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**EUSA
REVIEW**

EUSA Review Forum

The Rise and Rise of the Stability and Growth Pact
Amy Verdun

**The EMU Stability and Growth Pact: Is it Dead?
If So, Does it Matter ?**

IN DECEMBER 2004, the new Barroso Commission brought the saga of the French and German infringements of the Stability and Growth Pact to a close by lifting the “excessive deficit” procedure launched in 2003. That same month, the Commission launched infringement proceedings against Greece that has been providing inaccurate public deficit statistics since the creation of the Pact in 1997. The new head of the Commission also declared that there would be no major overhaul of the Pact. In the November 2003 crisis, when the Council suspended the implementation of the Pact at a time France and Germany overshot its deficit ceiling, most observers called the Pact dead and many rejoiced since the Stability and Growth Pact had come under heavy criticism for some time.

A year after, we asked four leading scholars that have studied monetary integration: have news of the death of the Stability and Growth pact been grossly exaggerated? Should it be resuscitated? Why or why not? Amy Verdun and Nicolas Jabko argue that the Pact will survive for lack of an alternative able to gather the support of a large bipartisan cross-national coalition. Henrik Enderlein then argues that the pact should not be fixed but broken. Finally, Andrew Martin explains why the real problem does not so much lie with the Pact per se, but instead with the philosophy behind the EMU policy mix (restrictive fiscal and monetary policies). It creates vicious circles: By keeping economic growth too low the European central bank retarded the expansion of public revenue, making it more difficult to meet the Pact requirements.

-Virginie Guiraudon, EUSA Forum Editor

DURING THE CREATION OF ECONOMIC AND MONETARY UNION (EMU) in the European Union (EU) it was prophesized many times that the single currency would never happen, and if it did, that it was doomed to fail (the “rise and fall” of EMU). It has often been argued that the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) will likely lead a similar life. However, it is my view that the SGP might lead the same life as the euro: strengthening when many believe it will not be a success. Hence: the rise and rise of the SGP.

First conceived in 1995 by Theo Waigel, the SGP was eventually agreed to at the June 1997 Amsterdam Summit by all fifteen Member States (in the form of two Council regulations 1466/97 and 1467/97 and a European Council resolution 97/C 236/01). The main idea was to make sure that Member States would continue keeping their budgetary deficits under control after having entered EMU. The Treaty on European Union (TEU) or Maastricht Treaty (1992) stipulates that Member States should avoid excessive deficits which are defined in a protocol to the Treaty as budgetary deficits not exceeding three per cent of Gross Domestic Product (GDP). Yet, the Treaty does not spell out in detail how this aim is to be achieved or what to do if these excessive deficits exist. In fact, it speaks about possible sanctions, but contains only a very rudimentary version of the excessive deficit procedure.

The SGP was created in the wake of the Maastricht Treaty. It should come as no surprise that the Germans were the most concerned about possible fiscal profligacy once the euro would have been introduced. It was the Germans who were leading the pack in the two decades prior to the signing of the Maastricht Treaty that spelled out the road to EMU. They were also the ones who would lose the most if EMU turned out to be less successful than they hoped for. The Germans saw their stable and strong deutschmark as a point of national pride, indeed national culture (referred to as ‘stability culture’) which secured low inflation following currency insecurity in Germany in the (*continued on p. 3*)

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415 Bellefield Hall

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From the Chair

George Ross

THERE CAN BE NO REST FOR WEARY EU SCHOLARS. Ratification of the Constitutional Treaty is moving forward, with prospects in France, Denmark and the UK less than clear. The Barroso Commission, after the Buttiglione episode, is off to a halting start amidst harsh opposition to the Bolkestein Directive on the Free Movement of Services. Turkey is now on track for accession, causing considerable controversy across the continent, even if this track is certain to be long and fraught with uncertainty. In all this the fact that important progress toward a larger EU foreign and security policy role has been made in the Ukrainian and Iran nuclear arms crises, not to speak of EU takeover from NATO in Bosnia, cannot be overlooked. The Union is ever more complex and changing, making our jobs more difficult, but so interesting.

How interesting will become clear at the 9th Biennial European Union Studies Association in Austin (March 31-April 2, 2005). Planning for the Conference is almost complete, under the very able leadership of Mark Pollack (Temple University). The Program Committee has assembled a first rate, diverse set of over 90 panels that reflect the broadening and deepening of our field. Among the exciting events planned for Austin will be the address by Professor Eric Stein (University of Michigan), the recipient of the EUSA Award for Lifetime Contribution to the Field. Professor Stein was a pioneer and remains a leader in the study of EU Law, a vitally important area for all of us. In addition, the University of Texas - Austin, will generously host a conference reception on their campus.

In other Association business, this month all current EUSA members will receive by mail the ballot for the election of new members to the EUSA Executive Committee. Please be sure to cast your vote for these important positions to the body that makes policy decisions and oversees the programs of the European Union Studies Association. Four current board members - John T. S. Keeler, Grainne De Burca, Virginie Guiraudon, and Sophie Meunier - will be continuing (they have 2003-2007 terms), and the three new ones elected this spring will serve from 2005-2009. Good luck to everyone and see you all in Austin.

GEORGE ROSS
Brandeis University

first half of the 20th century and indeed in the rest of Europe throughout the 1980s and 1990s. They were the trendsetters in monetary policy – a policy that was followed unquestioned by the national central banks of the other countries that participated in the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) of the European Monetary System (EMS). The Germans were most concerned about possible increases in inflation once the euro was introduced and the risk of ‘free riding’ when some Member States would run high budgetary deficits.

The governments these Member States would be borrowing funds in a market that was now open to all and not paying the same price for these funds as they would have had they stayed outside EMU. The excessive borrowing could bring about inflation and interest rates which would be covered by all Member States, but could be benefiting only the countries that were borrowing excessively (or running an excessive deficit). Without the corrective mechanisms of devaluations or significantly higher interest rates for national governments with higher debt or deficit ratios, the cost would be carried by all. It was clear that if the Germans were dissatisfied with the EMU regime, the move to stage three of EMU, and thereby the eventual introduction of the euro, might be at risk.

The Germans did, however, voice a concern that others shared, although no one was clear from the outset how to go about arranging a good system to avoid excessive deficits. The German government was keen to have strict rules and, for the sake of credibility, have sanctions be applied automatically. They did not trust politicians to be able to take this decision as they would succumb to time inconsistency. The French by contrast were not keen on automatic rules but rather wanted Member State governments to retain political control over the process. The other Member States acquiesced to having the Germans and the French sort out their differences between themselves as they represented the two dominant views among the Member States. The end-result was a compromise package that had some degree of automaticity but still left a few moments of decision-making to the Member States (Ecofin).

When the SGP was first created the general feeling was that it was a rather strange policy. It was the first that would penalize Member States that badly if they indeed went overboard (as stated in the Council regulation No 1467/97, the sanction would be equal to 0.2 % of GDP, and a variable component equal to one tenth of the difference between the deficit as a percentage of GDP in the preceding year and the reference value of 3 % of GDP). Though it had preventive measures as well (surveillance, economic coordination of policies, and an early warning mechanism)

the SGP was generally seen as a stick (as opposed to a ‘carrot’) or as some daringly said ‘an atomic bomb’. It was to scare governments away from certain deviant behavior (fiscal profligacy), but it did not offer many real carrots (incentives/rewards/encouragement) for ‘good behavior’. The stick-no-carrot problem is at the heart of the problems surrounding the SGP. Another problem was that it assumed the longevity of government. In fact, many of the national governments in office in the late 1990s should have made some cut-backs when the times were good, in order to be in a good position to spend more (or collect fewer taxes) when the times were bad. This behavior did not occur, notably in France and Germany during the upturn of 1999/2000. Furthermore, the SGP was aimed at simple rules that could be understood by all. So rather than complicated calculations about how to calculate an excessive deficit based on what the government might be spending the money on (e.g. investment versus consumptive expenditures) was not taken into account. The aim, again, was clarity, not necessarily any other indicator.¹

The SGP came under attack when it became clear that if the excessive deficit procedure (EDP) were to be applied it would require that governments, of France and Germany for example, pursue ‘counter-cyclical’ policies; they would have to tax more and spend less in an economic downturn. An economic adviser would recommend that governments do exactly the opposite. This phenomenon then drew criticism to the SGP. The clashing point came when France and Germany managed to hold the Pact in abeyance when the Ecofin Council of 25 November 2003 decided not to move to the next stage of the excessive deficit procedure (there was no ‘qualified majority’ to carry through that decision). At this point most newspapers declared the SGP dead.

Today, a year later, we find that the SGP is still on the agenda. Noises are being made about making the SGP more intelligent, trying to increase the number of carrots, possibly examining the golden rule of finance or the question of whether deficits are being used to pay for investment rather than consumptive expenditures. All these suggestions of reform have not been settled, but various options are being considered.

What will happen? The official parlance is that the implementation of the Pact should be improved while keeping legal changes to a necessary minimum. In my view, EU leaders will find a compromise that keeps the spirit of the SGP intact, but that gives the Member States more incentives to perform well in the run up to creating a possible deficit (hence avoiding their creation). Why would they do that?

First, no one is against the idea that one should constrain fiscal profligacy. Second, 25 November 2003 was not a pretty day for EU integration. It seemed a clear case of larger Member States getting their way whereas smaller Member States could never have pulled the same stunt. The question of equality and respect for the rules (the same for all) was at stake. If at all possible, the Member States will try to get rid of the impression that larger Member States are able to 'bully' the smaller ones. Third, not having any rules at all might undermine EMU – which is an important economic and politically crucial symbol of successful European integration. No one wants to risk the collapse of EMU. Fourth, avoiding excessive deficits also implicitly means creating a buffer that can be used to deal with the issue of shortages in some Member States' government savings that need to be filled to pay out an annually larger amount of pensions as a result of demographic changes. Fifth, every Finance Minister has an interest in a constraint that can be instrumental in her interaction with the spending ministries at the national and subnational levels. Thus for all these reasons it seems to me that the SGP is here to stay – regardless of what the critics say. We will not see the rise and fall of the SGP, but rather the rise and rise of the Pact.

