Understanding European Foreign Policy Cooperation

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In 1993, the European Communities transformed themselves into the European Union. A critical component of this transformation was the formal institutionalization of foreign policy cooperation. The previous system, known as European Political Cooperation (EPC), had been an informal arrangement of consultations by which the presidency made statements on behalf of the group and occasionally represented the group abroad through a 'Troika' arrangement with the former and next presidencies. The coming into force of the Treaty of Maastricht in November 1993 created an institutional structure to support this cooperation, which it now dubbed the Union's 'Common Foreign and Security Policy,' or CFSP.

The CFSP expanded on EPC in several ways. The legalization of the institution, chiefly through treaty provisions that legally committed member states to uphold and support CFSP decisions, was a major politico-philosophical change. The major functional change, though, was the creation of several new policy tools. EPC's conclusions and press statements were joined by Common Positions and Joint Actions. These tools allowed the EU to move beyond simply stating its position. Common Positions created ways to coordinate activity in international organizations and conferences, and Joint Actions allowed the new Union to *do* something in support of its positions. Both tools improved on existing ad hoc and quasi-legal coordination and action under EPC by formalizing it and creating an institutional structure to support it.

After a decade and a half of CFSP, EU cooperation in foreign policy has expanded dramatically. The annual number of statements and declarations has risen sharply, and the number of Joint Actions and Common positions has increased as well though not to the same

extent. On the surface, at least, CFSP appears to have been a success: more cooperation occurs each year. But has this expansion in cooperation kept pace with the expansion of world events? Has it kept pace with the expansion of the Union's own stated interests? Has it expanded in scope and coverage? How much is CFSP activity a function of collective interests, and how much from the interests of the presidency or other major states?

This paper examines questions about CFSP activity by studying it in the context of a random sample of world events. It asks to what kinds of events or issues does the Union respond, and compares the results with the Union's Treaty-established interests. The results are somewhat surprising: the EU is not particularly sensitive to events in neighboring regions, nor is it particularly responsive to abuses of human rights. Human rights issues are actually much *less* likely to attract Union attention than almost any other type of issue, though this trend appears to decline with time. The impact of the 1995 expansion dissipates rapidly, and contrary to the conventional wisdom, the new members' historic neutrality does not appear to have affected cooperation in any way. Two important conclusions emerge: first, cooperation does not appear to have expanded with time in either scope of issues addressed or volume of events addressed. At best, the development of the Union's Common Foreign and Security Policy has kept pace with the growth of world interactions. Second, characteristics of the state holding the presidency are insignificant predictors of CFSP activity, suggesting at least moderate support for a norm of presidencies working for the general interest.

The Conventional Wisdom on CFSP

Much of the 'conventional wisdom' on CFSP emerges from the marriage of intergovernmental theory and case studies of particular events.[2] Intergovernmentalist theory emphasizes the importance of unanimity or consensus voting rules and the attendant right of each state, no matter its size, to veto.[3] Liberal intergovernmental theory, developed by Andrew Moravcsik (1998), adds a role for national power by privileging large states through their ability to afford and make side-payments and also through their ability to torpedo cooperation entirely by refusing to participate. In the context of CFSP, large states are also more likely to possess critical capabilities that the EU requires for successful foreign policy cooperation: Security Council seats, military bases abroad, power projection capacities.

The more policy-oriented literatures of the early and mid-1990s emphasized practical obstacles to CFSP cooperation. In particular, they identified the existence of strong orientations for security and defense policy among current members as an obstruction. Ireland's neutrality was particularly problematic; the preference of the UK and Denmark for security cooperation through NATO was countered by French (and for a while Spanish) nonparticipation in NATO military structures. By the middle of the decade, enlargement to three additional states with historic policies of neutrality threatened to impede cooperation on security matters even further. It is no accident that all three acceding states repeatedly made explicit declarations of their intent to participate fully in CFSP structures and policies, including security matters and the then-"eventual" framing of a common defense policy.[4] In any case, policy orientation aside, achieving

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[2] The continued dominance in CFSP of intergovernmental decision-making processes reduces the value added of most (neo-) functionalist or similar arguments, though some analysts have described CFSP using multi-level governance frameworks. For example, see ME Smith (2004b); some of the contributions in Hill and M Smith (2005) also use this conception.

[3] Hoffmann (2000)

[4] CITES for declarations

consensus among fifteen was almost certain to be more difficult than among twelve who shared a long history of cooperation, if only because of the added transaction costs of negotiating with three more states.

