Who knows what the EU will look like in 2004, at the time of the next IGC. The Nice conclusions contained a "soft" political commitment to enlargement by that time, although everything depends on how the accession negotiations proceed. The Nice Treaty should be ratified within two years. Given that enlargement was the rationale for the treaty, and that to oppose enlargement is tantamount to being unEuropean (whatever one's position on the EU itself), it is unlikely that there will be noteworthy public or parliamentary opposition to ratification in the member states (despite the unpopularity of enlargement). Nor is it likely that the EP will block the treaty, which it could attempt to do politically (through an alliance with the Belgian and Italian governments) but not legally. There is a risk that Euroskeptics will try to block ratification of the Nice Treaty as a means of derailing preparations for the 2004 IGC, which are due to begin with preliminary reports during the forthcoming Swedish and Belgian presidencies. Although Euroskeptics should favor an IGC that will deal largely with subsidiarity, they are extremely wary of the "Fischer factor"—the possibility that the more integrationist member states will use the next IGC to advance Euro-federalism. In order to ensure smooth ratification of the Nice Treaty, therefore, there will likely be an absence of Fischer-like meditations on Europe's future for the next couple of years. Only then will the "post-Nice" debate about a possible *finalité politique*, a debate begun several months before the Nice summit, resume in earnest.

The draft Treaty of Nice is available on the Web site of the Council Secretariat, <http://ue.eu.int/cig/nice/>.

Desmond Dinan is Associate Professor, School of Public Policy, George Mason University. Sophie Vanhoonacker is Senior Lecturer, European Institute of Public Administration, Maastricht.

ECSA News and Notes

We are delighted to announce the slate of candidates (below) for **ECSA's 2001 Executive Committee election**. The Executive Committee oversees Association programs and activities and is elected by the membership every other year. Current ECSA members will soon receive, via regular mail, ballots and brief biographies of the candidates, and the ballots must be *received* by the ECSA office by April 1, 2001 to be included in the final count. ECSA members must return the original ballot by regular mail only, and replacement ballots will not be supplied for any reason. The new Executive Committee will be seated in office at ECSA's Seventh International Conference in Madison, Wisconsin (May 31-June 2, 2001). The candidates are:

Karen J. Alter (Northwestern University)
Christopher J. Anderson (Binghamton University)
Jeffrey J. Anderson (Brown University)
Stephanie B. Anderson (Dickinson College)
George A. Bermann (Columbia Law School)
Robert R. Geyer (University of Liverpool, UK)
Mark Hallerberg (University of Pittsburgh)
M. Donald Hancock (Vanderbilt University)
Peter H. Loedel (West Chester University)
Colette Mazzucelli (EastWest Institute)
Anand Menon (University of Oxford, UK)
Sofía A. Pérez (Boston University)
Mark Pollack (University of Wisconsin Madison)
George Ross (Brandeis University)
Martin Schain (New York University)
Mitchell P. Smith (University of Oklahoma)
James Walsh (University of North Carolina Charlotte)
Katja Weber (Georgia Institute of Technology)

Confused about **ECSA's mailing address**? In July 2000 we moved from Room 405 to Room 415 in the same building. Our mail comes to a locked box on the first floor and is not affected. As prudent stewards of your membership dues, we are using up stationery and other supplies, and printing materials with the new room number as supplies run out. Things printed before July bear our old room number; things printed afterward, the new. Please make a note of our new room number. Thank you!

Keep in touch with our Seventh Biennial International Conference Web pages at <http://www.ecsa.org/conf2001.html>. You'll find full details about the conference: the provisional program, an on-line registration form, the poster session, the designated conference hotel, travel to and around the Madison, Wisconsin, area, and more. Please note that this year the early registration deadline is **April 1, 2001**, and that participants wishing to be included in the final printed program must register by that date. Conference registration fees are non-refundable. We've included a registration form with this *ECSA Review*. See you in Madison!

From the Chair

THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY STUDIES ASSOCIATION is pleased to announce the fifth volume in its book series, *The State of the European Union*, just published by Oxford University Press. (The series was launched in 1991 as *The State of the European Community* and the first four volumes were published by Lynne Rienner Publishers in Boulder, Colorado.) Volume 5, *Risks, Reforms, Resistance, and Revival*, offers insightful essays on current questions in EU studies, and our hope is that instructors will use the paperback edition in their classrooms. See p.16 in this issue for a list of the authors and titles of the nineteen essays included, along with ordering details. I would like to thank co-editors Maria Green Cowles and Michael Smith for the work and dedication that made this fifth volume in the series possible, and the essay authors for their invaluable contributions.

In other ECSA activities, the Executive Committee is seeking scholars and teachers to help organize and launch ECSA interest sections on the EU and specific countries or regions. Examples might be (but are not limited to) the EU and Scandinavia, the EU and the small democracies, the EU and Italy (or France, Germany, UK ...), the EU and Asia. In our 1998 ECSA member survey, respondents indicated a strong interest in such sections. Our first two interest sections (on EU law and EU political economy) will be meeting at the 2001 ECSA Conference. We'd like to see other sections get launched in time to meet there, too. Any ECSA member who would like to be involved in organizing a country or regional interest section, please send a brief e-mail to the ECSA office at ecsa@pitt.edu with your idea. We'll try to connect you to another scholar who could co-organize with you. You should also check out the existing interest sections' information on the ECSA Web site, along with the statement you'll find there about our interest section policies.

This spring is the time for our biennial Executive Committee election. Please note the impressive slate of candidates (left column of this page). We appreciate all who took the time to nominate candidates and all who gamely agreed to run. The seven Executive Committee members serve very important roles in overseeing the programs and activities of the Association. And their work is entirely voluntary, another reason to thank them. Current ECSA members will receive ballots by regular mail.

Finally, as ECSA begins its fourteenth year of operations and continues to work toward both solid financial ground and independence, I would like to thank those generous ECSA members who made contributions to our Grants and Scholarships Fund or our Endowment Fund (or both) during the past year. (A complete list of 2000 donors appears on p.12.) We continue to seek contributions for those funds and to diversify our sources of support. We are happy to announce that we will award our first ECSA-funded, small travel grants for some graduate students to attend the ECSA Conference. Details will be forthcoming on the ECSA Web site and the e-mail List Serve.

VIVIEN A. SCHMIDT
Boston University

ECSA Review

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Inside the Winter 2001 *ECSA Review*:

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Founded in 1988, ECSA is a non-profit academic and professional organization dedicated to the exchange of information and ideas on European Union affairs. ECSA coordinates the Network of European Union Centers in the United States.

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Information and ideas on the European Union



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