Amy Verdun is Jean Monnet Chair and Associate Professor in the Department of Political Science at the University of Victoria, Canada.

No Immediate Death, but More Headaches to Come

Nicolas Jabko

AS THE NEW EUROPEAN COMMISSION and the recently appointed chair of the group of euro area finance ministers get down to work, the reform of the Stability and Growth Pact is once again the talk of the town in Brussels. This a sensitive political issue because of the bruising memories of the November 2003 crisis, when Germany and France overshot the budget deficit ceiling of the Pact and the Council agreed to suspend its implementation against the opinion of the Commission. EU officials are now scrambling to come up with a way to mend the Pact, so as to avoid a repetition of this kind of crisis in the near future. Contrary to what many observers said a year ago, nobody in official EU circles seems ready to pronounce the Pact dead. Yet nobody has a miracle reform solution either.

At first glance, it is not easy to grasp why the task of reforming the Pact should be so difficult. The Pact was established in 1997 in order to ensure a certain level of

fiscal discipline in the European Union and thus buttress the credibility of Europe's new currency. It was supposed to prevent member states from free riding on their neighbors by running high budget deficits. In a monetary union, fiscal profligacy entails a collective risk of inflationary pressures, higher interest rates, or even the demise of the new currency. Everybody in the EU agrees that this kind of behavior should not be allowed. Everybody also agrees that a reasonable balance must be found between the need for commonly agreed rules and member states' understandable reluctance to run economic policies on automatic pilot. What is the big fuss about reforming the Pact, then?

The fact is that a reform of the Pact raises much bigger issues than the technical problem of improving the current set of rules. At stake in this reform is a fundamental tension between two opposite sets of motivations upon which the euro was built.² For a first group of actors, the euro meant carried the promise of more *orthodoxy* in economic policy-making. This neo-liberal dimension of EMU has been described as a delayed European reaction to the inflationary economic recession of the 1970s.³ From this perspective, it is important to see that the Pact was more than just a way of dealing with the free rider problem. It was also the last piece in a framework of Economic and Monetary Union that essentially enshrined Germany's stability-oriented model in EU law. Before the Pact was adopted in 1997, the 1992 Maastricht Treaty already provided for an independent European Central Bank focused on the fight against inflation and for an elaborate mechanism of multilateral surveillance designed to check governments' tendencies to overspend. This orthodox vision of Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) had a strong political support. A Europe-wide elite coalition fought for an EMU that would prioritize the fight against inflation and rein in government spending. In particular, German central bankers and government officials accepted to sacrifice the deutsche mark on the altar of European unity only on condition that the ECB look as much as possible like the German Bundesbank. The Germans were not alone, since many politicians and officials outside Germany were also in favor of more discipline in public spending. On the whole, the partisan preferences of fiscal conservatives in Germany and in other European governments converged with the bureaucratic preferences of central bankers and financial officials all across the EU.

Today, this coalition is still very much alive and has even become stronger, in a sense, with the institutionalization of the orthodox vision behind the euro. The flag-bearers of economic orthodoxy are not always the same as in the mid-1990s – they are less likely these days to hold a German

than a Dutch or even a Spanish passport. But orthodoxy has many natural supporters. The European Central Bank is a vocal opponent of any weakening of the Pact. All other things being equal, this is also often the case for conservative politicians as well as finance ministry officials. For ideological or bureaucratic reasons, both groups would generally like to see more discipline in government spending and consider the Pact as a last line of defense against government profligacy.

On the other side of the fence, a second group of actors ascribes a completely different meaning to the euro. Even though this is sometimes forgotten today, the appeal of *sovereignty* played an important role in the late 1980s and early 1990s and, in a sense, it remains powerful today. Even at the time when EMU and the Stability Pact were introduced, not everyone in Europe had fallen in love with fiscal conservatism and low inflation. Many actors simply agreed to at least pay lip service to these policies. They accepted the stick of orthodox policies only because it came alongside the carrot of the euro. With the growing international mobility of capital, the European Monetary System of quasi-fixed exchange rates had become politically very problematic for countries like France and Italy. In effect, the Bundesbank was making monetary policy for the entire European continent, and government policies were subject to the enormous pressure of currency speculators.

Just like there was a coalition in favor of orthodoxy behind the drive for the euro, then, there was also a coalition in favor of EMU as a way to reassert sovereignty. For this second coalition, the euro opened the way for governments to regain some degree of freedom in an increasingly global economy. The actors who pushed for monetary union, especially in France and Italy, saw it as a way to challenge the hegemony of the German central bank and of the markets. Many politicians – and their voters – saw the status quo as politically unacceptable because it involved an obvious subordination to Germany and to the markets. Unless we take into account this category of motivations, it is impossible to understand why EMU became such a high political priority for these countries in the late 1980s.

This sovereignty-oriented vision of EMU still has some currency today. Of course, sovereignty in a strict sense is now somewhat beside the point with the advent of the euro. The management of the new currency has been delegated to the European Central Bank at the EU level. But this has not meant the disappearance of the old sovereignty-seeking political coalition altogether. The euro now serves as a shield for member government policies against currency crises. While governments are constrained by the rules of the Pact, they are in a much better position to assert their pre-

rogatives over fiscal policy today than when they faced the threat of market speculation within the European Monetary System. Now that the euro exists and that it can no longer be seen as a carrot, governments are understandably reluctant to accept the rigid stick of the Growth and Stability Pact.

In sum, the contradictory political aspirations that motivated the creation of the euro are resurfacing today in the context of the debate on the Stability and Growth Pact. The political vision that fuelled the euro in the 1980s-90s was successful because it offered something to everybody – to the Germans and to the French, to the Right and to the Left, to the bankers and to the politicians. Today, the successors of these two coalitions support the two opposite political agendas of budget consolidation and national fiscal autonomy. In reforming the Pact, therefore, the difficulty today is not merely to strike a “reasonable” balance between two legitimate concerns. Perhaps more importantly, any reform of the Pact has to strike a *political* balance between two coalitions and their agendas. Yet the problem is that the EU is not an electoral arena where two coalitions could clearly articulate their preferred reforms and let the people have the last word. So for the time being, the most likely outcome is a dilatory reform that will keep the lid over the dispute without really addressing it. EU officials may find a way to patch up the Stability and Growth Pact, but the underlying contest between political visions will undoubtedly resurface in the future.

Nicolas Jabko is National Foundation for Political Science Research Fellow at the CERi in Paris, France.

The Stability and Growth Pact is Broken?

Don't Fix it!

Henrik Enderlein

The discussion on the SGP raises two types of problems: one of economic effectiveness and one of democratic legitimacy. As I will argue, both aspects are closely linked and their combination implies that the EU might be best advised to completely abolish the SGP.⁴ From the perspective of economic effectiveness, the conduct of domestic fiscal policies in a monetary union is subject to two largely opposite requirements.

First, there are good reasons to limit member states' freedom of action. Since monetary policy in a currency union cannot react to inappropriate fiscal policies in single member states by ‘punishing’ individual governments through an increase of interest rates, some countries might try to free-

ride on the stability-oriented policy of their peers. Such free-riding is generally looked at from the perspective of deficits: countries might be tempted to run higher deficits, knowing that they will still benefit from relatively low interests. There is however a second perspective, which is often overlooked: countries with high inflation rates and high growth rates may be tempted to free-ride on low inflation rates in low growth countries by limiting their efforts to cool down the domestic economy. The discussion on Ireland's unwillingness to run a sufficiently large surplus in 1999/2000 nicely illustrates that point. In sum: there is an important rationale in a monetary union to constrain domestic fiscal choices in order to prevent collective action problems.

Second, there are good arguments to grant member states full discretion over their domestic fiscal choices. The main reason is that in a monetary union the importance of the use of fiscal policies as stabilizing instruments increases. The ECB has decided to derive its interest rates from average data of the euro area as a whole ('one size fits all'). It follows that the single interest rate does not necessarily correspond to the needs of every domestic economy: real interest rates may be too high for some countries (e.g. Germany) but too low for others (e.g. Ireland, Spain, and the Netherlands). Against this background, domestic fiscal policies can become key instruments in cyclical stabilization. High real interest countries should run deficits to offset the dampening effect of the ECB's policy, whereas low interest countries should run surpluses to prevent cyclical overheating.

When the SGP was initially discussed in 1996, the focus was almost exclusively on the deficit aspect of the collective action problem. Neither inflationary free-riding by high-growth countries nor domestic stabilization was given much attention. At that time, most economists argued that growth and inflation differentials across EMU would disappear automatically as a consequence of increased trade: low inflation countries facing relatively high real interest rates would become more competitive and thus benefit from growth through trade. Unfortunately, this mechanism (which focuses on the so-called real exchange rate effect) has not worked in practice. As recent studies indicate (see for example Chapter 4 in this fall's *World Economic Outlook* of the IMF), the destabilizing real interest rate effect is dominant in comparison to the stabilizing real exchange rate effect. The reason is that large parts of growth in European economies are still generated by non-traded goods.

Today, an ideal framework for fiscal policy-making in EMU should seek to incorporate all elements of economic effectiveness: it should prevent collective action problems

while allowing for appropriate fiscal stabilization in the domestic economies. While it might be technically possible to devise such frameworks, they would however suffer from a considerable lack of democratic legitimacy.

A first approach could be to fully transfer the decision-making authority over domestic fiscal stances to the European level. This would amount to establishing prescriptive and binding fiscal targets for each member state. It is straightforward to see why such an approach would face a problem of democratic legitimacy. Decisions on national fiscal stances, their financing, and their inter-temporal implications (e.g. inter-generational distribution) are at the very core of government's prerogatives and should only in very extreme cases be separated from direct electoral choice. It is unlikely that voters would accept binding fiscal prescriptions from EU bodies – they might remember the aphorism 'no taxation without representation'. Moreover, the enforcement of such rules would certainly prove difficult.