The crises in the Balkans proved to be important for CFSP's development. By demonstrating so soon that the Union's willingness to act exceeded its capabilities, particularly in the sphere of militarized security matters and humanitarian intervention, the Union funneled its policies towards an emphasis on peacebuilding and reconstruction. Military components of the debacle also demonstrated the Union's limited capacity for power projection. The combination came to raise the importance of the Union's 'backyard' or 'neighborhood' in its policy activity, particularly as the Union engaged in a long-term effort to administer and rebuild the city of Mostar.

As time went on, enlargement to the formerly Communist states of central and eastern Europe raised a new set of issues for CFSP cooperation.[5] In addition to being part of the EU's 'neighborhood,' the Union felt a responsibility to prepare the candidate states for accession both politically and economically. In particular, this meant the promotion of democracy, the rule of law, and the observance of human rights.[6] Civil and political rights, reform of the judiciary, free and fair elections, and treatment of cultural and linguistic minorities came to occupy a prominent place in the range of policy issues the EU emphasized in its dialogues with these states. These issues were enshrined in the Treaties as components of the Union's external identity.[7]

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[5] See in particular the work of K. E. Smith (1999, 2006: especially 276-84), which explicitly considers enlargement as foreign policy.

[6] The primary mechanism for this was the so-called 'Copenhagen Criteria,' which established political criteria for the opening of accession negotiations and accession. European Council (1993).

[7] Article J.1 of the Treaty on European Union establishes the "develop[ment] and consolid[ation of] democracy and the rule of law, and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms" as one of the CFS's objectives. See European Communities (1991: J.1.2).

Exploring Cooperation

The outcome of interest for this study is the EU's cooperation on particular issues or events. In particular, I examine the EU's adoption of declarations, statements, joint actions, and common positions through its Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). While the 1994 Annual Report of the Activities of the European Union remarks that the CFSP coordination process "need not take place in the public domain," it continues on to say that these processes may "lead to the issuing of a statement where issues of special political significance are noted."[8] This paper focuses entirely on the public output of CFSP for several reasons. First, and most importantly from a methodological standpoint, private behavior cannot be observed systematically. The only instances of CFSP cooperation which occur in private but for which public records exist would be a small set of either particularly salient or particularly non-salient issues, where the leaking of diplomatic contact has either deliberate political implications or no political implications at all. This is a nonrandom set of issues whose inclusion potentially skews the data.

From a substantive and theoretical standpoint, inclusion of only public behavior makes sense because only public behavior can credibly convey information, disclose preferences, or have a signaling or shaming effect. If the purpose of foreign policy is to affect the behavior of other states, then the actor must communicate to the target something about the actor's preferences. These could be preferences for the upholding of particular international norms, for the taking or non-taking of particular actions, or for other behaviors. Both rationalists and constructivists deem communication to one state privately as a less effective method for conveying information and changing behavior, though for very different reasons. Rationalists see public communication as effective because it relies on the reputation of the sender, whereas for

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[8] Commission of the European Union (1995).

constructivists the effect of public communication is felt through the reputation of the *target*. In any case, both believe that public communication is in most cases more likely to be effective than private.

Methodological Concerns and Selection Bias

The methodology employed here is quantitative and large-n. This is a deliberate attempt to correct a rather important oversight in existing qualitative studies of CFSP cooperation, namely, the effect of selection bias. As Geddes (2003) demonstrated, the cases an analyst chooses can substantially affect his or her conclusions, and this is particularly true in small-n (qualitative) work. Causal inference in a small-n sample, where cases are selected on the basis of their value on the dependent variable, often results in two kinds of mistaken inferences about the nature of relationships in the data. First, it often "jump[s] to the conclusion that any characteristic the selected cases share is a cause" (Geddes 2003: 93). This is the logic of Mill's method of causal inference; when multiple possible causal paths exist, findings become more an artifact of case selection than of the true causal process.

Second, and more importantly for this work, causal inference in small samples often assumes that unobserved cases, such as ones with other values of the dependent variable, have the same relationship between the dependent variable and the purported causal variable as the selected cases (Geddes 2003: 94). In Geddes' example, the set of economically successful East Asian countries all have high levels of labor repression; the assumption then is that low levels of economic success, in East Asia and elsewhere, have low levels of labor repression. This assumption can lead analysts to conclude that success in East Asian states was a result of their level of labor repression. As Geddes convincingly demonstrates, though, when the full set of

developing countries, in East Asia and elsewhere, both successful and unsuccessful, is included in the study, labor repression has no relationship at all to economic growth rates. Unsuccessful states repress labor just as much as successful ones.