A second approach could be a shift to a full-fledged system of fiscal federalism. The EU budget, which currently amounts to roughly one percent of the EU Gross Domestic Product, would have to grow dramatically and would have to include some redistributive mechanism that would ensure that surplus-money from the fastest growing Member States be used to compensate low inflation and low growth countries. This solution, which to some extent exists in the US and also in Germany, might have some appeal but looks unrealistic at the present juncture (or could you imagine Ireland wiring money to Germany?). Fiscal federalism in Europe could be a long-term target but not a short-term solution.

Against this background a third approach might work best. It would be based on the assumption that the euro area would be better off in a framework without sanctions and enforcement, i.e. without a rule-based approach to fiscal discipline. Authority over domestic fiscal choices would be fully returned to the Member States.

What could such a solution look like? The present Article 104 on the Excessive Deficit Procedure would have to be amended, as well as secondary legislation on the SGP. In principle, both sets of instruments could be scrapped. Article 99 on the Broad Economic Policy Guidelines would remain in place. Its soft provisions, based on the clause that 'Member States shall treat their economic policies as a matter of common concern', would continue to set out non-binding requirements on the appropriate conduct of fiscal policies. Yet Member States would ultimately retain their full autonomy to go against such recommendations. The framework would fully rely upon peer and public pressure.

The main benefit of abolishing the SGP would be to return full political ownership of fiscal decisions to Member States. As explained above, decisions on deficits and surpluses are of a fundamentally political nature. EU institutions should be allowed to issue recommendations and should to defend these in public discourse. However, Member States should be allowed to disagree, giving national politics the last word in the procedure.

I would argue that such a framework could strengthen the democratic legitimacy of fiscal policies in EMU. Should single Member States feel the need to submit themselves to some kind of technocratic guidance, they could still decide to do so at the national level. Belgium, for example, has delegated significant power over the fiscal stance to the independent national *Conseil Supérieur des Finances*.

Experiences in the US and Canada show that such an approach might work. Neither of the two countries has established a rule-based deficit control mechanism for states and provinces, although some US states and Canadian provinces have balanced budget rules. Both federal systems trust market forces to adjust borrowing costs and there are no recent examples of state or provincial government default in either of the two countries. It is true that several states and provinces are accumulating excessive debts, yet as the recent example of California shows, voters might ultimately favor fiscal restraint over the risk of debt default.

It is quite unlikely that any rule-based framework at the European level would succeed in establishing the right incentive structure to cope simultaneously with domestic stabilization and the avoidance of free-riding. Instead of trying to square the circle, the responsible actors in EMU might be better off by scrapping the SGP and putting more emphasis on peer-pressure. This approach might look radical in its formal implications, in practice however it could function more effectively than a badly reformed SGP.

Henrik Enderlein is assistant professor of economics at the Free University of Berlin, Germany.

Blame the ECB, Not the Stability and Growth Pact *Andrew Martin*

The Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) isn't the problem in the EMU macroeconomic policy regime, or at least not the main problem. The main problem, from which the SGP controversy distracts attention, is the European Central Bank's (ECB) excessively restrictive policy orientation.⁵

There is plenty wrong with the SGP — the arbitrariness of the 3 percent rule, the consequent pro-cyclical tenden-

cies, and the insufficient room for maneuver it allows to countries, such as Germany, where the one-size-fits all monetary policy is particularly restrictive, etc. — which other Forum contributors will undoubtedly discuss. But the objective of fiscal discipline which the SGP so clumsily and rigidly pursues is not wrong. A good case can be made for budget balances over the cycle, implying surpluses during expansions as well as deficits during recessions, providing that there is ample scope for automatic (and even discretionary) stabilizers and also for public investment (in human as well as physical capital), and, in the EMU context, coordination of national fiscal policies to achieve a eurozone fiscal stance consistent with a growth-promoting eurozone monetary policy.

The catch is that the ECB's monetary policy is not growth-promoting, despite its claim that single-mindedly pursuing price stability, as the ECB unilaterally defines it, is the best, and only, thing the bank can do to promote growth. Even as it stands, the SGP would pose less of a problem if the ECB's monetary policy were not so restrictive. By keeping growth too low — aborting the late 1990s growth spurt and subsequently easing policy too little and too late as world growth slowed — the ECB retarded revenue growth while social policy burdens rose, making it much more difficult to meet the SGP's requirements than it would otherwise be. The SGP can thus be evaluated only as part of the overall EMU policy mix that perversely combines restrictive fiscal policy with restrictive monetary policy.

The proposition that the ECB is excessively restrictive rests partly on the following argument (overlooked in conventional wisdom on the ECB). After an extended period of disinflation like Europe's in which policy has kept growth below its potential and unemployment high, an extended period of economic growth above its long-run potential — a sustained growth spurt — is necessary in order to bring unemployment back down to pre-disinflation levels. Comparison of policies that permitted and prevented such growth spurts in the 1980s and 1990s shows that policies that prevented growth spurts at the cost of continued high unemployment did not achieve lower inflation over the long run (8-10 years) than policies that allowed them and achieved lower unemployment. Although growth spurts were accompanied by increased inflation, it proved temporary, so that lower unemployment was not achieved at the cost of higher inflation over the long run than where monetary policy prevented growth spurts to avert even temporary inflation increases. Thus, the price in unemployment that the ECB exacts for price stability is an unnecessary one. The comparison also shows that it is primarily these differences

in macroeconomic policy rather than labor market rigidities, as claimed by the ECB, that explain inter-country variations in unemployment.

So the main thing wrong with the EMU policy regime is the ECB's failure to pursue growth-promoting monetary policy. Fixing that would make it easier to fix what's wrong with the SGP. The single monetary policy is inevitably too tight for some countries and too loose for others, which is why they need fiscal policy flexibility to adjust the policy mix to their diverse conditions. In countries for which the single monetary policy is too tight, it is especially difficult politically, possibly suicidal, to comply with fiscal discipline rules. This could often be true even if the rules were made more flexible, as would most SGP reform proposals, as long as fiscal policy was left to accelerate growth while monetary policy kept the brakes on. With the brakes off, or pressed more lightly, fiscal discipline would be as or more necessary but also more compatible with growth and thus more politically sustainable.

This more rational policy mix requires that the ECB accept responsibility for growth and employment as well as price stability, as in the American Federal Reserve Bank's dual mandate. It is difficult to give the ECB a similar mandate by changing the Treaty because of the need for unanimity. But it seems legally unnecessary. Free to interpret its mandate as it sees fit, the ECB could easily set a less restrictive inflation target and more genuinely "support" the other Community economic goals including a "high level of employment," as Articles 2 and 105 prescribe.

Fiscal discipline would then have to be reconfigured. While member states would get more scope for adjustment to their diverse conditions, their fiscal policies would have to be coordinated so that they add up to an overall euro zone fiscal stance that, combined with a more expansionary monetary stance, gives the euro zone a macroeconomic policy mix aimed at growth as well as reasonably low inflation. At a minimum, such coordination would require shifting the focus of the Broad Economic Policy Guidelines to the euro zone policy mix, including monetary as well as fiscal policy. This would, in turn, require the ECB to negotiate with the Commission and the Euro Group in Ecofin about the respective policy stances to be implemented. In other words, the ECB would have to abandon its insistence that even discussion of monetary policy by such other bodies, not to speak of "ex ante coordination of macroeconomic policy between other bodies and the ECB," is an unacceptable infringement on its independence.

This would be a step toward the *gouvernement économique* the French have called for, although further

steps might well be necessary. All this is doable without difficult Treaty revision. But changing the ECB's policy orientation and operating mode would probably be as difficult. It might not be possible to fix the SGP and the EMU macroeconomic policy regime of which it is a part in the absence of an economic crisis severe enough to make Treaty revision politically possible. But then it might be too late.

Andrew Martin is Research Affiliate at the Center for European Studies of Harvard University

Endnotes

¹ Martin Heipertz and Amy Verdun (2004) "The Dog that Would Never Bite? On the Origins of the Stability and Growth Pact" *Journal of European Public Policy* 11(5): 773-88.

² For a detailed historical account of EMU, see Kenneth Dyson and Kevin Featherstone, *The Road to Maastricht* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999). For more details on the two broad political coalitions that fuelled EMU, I refer to my 1999 article "In the name of the market" *Journal of European Public Policy* 6 (3): 475 – 495.

³ See especially Kathleen R. McNamara, *The Currency of Ideas* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1998).

⁴ This article is based on Henrik Enderlein (2004) "Break It, Don't Fix It!" *Journal of Common Market Policy*, 42(5): 1309-1046.

⁵ I spell out the argument in chapter 2 of Andrew Martin and George Ross, eds., *Euros and Europeans: Monetary Integration and the European Model of Society* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004).

EUSA Interest Sections

The European Union Studies Association now has seven active interest sections based on members' areas of special interest in European integration: EU Law; EU Political Economy; Teaching the EU; EU Latin America Caribbean; EU Economics; EU Public Opinion and Participation; and EU as Global Actor. Each section has its own Web pages (with syllabi banks, textbook lists, and more) and e-mail distribution list, and all will hold business meetings at the EUSA Conference in Austin (March-April 2005). For more information, please visit www.eustudies.org/EUSAsections.html.

Teaching the EU

Europe Matters: Teaching the EU in the U.S. *Peter H. Loedel and John Occhipinti*

Introduction

AT THE BIENNIAL CONFERENCE OF EUSA in 2001 held in Madison, Wisconsin, a diverse array of faculty from the North America, Europe, and Asia formed an interest section focused on teaching the EU. As the latest biennial conference approaches, we, the co-chairs of this interest section, think the timing is right to assess the state of the teaching the EU in the United States. In doing so, we build on the findings of the so-called Makins Report, commissioned by the German Marshall Fund of the United States and the Delegation of the European Commission in the United States. Similar to Makin's generally positive assessment, our view is that the state of teaching the EU in the United States is quite strong.

Indeed, there continues to be an ever-increasing number of institutes, programs, and courses focused on European Union studies. Based in part on the findings of a survey conducted by the authors 2004, we argue that Europe "matters" - even more so today than ever before. After making this case, we offer a few recommendations for sustaining, if not improving, the high level of study in the EU that we see today.

The Evolution of EU Studies in the US

Prior to the end of the Cold War, teaching the EU was hamstrung by the rigid geographic boundaries of the east-west divide. Western European Studies, Eastern European Studies, Soviet Studies, Iberian Studies all fragmented the teaching possibilities of someone truly focused on the European integration process. In fact, few institutions even had programs or specialized courses in European integration, rather than more general topics. The European Community (EC) was often treated as an interesting case study for scholars of international relations or comparative politics, which usually emphasized one aspect of the EC at the expense of others. Thus, the study, and thereby the teaching of the EU, was trapped both within geographic or theoretical boundaries.

Like the map of Europe, the situation has changed dramatically. Although some country-specific courses and leftovers of "Western European politics" carry on, the geo-

graphic distinctions of the Cold War are now largely gone. Meanwhile, new courses on European integration have quickly filled the gap.

Along with the unfolding of recent European history, another more recent factor in positive development of EU studies has been the establishment of European Union centers. Part of a broader effort to promote people-to-people ties outlined in the European Union's Transatlantic Agenda, the EU Delegation to the United States has financially supported these centers to promote the study of the EU, as well as Transatlantic relations. Many of these EU Centers are located at elite research universities, but a few are located at consortia of institutions (e.g., Claremont-Pomona Colleges in Southern California).

In addition to their research projects and depository libraries, these centers have helped to train a steady supply of new Ph.D.s, who will go on to create new courses on the EU and further its study in the US into the next generation. In addition, the EU centers, as well as the very nature of European itself, have promoted the interdisciplinary study of the EU, which carries over into how this subject is taught in the US. Political science, international relations, economics and business, legal studies, history, women studies, fine arts, and foreign language departments now provide a rich context for teaching some aspect of the EU, and the EU centers have helped promote this in a variety of ways.

Beyond the establishment of EU Centers, the European Commission has also invested in a number of teaching-oriented initiatives. These initiatives are broadly found under the rubric of the EU-USA Programme for Cooperation in Higher Education and Training. One example of this is PICCLE, Pedagogy for Intercultural Literacy, a joint project between five universities in the US and Europe which will eventually involve over 25 faculty members and more than 1000 students majoring in communication and education (i.e., future high school teachers), providing them with skills in the area of intercultural communication through transnational web based course modules.

Attributes of EU Courses

As part of this study, we reviewed syllabi for EU courses posted to the Teaching Section website or submitted to us by colleagues from our respective consortia. This revealed a wide array of course titles and a fair amount of diversity among approaches. Nevertheless, a few common patterns emerged, which is at least partly explainable by the way EU textbooks are often organized. Most EU courses begin with an historical analysis of the development of the European

Union and often tie this into a related theoretical analysis of European integration. This is commonly followed by coverage of the governmental institutions of the EU, with a third section on policy areas. Finally, concluding sections of syllabi often focus on the EU-US relationship (more below) or the impact of EU enlargement.

The theoretical coverage of the EU in undergraduate courses in the U.S. is quite revealing, particularly the dichotomy between intergovernmentalism and functionalism. While this debate is often simplified for teaching purposes (tending to discount the contributions of other theoretical models, such as historical institutionalism), the sharp contrast between the two schools allows for a systematic comparison of the historical development of the EU. The functionalist approach can appeal to American students, but only after they gain a better understanding of the EU's historical evolution. For example, if U.S. teachers conceptualize the development of the EU in terms of sovereignty and the functions of the nation state, then fruitful comparisons can be drawn to America's own political development - from the Articles of Confederation, through the debates presented in the Federalist papers, to today's increasing centralization and concentration of government authority at the federal level. In this way, studying the EU's evolution can actually help American students to understand their own country and how it has changed over time.

However, it is the intergovernmental paradigm that is initially most appealing to American students. The language of nation states, power politics, and states' interests fits easy into the vocabulary of U.S. politics and foreign policy and helps make intergovernmentalism attractive to American students, at least initially. The nature of power politics - the "Empty Chair" Crisis, the British refusal to join EMU, and Spain's hard fought battle over weighted voting in the Nice Treaty - all instinctively make sense for U.S. students. This, in turn, stems at least partly from the way US history is presented at the high school level, with no alternative presented to the common paradigm of the U.S. as a great power trying to survive in an anarchic international system.

This sheds some light on the underdeveloped state of teaching the EU in American high schools. If the EU is to be covered in those classrooms beyond the occasional reference in current events discussion, then institutions of higher education need to develop links to secondary schools in their communities. An innovative program out of New York University (NYU) could provide just such a model. The New Europe project at the Center for European Studies at NYU seeks to train public high school teachers on European issues. The culmination of lectures, presentations,

and small group discussions was the development of lesson plans for teaching the EU, which included problem-based learning models (e.g., debating the euro or enlargement) and document-based question assignments (DBQs), consisting of political cartoons on tense U.S.-EU relations. The project developed numerous resources, including a website that could be used by other partnerships between similar higher education-secondary schools.

The EU centers could be a central launching point for such endeavors. Some pilot projects are already underway. For example, in March of 2004, the Maxwell EU Center of Syracuse University funded a workshop on teaching the EU at Canisius College, attended by eighteen high school teachers from western New York. The SUNY EU Institute, based in Fredonia, NY is planning a seminar for high school teachers and others at Chautauqua Institution in June 2005, which will be presented by a variety of EU specialists, including several members of the EUSA Interest Section on teaching.

The Value of Simulations

There are certainly a number of innovative approaches to teaching the EU, including some initiatives to teach web-based or distance learning courses. Here we cover just one of these, European Union simulations (or "Eurosims"). As an experiential learning processes, intercollegiate simulations can "recreate complex, dynamic political processes" that are typical of the EU policymaking process and the intergovernmental conferences. Simulations also allow students to experience the "real EU," helping them to examine motivations, behavioral constraints, resources and interactions among institutional and afford deeper insight into political processes and political negotiations. In short, Eurosims bring the EU to life. Moreover, students who participate in these Eurosims have a personal stake in their outcome and therefore take ownership over their operation. Consequently, these students tend to be more attentive and more active in the learning process largely - because of the "hands-on" quality of simulations.

Consider, for example, the annual simulations presented by Mid-Atlantic European Union consortium and the Transatlantic Consortium for European Union simulations and Studies (TACEUSS). The latter has sponsored an annual Eurosims conference since 1988, rotating its location annual between host institutions in New York State and its European partners. The 2003 simulations, for example, was hosted by SUNY Fredonia on the topic of the European Convention, while the 2004 event was held in Tilburg, Netherlands on the IGC. Eurosims returns to Fredonia, NY this

April on the topic of the European Neighborhood Policy. An interesting feature of the TACEUSS Eurosims is that it also entails the participation of American and eight European colleges and universities, allowing American students not only to learn actively about the EU, but also to work closely with European students over four days. In addition to this, TACEUSS faculty have become increasingly involved in collaborative research projects, including those dealing with both pedagogy and EU politics.

The Mid-Atlantic consortium provides an interesting alternative to this model and can be examined by looking at the experience of its key members, West Chester University in eastern Pennsylvania, where the simulation is taught as a senior seminar in the international relations concentration. This seminar at West Chester has very specific learning objectives focused around building skills for communication, negotiation skills, analysis and a broad range of careers. In addition, students are asked collaborate with their peers from other colleges and universities in a semester long simulation that culminates in a conference at the end of the semester in Washington D.C.

The overall value of the simulation is that it captures the institutional dynamics of the EU, demonstrating the supranationality of the Commission, the European Parliament, and the European political parties. It also illuminates both the relevance of “spillover,” as students realize the connections between the range of EU policy issues, and the nature of power politics, as the students simulate the ministerial councils and assert national interests. By experiencing this contrast for themselves, American students can better appreciate the logic of both the neo-functionalism and intergovernmental paradigms, as well as the limits of each.

The responses of West Chester University students (2000-2003) indicate the success of the simulation experience to their academic development, or at least their perception of this. For example, 62.2 percent of respondents indicated that they “strongly agree” that the course taught them conflict resolution and negotiation skills. Another 29 percent indicated they “agree” with this statement. In addition, 65 percent indicated that they “strongly agree” that the simulation taught them the value of teamwork, with another 3 percent “agreeing” with this statement. In terms of communication and leadership skills, 91 percent of the students either strongly agreed or agreed that the simulation succeeded. Another 80 percent strongly agreed or agreed that the simulation prepared them for careers in international relations.

One of the more significant advantages of teaching the EU by using simulations is that it forces American students to

take on the mindset, mentality, and ideology of Europeans. Put more bluntly, it forces students to not think like Americans, but rather as Europeans, promoting better transatlantic understanding. One of our faculty colleagues related to us his past concerns that the war in Iraq would create a more difficult situation for US students to negotiate “as Europeans” during their simulation. But to his surprise, the war had no effect in that respect. Students quickly became “Europeanized” (as they have become in previous simulation experiences) and found it frustrating to negotiate with students playing U.S. roles. Surely, this kind of valuable experience is difficult to replicate in a traditional classroom and illustrates the value of simulation for teaching the EU.

Faculty Survey Results

We conclude our analysis by addressing the question that prompted our study in the first place, namely, what influence have the escalating tensions of the EU-US relationship had teaching the EU. In the spring of 2003, a short survey was developed that was sent to the thirty members of two Eurosims programs that the authors participate in and to the 130 members of the Teaching the EU List serv. From this group, we received 32 responses. While one must take these results with some measure of caution, they do indicate some general trends in the teaching of the EU in the U.S.