The implications of Geddes' work for research on cooperation are profound. We cannot study only cases of cooperation: The population of declarations, statements, conclusions, joint actions, and common positions is still a very narrow and nonrandom portion of the population of possible cases of cooperation. In the case of a consensus decision rule, any one state can block cooperation. This implies that the set of cases on which cooperation occurs is a highly biased set, one in which all (twelve) fifteen member states agree. Cases which are excluded from the sample are thus nonrandomly selected – success is perfectly correlated with the underlying variable of complete agreement – and this violates fundamental principles of inference. The result of selection on the dependent variable is that statistical results are biased towards finding no relationship even when one truly does exist.[9]

Moreover, including only prominent examples or cases of failed or non-cooperation, as in studies of the 2003 Iraq War, does not eliminate the selection bias, though it can help to mitigate it slightly. If an analyst selected a set of publicly known unsuccessful cases to include in an analysis, this set would be biased as well: non-success would be correlated with an omitted variable of saliency or prominence. Norms of secrecy and confidentiality in CFSP (Smith 2004a) prevent the majority of disagreements from becoming public knowledge. Only cases with high political value would enter public discussion through leaks or other forms of journalistic investigation.[10]

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[9] Geddes (2003:94)

[10] See Achen and Snidal (1989) for a well-known discussion of the pitfalls of prominent failures in the small-n analysis of deterrence.

Negative cases are important, then, for unbiased analysis. In cooperation, negative cases emerge from three separate processes. First, states could choose to discuss a topic but then be unable to reach agreement – this is failed cooperation. Collapsed negotiations leave a paper trail and public records in the form of media reports and diplomatic documents. This is the obvious route to identify and select negative cases, and in more transparent international processes such as negotiations to end civil wars, WTO negotiating rounds, etc., this is a valid approach. The analyst can identify the entire population of cases using these methods, and so analyze the population rather than a sample.

Negative cases can also occur, though, when the issue is never raised for discussion so that cooperation was never attempted. Two routes to this 'non-cooperation' exist. First, non-cooperation could emerge because the issue is collectively deemed unworthy of (or inappropriate for) cooperation. The issue is not part of the institution's remit, or it is insignificant or irrelevant to the members. The second route involves a more insidious selection mechanism. States may know from previous events or relationships that one or more members would block cooperation, and so they consciously and strategically opted not to pursue cooperation. This is a particularly important concern if failed cooperation carries substantial costs; the higher the potential costs of failure, the more risk-averse actors are likely to be.

Selecting an Unbiased Sample of Events

Identifying an unbiased sample of cases for cooperation requires a solution that allows all cases, *regardless of their values on the dependent variable*, to have an equal probability of entering the dataset. Instances of both failed and non-cooperation must join successful cooperation in the sample. One solution is to identify the set of all international events or issues

on which states possibly could have cooperated. No such population census of issues and events exists. A close substitute, though, is *Keesing's Contemporary Archives*, which is a global news digest. This monthly publication summarizes news and events from hundreds of sources around the world, using a consistent set of editorial criteria to guide selection and placement of items.[11] It thoroughly covers inter-state relations; it also covers domestic politics in major states and prominent issues in domestic politics of small states (coups, constitutional revision, major protests or riots, natural disasters, elections, etc.).

To achieve an unbiased sample for analysis, methodologists generally recommend a random sample to ensure that selection criteria do not deliberately correlate with the dependent variable.[12] In this case, I applied a double-random method to *Keesing's*. I randomly selected a stratified sample of pages from *Keesing's* and coded these to identify qualifying international events and issues. Because of the nature of EU cooperation, instances of foreign economic cooperation or issues of economic policy were not coded.[13] Each page contained from 0 to 7 qualifying international events, with the median page having 2. A random number generator then provided a way to select a single qualifying event from each page.

The final dataset spans the period 1994-2003, or the first full year of CFSP existence to the final year of the era of the Fifteen.[14] It contains 300 observations, or 37.68% of the 796

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[11] Personal communication, *Keesing's* staff, 2 March 2006.

[12] Geddes (2003: 97.

[13] Issues of foreign economic cooperation (trade agreements, loans and grants from international financial institutions, etc.) are addressed in the EU through the Pillar I/EC processes and require cooperation between the Council and the Commission. My interest here is primarily on Pillar II/CFSP cooperation between states only. Other sets of non-qualifying events included state and official visits, military aid, and military equipment sales. Additional discussions of coding rules are in a more extensive appendix about event selection rules (see fn 1).

[14] The 2004 enlargement brings a host of methodological and practical problems. Methodologically, the 66% increase in the number of members creates a fundamentally different dynamic for decision-making. The substantial difference in histories and experiences between the new and old members also makes the pool a strongly non-homogenous population, which complicates theorizing. In practical terms, later work will require discussion of events in the sample with diplomats, whose reluctance to talk may be amplified by events or issues that are still of political interest, so earlier cutoffs are desirable. It will also require information on unilateral activity on these

qualifying events observed in the initial sample. The events in the final sample span the full range of geographic locations, issue areas, degrees of immediacy or urgency, and levels of salience.[15] This large random sample of events is, by the properties of random selection, a reasonable approximation of the full population of events and issues that states address in foreign policy.

The *Bulletin of the European Union* provided information on EU activity on each issue. In particular, it identified instances of statements, conclusions, joint actions and common positions – the four primary CFSP instruments of interest here.[16] The dependent variable for most analyses below is whether the EU adopts any of these four instruments for a given issue or event. Other analyses below use an ordered probit approach exploring total number of different instruments employed, and whether cooperation passed beyond the declaratory stage.

This coding of CFSP activity reflects a random sample of issues. It does not, and does not presume to, capture all CFSP activity. The EU does many things through CFSP which are not reflected here. In particular, internal institution-building is not captured in this coding, nor are most efforts to develop forward-looking proactive policies. Most ongoing or long-term activities, such as the reconstruction and administration of the city of Mostar, drop out of the study after a period, when they fail to continue to make headlines. A random sample of CFSP activity itself would certainly capture a better idea of the range of activity conducted with CFSP. The interest here, however, is not *what* the CFSP does substantively but *when* – in response to what sets of issues and antagonists – the CFSP is able to act at all. A random sample of events and CFSP

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selected issues from each state for the entire study period. This poses a major challenge for the enlargement countries, many of whom do not have published records for that era in any widely-accessible language.

[15] Appendix 1 of this paper contains descriptive statistics about the data used here, including the dependent variable. A more extensive appendix describing event selection and coding procedures is available on my website (see fn 1).

[16] Common strategies are used only rarely and, during the period of this study, exist only in areas where much other activity occurs. As forward-looking framework documents, they are less of interest here than specific instances of concrete cooperation in the present.

responses to events would not be expected to produce a representative picture of CFSP activity *unless* no strategic selection occurs, that is, unless all world events and issues have an equal probability of being addressed by CFSP.

Hypothesizing About CFSP Cooperation

Two sets of factors affect the EU's ability to cooperate: issue area and characteristics of the state holding the presidency. Because the presidency controls the agenda, formal activity is influenced by presidency characteristics; I return to this matter below.

First, issue area should matter. The presence of neutral states, initially including Ireland but then adding Austria, Finland and Sweden after the 1995 enlargement, should decrease the probability of acting on security and defense issues. This should be particularly true after the 1995 enlargement, when a clear neutral caucus emerges.[17]

> *H1: Facing a security or defense issue should decrease the probability of cooperation.*

> *H2: The interaction between security and defense issues and the 1995 enlargement should decrease the probability of cooperation.*

The EU has also developed a set of issues that it identifies as its 'external identity,' which are increasingly specified in each successive treaty. Cooperation on these issues is, in theory at least, a fundamental goal of CFSP. One of the most prominent components of this external identity as it has developed in practice is the promotion of human rights, including

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[17] The presence of Britain and Denmark, which are both generally Atlanticist in their foreign policy orientation and prefer to act on security and defense issues through NATO, would also decrease the likelihood of cooperation. But because this hypothesis depends on the presence of an alternative forum – NATO – as a substitute for the EU, I do not address it here. Later work tackles the substitutability of institutions in European foreign policy cooperation.

abolition of the death penalty.[18] The Union also sees itself as a major promoter of regional

integration and other forms of international cooperation.[19]

> ***H3***: *Human rights issues have an increased probability of cooperation.*

> ***H4***: *The interaction of human rights issues and time increases the probability of*

> *cooperation.*

> ***H5***: *Regional integration issues have an increased probability of cooperation.*

Second, region should matter. Events in the EU's 'neighborhood' of non-EU Europe and

the former Soviet Union should draw more attention because of the risk of spillover from

instability or other problems, and also from the possibility of enlargement. The latter concern is

particularly relevant for human rights and democratization issues.