The first question asked respondents to reflect on the effects of the dramatic transformations in Europe during the period 1989-1991 (the collapse of the Berlin Wall, German unification, the Single Market of 1992, etc.). In other words, we wanted those who were teaching back then to evaluate the effect in comparison to the effect to come later in 2001-2003. Over 80 percent of respondents who were teaching back then suggested that there was a noticeable increase in student interest in European affairs, and that new courses were put together to reflect on these transformations. While not uniform, a majority of those responding to the question also noted that the demand dropped off through the 1990’s as people focused on larger international concerns (such as globalization or the WTO) or other regional studies gained in prominence (Latin America, Middle East, and Asian).

We then asked respondents to evaluate whether there had been an increase, decrease, or no change of interest in courses focused on European politics after 2001. Over 90 percent of respondents indicated a general increase in student interest in European politics through 2002, but the real effect came with the lead up and eventual U.S. deci-

sion to go to war in Iraq. In conjunction with the U.S. decision to go to war, some respondents also noted the recent enlargement of the EU as a further spark to student interest. All noted that students – whether pro-Bush, pro-War or anti-Bush or anti-War – were fascinated by the bitter turn in transatlantic affairs in 2002-2003 and the strident views taken up on both sides of the Atlantic.

The increasing importance of the EU has been experienced beyond Political Science. Several commentators who teach in law programs noted additional interest in the EU as a result of enlargement and the increasing importance to commercial law (e.g., antitrust regulations impacting U.S.-based firms). Despite the fact that EU questions are not included on bar exams in the US, some law students have come to believe that it is necessary to have some background on this topic. Another interesting twist noted by one of the survey respondents was the effect on military cadets (his particular students). All were very interested in the role and future of NATO and the potential effect of the war on terrorism and the war in Iraq on the fifty-year old security alliance.

What all commentary had in common was that the last two years have had a sharp and very real effect on teaching the EU. As one respondent noted (perhaps with a bit too much enthusiasm), the negative turn of events in EU-US relations has the potential of turning the EU politics into the “Soviet Politics” course of the Cold War era. Another respondent simply noted, “Europe Matters.”

In our survey, we also wanted to ascertain the effect noted above on the actual teaching of the EU – in particular on how faculty adjusted their syllabi to reflect these changes. Again, with almost near unanimity, respondents noted significant or substantial changes in their approach to teaching the EU. In asking this question, a set of possible responses were given, for example, including particular readings (i.e. Kagan) or assignments. Some respondents noted they used Kagan’s book to provide a jumping off point for discussion on the EU-US relationship. Respondents also indicated that they had either expanded or added sections on the EU-US relationship – particularly in the area of EU-US security policy and the question of the EU’s development of a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP), and Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) related to the War on Terrorism (where there has been a significant increase in EU-US cooperation). Many responded that the wealth of material out there (books, articles, newspapers like *The New York Times* and *the Financial Times* – and TV resources such as PBS) makes it much easier to put together informative and stimulating

discussion sections on the EU-US relationship. Finally, some respondents noted that enlargement has also created the room to finally bridge the Western European Politics vs. Eastern European Politics divide that normally separated material in the syllabi or, as noted earlier in the essay, entire courses.

We then asked respondents to comment more broadly on whether these changes in the EU-US relationship provided either a challenge or an opportunity in their teaching of the European Union. This particular question arose from the authors’ recent call to the membership of the EUSA Teaching the EU listserv to reflect on this very question. The goal was to spark some debate over the future of teaching the EU. We asked specifically for essays on the topic of challenge and opportunity. One short essay on the subject is published in the *EUSA Review*; the essay focused on this subject and indicates similar thoughts to the general trend in respondents’ answers. Without exception, there was a general sense that the moment in history provides a significant challenge to the teaching of the EU in the U.S. in terms of adjusting to the new political landscape, revising curriculum and syllabi to reflect that landscape, and managing student intensity on the subject matter in terms of U.S. centric or Euro-centric viewpoints.

In short, faculty have responded to those pressures created by a changing world as a teaching opportunity. As one survey respondent noted, “our students are attracted by conflict settings (and probably bored by non conflict settings.) The fact that there is conflict makes it relevant.” Another respondent noted that the situation allows “American students to see things from a European perspective, and to show them how their approaches to global issues are actually complementary to our own approaches – both working toward the same end, and that we should welcome the EU as a peer on the world stage.” One faculty member commented a bit more pessimistically that the current state of affairs offers an opportunity to teach U.S. students that “the United States is not always right” on international affairs, and that US faculty have an opportunity to “enlighten students as to the sources of EU discontent” and general anti-Americanism in Europe today. Whatever ones point of view on the subject matter, it is clear that the silver lining in recent transatlantic troubles is increasing interest in the EU across US campuses of higher learning.

Another theme that surfaced in the surveys was on the idea of European multilateralism. Students are fascinated by the divergence in EU-US foreign policy perspectives. As one faculty member noted, it provides a “great opportunity to explain the historical development of the EU as an

experiment in war avoidance, as well as in economic integration, and why in general the European outlook is so oriented toward multi-lateralism as opposed to the unilateralism currently displayed by the Bush administration.” Clearly, focusing on the conflicts and differences helps to alert students to the underlying realities of power and interest. In fact, this crossover of approaches was noted by some faculty who also teach American foreign policy. That is, a comparison of the EU-US relationship can be used to highlight and compare the substance and approach of US foreign policy with those in Europe.

Beyond responses to our questions, many faculty also made interesting comments in the anecdotal section of our survey. Here we learned that faculty seemed generally concerned about the state of this relationship and felt it was their role to help students look beyond any transatlantic divide. In the face of this, how does one give U.S. students a complete understanding of the European vision of an “ever closer union?” There is no easy answer to that question.

As we noted above, we feel that simulations provide a comprehensive framework and opportunity for U.S. students to understand the European point of view. Study abroad opportunities were also cited by some faculty as a way to overcome the divide. Another technique noted by a faculty member was to purposely teach the course from a largely pro-EU perspective and to challenge the students in their American comfort zone. The faculty member also gets them to question their own assumptions about U.S. policies toward Europe and to write term papers on changing attitudes and approaches toward our European allies. Other faculty noted that they provide both perspectives and allow students to reflect in essay form, in course discussions, or in structured debates their opinions about the EU-US relationship. For example, a course taught by one of the authors focuses on Kagan’s suggestion that Europeans are from Venus and Americans are from Mars. A final exam topic has students evaluate that claim and give their opinion.

Conclusion/Recommendations

Our analysis of the current state of teaching the EU in the United States is that it is quite healthy. Moreover, the current political climate has actually had a positive impact on the study, research, and teaching of the EU, provided opportunities to develop new courses, programs, and centers built on a broad, interdisciplinary approach to the EU. Based upon our analysis, we believe that the following initiatives are essential to maintaining the health of the current state of teaching the EU:

- Continued EU Commission and Delegation funding is

critical and should be encouraged. While we recognize the concern about the conditions of such funding (that the project funded be supportive of the “EU project”), the Delegation’s support has come at an important juncture in the historical development.

- We believe that efforts to teach the EU should continue to reach out to the secondary education (high school) level. This is not an easy task, but we feel that the model developed at NYU and the projects undertaken by the EU Centers of Syracuse University and the SUNY Institute have good deal of potential.
- We think that more faculty, deans, etc. should recognize the value of innovative pedagogy in teaching the EU. We should note that this has already been occurring across the field of Political Science. In particular, professors of the EU should be evaluated on the links between their teaching and research, just as the so-called Teacher-Scholar Model is being applied to other areas of study. The simulation model and various on-line and transatlantic partnerships are also areas where success has been noted. Support and recognition from professional organizations, such as EUSA, is quite valuable indeed.
- Finally, given limited resources, the creation of consortia across disciplines should be encouraged. By pooling resources, teaching talents, geographical proximity to EU centers, academics could create a viable network of scholars teaching the EU, especially when this results in collaboration across academic disciplines, research methods and approaches.

Peter H. Loedel is Associate Professor of Political Science at West Chester University

John Occhipinti is Associate Professor of Political Science and Director of European Studies at Canisius

Editor’s note: This column is written by members of EUSA’s “Teaching the EU” Interest Section. For details about the Section and how to join it, please visit www.eustudies.org/teachingsection.html



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The State of the European Union, 6: Law, Politics, and Society

Co-edited by EUSA members **Tanja A. Börzel**, University of Heidelberg,
and **Rachel A. Cichowski**, University of Washington

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THIS IS THE SIXTH AND latest addition to our book series, *State of the European Union* (launched in 1991 with Lynne Rienner Publishers). The contributors to this volume take the dynamic interaction between law, politics and society as a starting point to think critically about key recent events in the European Union, while bringing to the forefront why these developments matter for ordinary citizens. Contents and authors:

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Book Reviews

Wade Jacoby. *The Enlargement of the European Union and NATO: Ordering from the Menu in Central Europe* Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2004, 287 pp.

THE TRANSFORMATION OF CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE (CEE) has generated a vibrant literature on the external sources of institutional change (e.g. Andonova 2004; Kelley 2004; Linden 2002; Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2005; Vachudova 2004). Several factors make the region particularly suitable for examining the power of external pressure on domestic reform: a shared history of Soviet influence, the desire of both elites and mass electorates to join Western organizations such as the European Union and NATO, and the conditionality of membership in those organizations. Most of this research consists of sectoral studies that tend to explore the explanatory power of external reform pressures for domestic outcomes. Jacoby's book *The Enlargement of the European Union and NATO* differs in two important ways: First, it examines CEE emulation of external models as the outcome to be explained. Second, it employs a most-similar, most-likely case design to compare two frontrunners of transformation (Czech Republic and Hungary) across five sectors (health care, consumer protection, regional policy, agricultural policy, and defense). Further, Jacoby adds four shadow cases to explore variations in domestic factors such as country size (Poland, agriculture), Ottoman legacies (Bulgaria, regional policy), geographic proximity (Ukraine, defense), and advanced capitalist development (Sweden, consumer protection).