> ***H6***: *Compared to events elsewhere, geographically proximate issues (i.e., ones*

> *occurring in non-EU Europe or the former Soviet Union) should have an*

> *increased probability of cooperation.*

> ***H7***: *The interaction of human rights or democratization issues with geographic*

> *proximity should increase the probability of cooperation.*

I evaluate these hypotheses using a dummy variable that indicates if an event is in the EU's

'Neighborhood' (i.e., central/eastern Europe or the former Soviet Union), and interact this with

an additional dummy variable indicating human rights or democratization issues.

Third, enlargement should matter. This is captured in ***H2*** above, in the effects of the new

members' particular security policy orientations, but it should also matter more generally. The

transaction costs of achieving consensus among 15 are greater than for 12; this cost would persist

after the members join and would not dissipate. Uncertainty about the new members' true

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[18] Manners (2002).

[19] Treaty on European Union Article J.1.2, and its successor Article 11.1 in the Treaty of Amsterdam, identify the objectives of CFSP. See European Union (1991) and European Union (1997).

preferences and willingness to cooperate may also affect the Union's overall propensity to cooperate, but the passage of time should ease this latter concern. I model enlargement in two ways: first, with a post-enlargement dummy variable which equals 1 for all events after 1 January 1995, the date of formal accession to the Union, and second, with a variable whose value declines over time, from 1 in 1995 to 0.5 in 1996, 0.25 in 1997, 0 in 1998 and all years thereafter.

> **H9**: *The 1995 enlargement should have a negative effect on cooperation in all*
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> *future years by raising transaction costs.*
>
> **H8**: *The influence of the 1995 enlargement should diminish over time as states*
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> *become re-socialized into the new institutional environment.*

In addition to the mechanisms presented above, several other claims exist in the academic literature about CFSP cooperation. As suggested in **H9**, the first is a socialization argument. As states interact over longer periods of time, they become more familiar with each others' positions and with the effects of the institutions in which they cooperate. State preferences may or may not shift, but familiarity with preferences and institutions increases state willingness to cooperate on a broader range of issues.[20] I model the effects of socialization here with a time trend variable

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[20] CITE! This mechanism seems to blur with a rationalist sense of Bayesian learning, in which states reduce their uncertainty by incorporating newly revealed information into their strategies for subsequent rounds. The current model is unable to distinguish between the two mechanisms; future work on preference formation may shed light on this issue.

measuring time since creation of the CFSP institutions.[21] I treat November and December of

1993 as the "zero" year (excluded from the sample) and begin with 1994 = 1, 1995 = 2, etc.[22]

H10: Socialization [time] should increase the probability of cooperation.

Hypotheses About Presidency Influence

The identity of the state holding the presidency may influence CFSP output. As the data

in Figure 1 indicate, presidencies vary substantially in their levels of foreign policy activity. As

the primary agenda-setter in the Council, including CFSP and all other matters, the presidency

allows states an opportunity to stamp their own priorities on the Union's policy activity. For the

period of the six-month presidency, the state's leaders serve as the 'face' of the Union's external

policy, and agenda power allows states to pursue their own special interests.[23] For small states in

particular, who lack the power to influence international events unilaterally, this provides an

unusual opportunity for international exposure, visibility, and prestige.[24]

H11: Union activity is more likely if a small state holds the presidency.[25]

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[21] A time trend variable may also capture the effect of the development of a common identity among members. Identity development would presumably have begun during the EPC years, though it may have accelerated in the CFSP era. A model which spanned the formal creation of CFSP should produce a significant result on a time-trend variable if identity development and cohesion occurs, while also having a significant coefficient on a socialization time-trend variable which only begins with the creation of the formal institutions. Data limitations currently do not permit testing this claim.

[22] The accession of Austria, Finland and Sweden in January 1995 may complicate this issue. Efforts to investigate this question empirically are complicated by the accession only 14 months after the Treaty's entry into force; I am unable to obtain sufficient variation to test directly. Alternate specifications of variables to capture socialization effects which account for this enlargement are not significant and do not affect the substantive results of the reported model.

[23] E.g., Edwards (2006: 55).

[24] Edwards (2006: 55-56).

[25] An alternative possibility is that small states, which lack the extensive bureaucracies of the larger states, may be politically willing but physically unable to coordinate as much activity and so we should expect a negative coefficient. (See, e.g., Edwards (2006).)The development of the Council secretariat over this time period, as well as the substantial experience of three of the four small states in holding the presidency, raise doubts about empirical support.

On the other hand, large states have at least some minimal ability to influence world events; perhaps they see the Union as a set of resources to tap to enhance their influence. Large states are also more likely to have extensive trade relations with other states outside the Union, which may increase their interest in and attention to events abroad.[26]

H12: Union activity is more likely if a large state holds the presidency.

Large states are the 'Big 5': France, the UK, Germany, Italy, and Spain. Small states are those with three or fewer council votes during the period: Luxembourg, Ireland, Denmark, and Finland after enlargement.[27]

'Great Powers' are a separate category. States which hold permanent seats on the UN Security Council, which possess nuclear weapons and extensive sets of military installations abroad, and which have far-flung trade exposure may be particularly well-attuned to and active in foreign affairs. Their large foreign affairs bureaucracies can handle the demands of a presidency with the most ease, and would have sufficient capacity to process and manage extensive cooperation. The foreign military installations in particular, and seats on the Security Council, may make them particularly attuned to security issues. A separate dummy variable for Great Powers indicates France and the United Kingdom.

H13: Union activity is more likely if a Great Power holds the presidency.

H14: Union activity is more likely if a Great Power holds the presidency and the issue is security-related.

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[26] Edwards (2006: 52) makes a counterclaim, that efforts by large states, who *do* possess the ability to influence international affairs unilaterally, has resulted in their reluctance to use the EU for cooperation and a continued preference for *domaines réservés* and bilateral relationships.

[27] Data drawn from Hix (1999: 70) and reflect voting weights used in the Treaty of Maastricht (TEU) era. Substantively, a higher threshold may be desirable, but methodologically it is not possible. A higher threshold of 4 votes makes this category too highly correlated with neutral presidencies to include both in the same model. A threshold of 5 votes eases the collinearity problem with neutral presidencies but then thirteen of the fifteen states are either "small" or "big." The two variables are nearly a linear combination equal to 1 and so cannot be included in the same model.

States with former colonial empires are also likely to retain substantial trade flows outside the Union and to have vested economic and political interests in their former colonies.

H15: Union activity is more likely if a former colonial state holds the presidency.

A dummy variable indicates the seven EU states with colonial empires: France, the United Kingdom, Belgium, Portugal, the Netherlands, Spain, and Italy.[28] Data limitations prohibit coding only for events in or affecting former colonies, so the colonial dummy takes the value of 1 for any event during the presidency of a former colonial state.

On a related note, we might also expect that neutral states have less engagement with the world, particularly in security affairs, and so are less likely to be active in foreign policy. This would be particularly true for security issues, which they find sensitive.[29]

H16: Union activity is less likely if a neutral state holds the presidency.

H17: Union activity is less likely if a neutral state holds the presidency and the issue is security-related.

Finally, an additional factor to consider here is the norm of presidential neutrality. Holders of the presidency are expected to set aside, or at least not explicitly pursue, their national interests during their period of leadership, and they should work for the good of the Union.[30] The strength of this norm is debated; some scholars find evidence in support of such a norm, while others point to French behavior during the final negotiations on the Treaty of Nice as evidence

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[28] Alternative models excluding Spain, Italy, and the Netherlands, which are substantially less colonial than the others, produce identical results. Spain lost its last colony (the Philippines) during the 1901 Spanish-American War; Italy came late to the colonial game but lost Ethiopia and Eritrea as part of the Second World War rather than through any actual decolonization process; and the Netherlands had only Suriname and the Netherlands Antilles. The other four experienced significant shifts in their foreign policies in the postwar period as a result of decolonization, and this would affect foreign policy in ways that are not true for the three debatable cases.

[29] We might also expect states to be less active during their first experience with the presidency, which is often an overwhelming task; unfortunately this variable is too collinear with neutrality to permit its inclusion since three of the four neutrals (the enlargement states) are the only ones to experience a first presidency during the study period.

[30] CITE

that if such a norm exists, it is weak and easily broken when clear national interests demand.[31] If this norm holds, we should see no or few significant coefficients on the presidency characteristic variables identified above. The influence of particular identities of presidency holders should not affect the probability of cooperation.