Given that external EU and NATO pressures were the same across Central and Eastern Europe, what explains the variation in outcomes? Jacoby offers useful typologies for modes and outcomes of emulation. He describes modes of emulation based on whether they are voluntary and faithful (p. 6). "Copies" are faithful and voluntary adoptions of external models. "Patches", by contrast, adopt external models faithfully but less voluntarily. "Templates" voluntarily adapt external models to local circumstances. "Thresholds", finally, provide minimum and often vague standards that are not negotiable. Contrary to the author's claim, this first typology is definitional and descriptive, rather than predictive. Thus, it cannot be "falsified" (p. 36) by factors outside the typology, though it might well be that different dimensions describe the reality of emulation better. Note that modes of

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Dr. R. Daniel Kelemen
Lincoln College
Oxford University
Oxford OX1 3DR UK
E-mail daniel.kelemen@politics.ox.ac.uk
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emulation do not determine outcomes. Though in practice pure copies are exceedingly rare, in principle any mode can be associated with any outcome.

Outcomes of emulation, Jacoby argues, can be predicted based on the density of external rules and domestic actors, respectively (p. 10). Low rule density in the presence of few or no domestic actors produces "homesteading", a rather poorly defined concept that suggests a less than full embrace of the rules by new actors (e.g. consumer protection). Where there are few external rules but multiple domestic actors, we should expect "continuous learning", i.e. iterative borrowing (e.g. health care). By contrast, where high rule density coincides with a lack of domestic actors, "scaffolding" will result: local interests will organize around imported rules, though implementation may lag (e.g. regional policy). Finally, an "open struggle" is to be expected when dense external rules clash with strongly organized domestic actors. The cases at hand (agriculture and civilian control of the military) confirm this prediction. But it is not clear why high actor density in the face of detailed external rules might not produce the opposite outcome: the active appropriation of such rules by domestic players hoping to reap previously unavailable benefits.

The two dimensions of actor density and rule density reflect essential arguments of the three strands of institutionalism on which Jacoby draws. According to sociological institutionalism, external rule density constitutes the motivating force behind emulation. In Jacoby's rendition, rational institutionalism emphasizes the role of veto players who may obstruct emulation. In this logic, a dense set of domestic stakeholders is likely to impede the adoption of external rules—as in the outcome of "open struggle." By contrast, historical institutionalism draws attention to domestic actors with the capacity to actively adapt external rules to local needs. The outcome of "continuous learning" thus depends on stakeholders seeking to adapt outside

models to deal with domestic shortfalls. Similarly, both “homesteading” and “scaffolding” suffer from incomplete implementation because there are no stakeholders willing to endorse external rules. If this account of the three strands seems overly schematic, it is because both rational and historical institutionalism view the role of domestic actors as ambiguous. Rational institutionalism can easily accommodate rule promotion by local interest groups who see themselves empowered through such rules. By the same token, historical institutionalism can account for resistance to external rules by entrenched domestic constituencies. It is therefore puzzling to see the author cast domestic actors as potential rule adopters in three of the four outcomes, but as opponents of emulation in the scenario of dense external rules.

Despite this inconsistency, Jacoby’s effort at systematic and thorough synthesis among the three strands of institutionalism is welcome indeed, as no single strand can capture the variation across sectors and countries. The concept of “embedded rationalism” acknowledges constraints on rational decision-making, such as extensive set of EU and NATO demands and limited policy options in light of a country’s historical legacies. Particularly admirable, in terms of theoretical synthesis, is the author’s serial juxtaposition of two of the three strands and isolation of the third in chapter 7. Without dense external rules, outcomes in health care and consumer protection might have been the same, but would likely have been very different in agriculture, regional policy, and defense.

The Enlargement of the European Union and NATO has several natural audiences: Scholars of institutional diffusion and rule transfer will benefit from the book’s theorization of the politics of emulation, even though the case studies present political controversies often as an afterthought. For instance, in the case of agriculture, controversy arose not so much over EU rules that the prospective members had to implement, but rather over the financial incentives for doing so. Scholars of Europeanization, i.e. the impact of EU rules on member states, may appreciate the careful disaggregation of rational, sociological and historical arguments across multiple policy sectors. As an effort to synthesize several theories, furthermore, the book speaks to a larger audience in international relations and comparative politics concerned with transcending the limits of any single paradigm.

Beate Sissenich
Indiana University

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Joseph Jupille. Procedural Politics: Issues, Interests, and Institutional Choice in the European Union. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2004, 294 pp.

PROCEDURAL POLITICS is about everyday politics with respect to rules. In other words, it studies the conditions under which, the ways in which and the effects with which actors challenge the rules they operate under. The European Union (EU) is an ideal setting for such a study, because it contains a variety of decision-making rules and institutions that exert different influence under such rules.

Jupille starts by developing a general argument about the determinants, the dynamics and the effects of procedural politics. He deals with the following three questions: when are actors more likely to debate about which rules to follow rather than to operate under them? (or in other words, when is procedural politics more likely?), which behavioral regularities are we likely to observe when actors engage in procedural politics? and, finally, what are the policy consequences of procedural politics? The author develops six broad hypotheses. He then proceeds by ranking the preferences of the Council, the Commission and the Parliament with regard to nine EU legislative procedures and by introducing a game of EU procedural politics that provides the basis for some these expectations. The hypotheses are tested using an original data set of instances of procedural politics

occurring between 1987 and 1997 and case studies of environmental and agricultural policy legislation.

With regard to the determinants, a necessary condition for procedural politics is the availability of alternative institutional arrangements, otherwise actors would have no choice between rules. Having satisfied this condition, procedural politics is more likely to occur if the jurisdictional ambiguity of proposed legislation increases. Jupille illustrates how the frequency of procedural politics increases around the period when a new Treaty enters into force as the new regime offers new opportunities and creates new ambiguities. Moreover, policy areas that are 'horizontal' in nature, such as environmental policy which cuts across many sectors, generate greater ambiguity and are more susceptible to procedural politics. The second determinant is related to actors' incentives. Actors promote those rules that maximize their influence and, as the influence differential among available alternatives increases, procedural politics is more likely to occur. Jupille shows how EU institutions, especially the Parliament, have systematically argued for the use of those rules that are either neutral or increase their influence. A dispute is ten times more likely when the Parliament faces its most unfavorable procedure as when it faces an average procedure. Confirming evidence is reported both from statistical analysis and, especially environmental policy, case study evidence.

In terms of dynamics of procedural politics, Jupille argues that actors are likely to frame issues in such a way as to "fit" them within the rules that they prefer. Reframing, namely redefining an issue so as to move its substantive core from an unfavorable to a favorable procedure, appears ubiquitous. But joining or separating issues for the same purpose are also common. An interesting result, of which so far we have had only anecdotal evidence, is the Parliament's readiness to forego short-term substantive policy losses to obtain long-term procedural gains.

Procedural preferences also explain the coalition dynamics, more so than the supranational-intergovernmental divide. Jupille provides systematic and case study evidence (especially from environmental policy) that the supranational nature of the Commission and the Parliament do not drive these institutions together if their procedural preferences differ. However, it must be noted that this result is confined to instances where actors dispute the procedural basis of a legislative proposal.

Procedural politics has three main repercussions. First, it decreases decision-making efficiency. The decision time of proposed legislation, of which the procedural basis has been disputed, more than doubles. Second, it affects policy

outcomes by making log rolls possible, defining substantive issues on the basis of procedural motivations or, more simply, because rules shape outcomes. The environmental and agricultural policy case studies provide ample evidence of these effects. For instance, the very existence of the Beef Hormones Directive is the result of the Commission and eight member states conspiring to change the legal basis and adopt the measure by majority, rather than unanimous, voting. Finally, the likelihood of procedural changes in Treaty articles increases as the frequency of procedural disputes increases. The provisions that were subjected to a procedural change in the Maastricht Treaty were those that experienced a greater than average share of procedural disputes. This is especially the case where the Parliament has been involved in the dispute and has been the beneficiary of the rule change. Additionally, Jupille maps day-to-day procedural politicking to subsequent Treaty changes, especially in the environmental policy cases. This result sheds new light on the motivations for institutional changes at Treaty level. It provides an alternative, or at least complementary, explanation to Moravcsik's argument about credibility as the basis for adopting majority voting.

This book is a fine example of scholarly work. Jupille investigates an under-researched aspect of EU politics, he develops an original argument, he tests his propositions systematically both quantitatively and qualitatively and he is always careful of producing alternative explanations to his main thesis. Different readers will find different aspects more or less satisfying. For instance, the analysis of patterns of procedural politics is particularly rewarding. I also like how Jupille links everyday procedural politics to Treaty changes. This is probably the finest example of linkages and feedback effects between day-to-day and grand bargaining politics and is a credible challenge liberal intergovernmentalism. The accurate and systematic process tracing in the case studies deserves also mention. Here, however, I would have preferred greater reliance on bargaining theory. In addition to the coalition and framing analysis, bringing to light standard negotiating dynamics such as anticipation of actors' responses, uncertainty of policy positions and strategic reputation building, which clearly operate in these cases, would have helped us to better understand outcomes and patterns of mutual concessions. Nevertheless, these comments should take nothing away from a work that breaks new ground in the study of EU politics.

Fabio Franchino
University College London

**EUSA 9th Biennial Conference
March 31-April 2, 2005
Hyatt Regency Austin on Town Lake
Austin, Texas**

EUSA's 9th International Conference of European Union specialists will draw scholars and practitioners from around the world. This year's program features over 90 panels and roundtables on current EU scholarship from theoretical, empirical and practical perspectives. Be sure to attend Friday evening's Conference Dinner and Keynote Address, delivered by Professor Eric Stein.