Control Variables

Commission activity on an issue enters the models as a control. The Council delegated responsibility for humanitarian affairs to the Commission even prior to the formal start of CFSP. Commission activity in this case serves as a (full or partial) substitute for Council activity and should decrease the probability of the Council acting. In 1999-2000, the EU standardized its procedures and criteria for elections assistance and monitoring; the resulting policy was delegated to the Commission for administration.[32] I code Commission activity as humanitarian aid or aid for refugees/displaced persons for the country in question, or technical and project grants if they are explicitly related to the issue under consideration.[33] The latter characteristic captures most election assistance as well as some forms of 'carrot' aid given as incentives for desired behavior. For example, Guatemala's major peace agreement of 1995 was followed immediately by a large series of Commission-funded projects for the reintegration of paramilitary units back into society, for the rebuilding of schools and infrastructure damaged by the war, and other similar items.[34]

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[31] CITES.

[32] See COMM (2000) 191 975/EC, 976/EC [OJ L 120]; the Council's adoption of election observer guidelines is noted in Bull. 6-1999 1.3.2.

[33] All Commission activity is coded from the *Bulletin of the European Union*, cited in the standard format (Bull.).

[34] For the Guatemala example, see Bull. 10-1996 1.4.48; Bull 11-1998 1.4.115; Bull. 12-1996 1.4.42, 1.4.46, 1.4.96, 1.4.97; Bull. 1/2-97 1.3.68.

The European Parliament in Foreign Affairs

In addition, I hypothesize that activity by the European Parliament (EP) may in some ways serve as a substitute for Council action in particularly sensitive human rights issues. The EP and its directly elected members have no formal authority to act in the EU's external relations, and despite frequent calls from the Parliament for its greater involvement, CFSP and other external policymaking processes remain centered firmly in the Council. The EP is known for passing a large number of nonbinding foreign affairs resolutions every year. Often these are rather frivolous-sounding and of little effect, such as the ones condemning child labor in the production of sports equipment (specifically citing FIFA soccer balls used at World Cup matches in Germany),[35] on the situation of the elderly in developing countries,[36] and on the sexual abuse of women (with particular reference to Catholic nuns by priests).[37]

Paradoxically, though, the EP's main weakness in foreign affairs – its lack of 'state' or 'international actor' status – may be its main source of strength. As a non-state actor, it is not bound by conventional rules of propriety in relations among states: noninterference in domestic affairs, implicit (or explicit) respect for powerful states, etc. Parliament regularly protests or denounces policies or events in the United States, China, and Russia, even when the Council has been uncharacteristically silent. The Council may see or acknowledge this kind of behavior as complementary to its own, and indeed may even encourage it.[38] At a minimum, with or without Council recognition, independent EP activity serves at least as a partial substitute for Council

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[35] Bull. 6-2002 1.2.1.
[36] Bull. 5-1994 1.3.92.
[37] Bull. 4-2001 1.2.1.
[38] Without conducting interviews, I am unable to identify to what extent the Council (tacitly or explicitly) encourages this behavior or accepts it as a partial substitute for its own actions. I plan to pursue this line of questioning in Brussels next winter.

behavior and should decrease the likelihood of CFSP cooperation on an issue.[39] EP activity is

coded from the *Bulletin*'s reports. It must appear in the 'The Union's Role in the World' chapter

of the *Bulletin*. Resolutions must be own-initiative rather than a response to a Commission

publication; they must also be about the substance of policy, not simply about inter-institutional

prerogatives.

> **H18**: *Action by the European Parliament should decrease the likelihood of*
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> *cooperation.*

Cooperation Patterns in the EU

Evidence about overall cooperation in the EU'S CFSP is mixed. If socialization

arguments are correct, we should expect, overall, an increase in activity over the studied period

as the states learn each other's preferences and familiarize themselves with the workings of the

institutions. As a first cut at this issue, Figure 1 presents the average number of statements

released in a month by each EU presidency since 1994. This represents only one type of

cooperation that may occur, but provides a reasonably reliable measure of CFSP output initiated

by each presidency. Levels of cooperation vary here from a low of 7 statements a month from

the Spanish presidency of late 1995, to a high of 19.8 statements a month by the Swedish

presidency of early 2001. These figures do show an upward trend, albeit a very slight one: on

average, each successive presidency issues 0.38 statements more a month, or about 2 more

statements a presidency, than its predecessor. Figure 2 plots the data against its regression line,

with the 95% confidence interval showing the clear statistical significance of the coefficient.

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[39] Its additional habit of addressing thorny or politically awkward issues should also result in a lower probability of the Council addressing the issue. I am unable to separate the two mechanisms in the current dataset but may pursue the question in the future.