EUSA continues its successful Poster Session and Conference Paper Room (proceeds to benefit EUSA's Grants and Scholarships Fund). Major EU-related publishers will also be present at the Conference, and EUSA's seven interest sections will hold meetings over the lunch breaks each day. Finally, as required by our constitution, we will hold the open EUSA Business Meeting for interested members.

CONFERENCE PROGRAM

Mark Pollack, Temple University, Program Chair

A tentative, provisional conference program is now on our website's conference page www.eustudies.org/confprog05fp.

CONFERENCE REGISTRATION

All those whose names appear on the conference program or who attend the conference must register and pay the applicable fee. The conference registration form is posted on our website at www.eustudies.org/confprog05fp, and may be returned by mail or fax. Please note that early registration ends Friday February 25th.

CONFERENCE HOTEL

The official conference hotel is the Hyatt Regency Austin on Town Lake. The reduced conference room rate is US \$149.00. We will offer a roommate matching service; just send an e-mail to eusa@pitt.edu if you wish to be placed on a roommate list (we will do our best but cannot guarantee finding you a roommate). To make hotel reservations please call 512 477 1234 or visit the Conference 2005 website at

www.eustudies.org/conf2005.html and click the Hotel Information link. When making a reservation by phone, please mention our group name European Union Studies Association.

USA-DG EDUCATION AND CULTURE GRANTS

We will offer up to seven EUSA-DG Education and Culture Grants of approximately 600 euros as outright grants to help defray the travel expenses of scholars coming from the ten new member countries and three candidate countries to present papers or posters at the 2005 Conference.

To qualify for these grants, applicants must:

(a) be residents of one of the EU new member or candidate countries, and (b) have been accepted to present a paper on a panel or to present a poster in the conference poster session.

These grants will be awarded in the order in which the applications are received. The EUSA-DG Education and Culture Grants will be paid in person at the EUSA Conference by check in US\$.

To apply, please mail a clear, legible photocopy of your current passport page showing your nation of residence, and a one-page (maximum) letter of support from your university major/ thesis advisor or from your current employer, to:

EUSA-DG Education and Culture Grants
415 Bellefield Hall
University of Pittsburgh
Pittsburgh, PA 15260 USA.

Applications sent by e-mail or fax will be disqualified. These grants are funded by the European Union (European Commission, DG Education and Culture).

TOURISM OUTINGS

Several outings have been coordinated in conjunction with the 2005 Conference.

*To wrap up and celebrate the conference week, the **University of Texas at Austin** will be holding a reception on Saturday evening, April 2nd on the University of Texas campus.

*On Sunday April 3rd an **Austin Highlights Tour** will leave from the conference hotel at 9 a.m. for a tour of Austin landmarks.

*On Saturday, April 2nd at 10 a.m. an outing will depart from the hotel to tour the beautiful **Lady Bird Johnson Wildflower Center**.

Please see the conference registration form for more details on these outings.

PAPER AND PANEL REQUIREMENTS

All paper authors at the EUSA Conference must:

- Deliver to your panel chair and discussant a copy of your paper no later than 1 March 2005
- Present a finished, formal paper (not a talk)
- Bring twenty hard copies of the paper for the conference paper room (a fundraiser for the EUSA Grants and Scholarships Fund); only those who bring twenty copies of their papers will be eligible for the Best 2005 Conference Paper Prize

Panels are 1 hour, 45 minutes in duration and the program committee recommends the following agenda for panels:

- 2 minutes for chair's introduction
- 15 minutes per paper
- 10 minutes for discussant's response
- 15 minutes for open discussant with the audience

KEY DEADLINES

Early registration deadline: **February 25, 2005**

Reduced room-rate booking deadline: **March 5, 2005**

DID YOU KNOW THAT you may order back issues of the *EUSA Review* for classroom use at an educator's discount? For instructors who want their students to read a particular essay it is possible to order small quantities (up to 50) of selected back issues of the *EUSA Review* (while supplies last). We charge a token (\$1 each) to help defray our printing and production costs plus a contribution toward the postage cost (\$3 in the USA, \$10 outside the USA). To place such an order, send a letter or email with full institutional signature, indicating the desired issue and quantity of the *Review* along with the name of the instructor, course, and department in which it will be used to the EUSA office at esua@pitt.edu.

Spotlight on Luxembourg

This feature highlights an individual EU member state's major presences in the USA and beyond.

Important Web sites

- http://www.lcto.lu/html_en/index.html - Tourist information on Luxembourg City
- <http://www.ont.lu/> - Grand Duchy of Luxembourg National Tourist Office
- <http://www.visitluxembourg.com/> - Luxembourg National Tourist Office in the United States
- <http://www.eu2005.lu/en/index.html> - 2005 Luxembourg European Union Presidency

Missions

Embassy of the Grand-Duchy of Luxembourg
2200 Mass. Avenue
Washington, DC 20008
Tel: (202) 265-4171
Fax: (202) 328-8270
E-mail: washington.info@mae.etat.lu

Consular Offices

Consulate General of Luxembourg
The Luxembourg House
17 Beekman Place
New York, NY 10022
Tel: (212) 888 - 6664
Fax: (212) 888 - 6116
E-mail: info@luxembourgnyc.org

Consulate General of Luxembourg
1 Sansome Street - Suite 830
San Francisco, CA 94104
Tel: (415) 788 - 0816
Fax: (415) 788- 0985
E-mail: info@luxembourgsf.org

Media

Tageblatt, French-language daily newspaper, online edition at <http://www.tageblatt.lu/Edition/>.
d'Letsebuenger Land, French-language daily newspaper, online edition at <http://www.land.lu/>.

Fellowships, Awards and Grants

EUSA Haas Fund Fellowship

THE 2005-2007 EUSA EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE is pleased to announce the 2005 Haas Fellowship competition. Thanks entirely to contributions to the Ernst Haas Memorial Fund for EU Studies—launched in June 2003 to honor the memory of the late scholar Ernst B. Haas (1924-2003), whose work was pivotal in the establishment of the field of EU studies—we will offer one unrestricted fellowship of \$2,000 to support the dissertation research of any graduate student pursuing an EU-related dissertation topic in the academic year 2005-06. Please note the following stipulations for applicants, who must:

- be pursuing the doctoral degree (PhD) at an accredited institution in any country;
- be writing a dissertation in English;
- have an EU-related, doctoral dissertation topic approved by the professor who will supervise it; and,
- be able to demonstrate clearly the relevance to EU studies of the dissertation topic.

Applicants for this Fellowship should submit in triplicate, hard copy, by regular post to EUSA, 415 Bellefield Hall, University of Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh, PA 15260 USA:

- (1) A one-page letter of application that specifies how the fellowship would be used;
- (2) A two-page (500 words) *précis* of the dissertation research project that also explains its relevance to EU studies; and,
- (3) Two letters of support from professors serving on the student's dissertation committee, one of them its chair.

The firm deadline for applications to be *received* in the EUSA office is **April 1, 2005**. The successful applicant will be notified by May 15, 2004, and will receive the grant as soon as the fellowship award letter has been signed and returned to EUSA. The fellowship will be paid in one lump sum by check and in US\$ only.

Anyone wishing to contribute to our Ernst Haas Memorial Fund for EU Studies should visit www.eustudies.org/haasfund05 or contact the EUSA office.

EUSA-DG Education and Culture Grants

We will offer up to seven EUSA-DG Education and Culture Grants of approximately 600 euros as outright grants to help defray the travel expenses of scholars coming from the ten new member countries and three candidate countries to present papers or posters at the 2005 Conference.

To qualify for these grants, applicants must:

- (a) be residents of one of the EU new member or candidate countries
- (b) have been accepted to present a paper on a panel or to present a poster in the conference poster session.

These grants will be awarded in the order in which the applications are received. The EUSA-DG Education and Culture Grants will be paid in person at the EUSA Conference by check in US\$.

To apply, please mail a clear, legible photocopy of your current passport page showing your nation of residence, and a one-page (maximum) letter of support from your university major/ thesis advisor or from your current employer, to:

EUSA-DG Education and Culture Grants
415 Bellefield Hall
University of Pittsburgh
Pittsburgh, PA 15260 USA.

Applications sent by e-mail or fax will be disqualified. These grants are funded by the European Union (European Commission, DG Education and Culture).

Publications

Dunn, Elizabeth (2004) *Privitizing Poland: Baby Food, Big Business, and the Remaking of Labor*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

Egan, Michelle (ed.) (2004) *Creating a Transatlantic Marketplace: Government Policies and Business Strategies*. Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press.

Hallerberg, Mark (2004) *Domestic Budgets in a United Europe : Fiscal Governance from the end of Bretton Woods to EMU*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.Cornell.

Jacobsson, Bengt, Laegreid, Per, and Pedersen, Ove Kaj (eds.) (2004) *Europeanization and Transnational States: Comparing Nordic Central Governments*. London, UK: Routledge.

Conferences

Jordan, A. and Liefferink, D. (eds.) (2004) *Environmental Policy in Europe: the Europeanization of National Environmental Policy*. London, UK: Routledge.

Kaiser, Wolfram and Elvert, Jurgen (eds.) (2004) *European Union Enlargement: A Comparative History*. London, UK: Routledge.

Cottey, Andrew and Forster, Anthony (2004) *Reshaping Defence Diplomacy: New Roles for Military Cooperation and Assistance*. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.

Kelley, Judith (2004) *Ethnic Politics in Europe: the Power of Norms and Incentives*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Lahav, Gallya (2004) *Immigration and Politics in the New Europe: Reinventing Borders*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

Martin, Andrew and Ross, George (2004) *Monetary Integration and the European Model of Society*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press

Moss, Bernard (ed.) (2005) *Monetary Union in Crisis: the European Union as Neo-Liberal Construction*. London, UK: Palgrave MacMillan.

Petro, Nicolai (2004) *How Novgorod Coped with Rapid Social Change*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

Rathbun, Brian (2004) *Partisan Interventions: European Party Politics and Peace Enforcement in the Balkans*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press

Savage, James (2005) *Making the EMU: The Politics of Budgetary Surveillance and the Enforcement of Maastricht*. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.

Shaelou, Stephanie (2004) *Higher Education in Cyprus Before and After Accession*. Cyprus: Policy Paper of the Research and Development Centre.

March 17-19, 2005: "Dual Citizenship: Rights and Security in an Age of Terror." University of Toronto, Joint Initiative in German and European Studies, Toronto, Canada.

March 22-23, 2005: "Shifting Boundaries of Sovereignty: Governance and Legitimacy in the European Union and Australia." National Europe Centre of the Australian National University, Canberra, Australia. For more information see <http://www.anu.edu.au/NEC/conferences.php>

March 31-April 2, 2005: 9th Biennial Conference of the European Union Studies Association, Austin, Texas, USA. For more information please see www.eustudies.org.

May 5-6, 2005: "The European Union and the World: Asia, Enlargement and Constitutional Change." Meeting of the International Political Science Association (IPSA) Research Committee 3 on European Unification, Beijing, China.

May 13-14, 2005: "Elites and EU Enlargement." Second International Conference, University of Bremen, Bremen, Germany. For more information see <http://www.iaw.uni-bremen.de/~jtholen/tagungen/EuEnlcallforpaper3.pdf>.

September 5-7, 2005: "EU: Past and Future Enlargements." UACES 35th Annual Conference and 10th Research Conference, University of Zagreb Faculty of Law, Zagreb, Croatia. See www.uaces.org/zagreb.htm. **Deadline for call for papers** February 18, 2005.

September 22-23, 2005: "Firms in the Domestic Market of the European Union Today." Organized by the Chair Jean Monnet in Compared Regional Integration, at the University Montesquieu-Bordeaux IV for the Vth International Days of Study Jean Monnet. See <http://yvars.u-bordeaux4.fr> **Deadline for call for papers** is March 1, 2005.

EUSA News & Notes

PLANNING FOR EUSA's Ninth Biennial International Conference (March 31-April 2, 2005) is almost complete and the Program Committee has been convened. Please remember that the deadline to get the early registration rate and to appear in the final printed program is **Monday, February 21, 2005**.

Please plan to attend our Austin, Texas gathering. Our conference hotel is the Hyatt Regency Austin on Town Lake. Austin is the Texas state capital, and the state legislature will be in session and open to the public for observation during the dates of our conference. Free guided tours are available of the stunning capitol building, built in 1888 of pink granite. Across the street is the Texas Governor's Mansion (free guided tours also available), home to Texas' "first family" since 1856. Austin's oldest building is the French Legation, constructed in 1841 for the French *charge d'affaires* to the Republic of Texas, and now a small museum on lovely grounds. Austin has many historical linkages to Europe, especially to Germany, as the German Free School and the Scholz Garten (Texas' oldest *biergarten* and Austin's oldest restaurant) attest.

Austin's population is approximately 1.25 million people, and Austin is 235 miles from the Mexican border. The city is home to the University of Texas main campus, one of the largest state universities in the United States—thus Austin's reputation as a young city. Nicknamed "live music capitol of the world," Austin has over 100 live music venues and is home to the well-known "Austin City Limits" concert studio. More details about our Conference and about Austin as a destination are posted on our Web site at www.eustudies.org.

Are you moving? Please drop an e-mail to the EUSA office at eusa@pitt.edu in advance to let us know your new address. This will ensure your continued receipt of the *EUSA Review*, and other important EUSA mailings.

Things members can do to help promote EUSA:

- have EUSA and its Web site (www.eustudies.org) listed as a resource on their EU-related course syllabi
- recommend EUSA membership to their students/colleagues as the key source for the latest ideas and scholarship on European integration, EU affairs, and transatlantic relations
- list EUSA's biennial international conference on calendars of upcoming events and help circulate EUSA's call for proposals

- encourage their students to submit paper/poster proposals for the EUSA conference
- vote in (and run for) our biennial executive committee election
- renew their memberships!

Thanks for supporting EUSA in these ways.

EUSA Haas Fund Fellowship

THE 2005-2007 EUSA EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE is pleased to announce the 2005 Haas Fellowship competition. Thanks entirely to contributions to the Ernst Haas Memorial Fund for EU Studies—launched in June 2003 to honor the memory of the late scholar Ernst B. Haas (1924-2003), whose work was pivotal in the establishment of the field of EU studies—we will offer one unrestricted fellowship of \$2,000 to support the dissertation research of any graduate student pursuing an EU-related dissertation topic in the academic year 2005-06. Please see page 20 of the *Review* for more details.

The *EUSA Review* follows an annual calendar of announcements and listings organized in four topic areas:

Winter (January 15):

EU-Related Academic Programs (degree or certificate-granting, worldwide)(suspended this issue due to space considerations);

Spring (April 15):

EU-Related Web Sites (especially primary sources such as databases, on-line publications, and bibliographies);

Summer (July 15):

EU-Related Organizations (academic and professional associations or independent research centers (such as think tanks) with significant EU aspects in their missions); and

Fall (October 15):

EUSA Members' Research Notes (current, EU-related, funded research projects).

Send brief announcements by e-mail to eusa@pitt.edu or by mail to EUSA, 415 Bellefield Hall, University of Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh, PA 15260 USA. We reserve the right to edit for length, and we cannot guarantee inclusion in the listings. We do not accept unsolicited e-mail attachments.

EUSA Lifetime Membership

What is it?

It is a one-time dues payment to EUSA of US\$ 1500.

What does it include?

The Lifetime Membership includes all regular membership benefits for life. Among those benefits currently are subscription to the quarterly *EUSA Review*, receipt of occasional EUSA monographs, discounted registration rates at the EUSA International Conference, subscription to our e-mail List Serve, and the opportunity to join EUSA interest sections.

Are there any other benefits?

By making a one-time membership payment, you not only avoid the task of renewing each year, but gain the twin advantages of securing lifetime membership at today's dollar values and avoiding future dues increases.

Who should do this?

Any person wishing to support the endeavors of the European Union Studies Association—the fostering of scholarship and inquiry on the European integration project. For U.S. taxpayers, an additional benefit is a receipt for a one-time \$500 charitable contribution to EUSA, tax-deductible to the extent allowed by law (reducing your tax liability for the year in which you become a Lifetime Member).

How do I become a Lifetime Member?

Simply mail your check, in US\$ and made payable to "EUSA," to the European Union Studies Association, address given at right. (We can not accept lifetime membership payments by credit card.) We will send you a receipt and letter of acknowledgment.

Will my Lifetime Membership be publicly recognized?

Yes, EUSA Lifetime Members will be listed in the *EUSA Review* and in our printed, biennial Member Directory.

EUROPEAN UNION STUDIES ASSOCIATION Individual Membership Form

Name _____

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Do you wish to be subscribed to
EUSA's e-mail List Serve? _____ yes _____ no

Membership dues (please check as appropriate):

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* Students must provide copy of current semester's registration form.

EU Law Interest Section _____ 2 yrs. \$10

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Teaching the EU Interest Section _____ 2 yrs. \$10

EU Latin America Caribbean Interest Section _____ 2 yrs. \$10

EU Economics Interest Section _____ 2 yrs. \$10

EU Public Opinion and Participation Section _____ 2 yrs. \$10

U.S. taxpayers may make a tax-deductible contribution to support the work of EUSA in any amount over membership dues:

EUSA Grants and Scholarships Fund \$ _____

EUSA Endowment Fund \$ _____

EUSA Ernst Haas Fellowship Fund \$ _____

Total amount enclosed \$ _____

We prefer payment by check (payable to "EUSA") when possible. Checks must be in US\$ and drawn on a USA bank. We also accept international money orders and MasterCard or Visa credit cards. Your cancelled check or credit card statement will be your receipt.

MasterCard # _____/_____/_____/_____

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Signature _____

Mail or fax this form to:

European Union Studies Association

415 Bellefield Hall

University of Pittsburgh

Pittsburgh, PA 15260 USA

Fax 412.648.1168

Inside the *EUSA Review*:

EUSA Review Forum: The EMU Stability and Growth Pact : Is it Dead? If So, Does it Matter ?

“The Rise and Rise of the Stability and Growth Pact”	Amy Verdun	1
“No Immediate Death, but More Headaches to Come”	Nicolas Jabko	4
“The Stability and Growth Pact is Broken? Don’t Fix it!”	Henrik Enderlein	5
“Blame the ECB, Not the Stability and Growth Pact”	Andrew Martin	7

Teaching the EU:

“Europe Matters: Teaching the EU in the U.S.”	Peter H. Loedel	9
	John Occhipinti	

Book Reviews	15
EUSA 9th Biennial Conference Information	18
Fellowships and Awards and Grants; New Publications	20
Upcoming Conferences	21

Founded in 1988 (and formerly called the European Community Studies Association), the European Union Studies Association is a non-profit academic and professional organization devoted to the exchange of information and ideas on the European Union.

How to Support the European Union Studies Association



Lifetime Membership

\$1500 for all our materials, for life, and credit for a one-time tax-deductible contribution of \$500

EUSA Grants and Scholarships Fund

to support EU-related scholarship, the EUSA prizes, and travel to the biennial EUSA Conference

EUSA Endowment Fund

to ensure the long-term viability and independence of our non-profit organization

Ernst Haas Memorial Fund for EU Studies

to honor the seminal work of Ernst B. Haas and support dissertation research in EU studies

Your gifts are tax-deductible to the extent allowable by U.S. tax law. Donors of \$25 or more receive a receipt for income tax purposes and will be listed in the *EUSA Review*. Include a contribution with your membership renewal, or contact the EUSA Office to make a contribution. Call 412.648.7635 or e-mail eusa@pitt.edu