Alternate models suggest that the 1995 enlargement may have had a negative influence on cooperation levels, but the coefficient is insignificant.[40]

[Figure 1 about here]

[Figure 2 about here]

[Table 1 about here]

As an indicator of overall cooperation, the statement counts suggest that yes, CFSP is becoming more active and more productive over time. Data comparing CFSP activity to the broader sample of international events paints a different picture, though. Compared to the random sample of international events described above and in the appendix, CFSP activity has not increased substantially relative to the number of possible events or issues to which it could respond. Figure 3 shows the proportion of events receiving cooperation for each year of the sample, where the Council adopting a statement, conclusion, joint action, or common position on the issue or event in question. The fitted regression line shows a positive but insignificant trend. Interestingly, post-regression analysis suggests that the most influential observation is 1995, which has a substantial and negative residual. Additional models controlling for post-enlargement also failed to produce significant coefficients on either variable, though both signs are in the predicted directions.[41]

[Figure 3 about here]

[Table 2 about here]

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[40] All analysis is conducted in Stata 8.2.

[41] Disaggregation to presidencies, to parallel the first analysis, produces a negative effect; some presidencies cooperate on zero or one event in their period. In such a short overall period, though, when the dataset contains about 12-14 events for a typical presidency, this is probably more a function of the small sample size than of an actual decrease in CFSP activity. 300 events is a substantial number over a decade, but over 20 presidencies it produces a mean of 15 events per presidency.

Evaluating Hypotheses About Issue Characteristics

The hypotheses above group loosely into two categories: those related to characteristics of the issue (issue area, region of the world, time, and related interactions), and characteristics of the actors (presidencies and related interactions, action by other institutions).

I investigate these hypotheses using a probit model. The dependent variable captures whether any cooperation occurs within the Council on or in reaction to a specific event or issue from the *Keesing's* sample. Any cooperation here refers to the issuing of a statement or conclusions (at any level), or the passage of a joint action or common position on the issue.

The Core Model

Table 3 shows the results of a core probit model testing most of the hypotheses above. Model 1 in the first column is the primary focus of discussion; models 2-5 are robustness checks.[42] As is unsurprising in such preliminary work, evidence for the hypotheses is mixed.

Enlargement and Time

The effects of the 1995 enlargement are complex. Enlargement was hypothesized to affect cooperation in several ways: through an increase in transactions costs caused by larger membership (**H9**), by making cooperation on security issues more difficulty (**H2**), and disrupting existing institutional patterns as the new members are socialized into the system (**H8**). A simple dummy indicating events which occurred after the enlargement (*Enlargement* in the table) is consistently insignificant and inconsistently signed, which generally leads to the rejection of **H9**. Despite support from Koremenos et al. (2001) and contributors there, adding more members by itself does not appear to impede cooperation notably in this case.

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[42] All predicted probabilities reported in this paper are generated using CLARIFY 2.0 and Model 1. See King et al. (2000) and Tomz et al. (2001).

An alternate and somewhat more sophisticated understanding of the effects of enlargement is captured by the *Enlargement2* variable. This variable takes the value of 1 in 1995 and then decreases to 0.5 in 1996 and 0.25 in 1997.[43] While these values themselves are arbitrary, they reflect the idea that the effect of enlargement should decrease over time as the new members are socialized into the system and old members adapt to the new institutional dynamics. This variable performs much better, both in models testing it alone and in conjunction with the other complementary conception of enlargement. It is consistently significant and negatively signed. Table 4 shows the change in probability of any action being adopted across the years required to integrate the new members into the CFSP system.

[Table 4 About Here]

This finding appears to provide considerable support for *H8*. Findings on the 'time' variable, however, seem to contradict or weaken this support. Time, as a counter variable indicating number of years of experience with CFSP, is correctly signed in only one model and does not ever approach statistical significance. In most models, states are *less* likely to cooperate as time goes on, suggesting some sort of reverse socialization effect.

Interestingly, though, neither understanding of enlargement produces an effect on the likelihood of cooperation on security issues. Security issues themselves do not appear to be significantly less likely to obtain cooperation; the coefficient on security alone is always insignificant and inconsistently signed. Neither form of interaction term (*Enlargement* or *Enlargement2*) produces a significant effect in any reported model or in unreported robustness checks. Model 2's p value is best, at around 0.475 – still well outside the bounds of conventional standards of statistical significance. *H2* is thus also rejected by this set of tests.

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[43] This is equivalent to modeling a shock to the system which then decays. 1997 represents the last 'transition year' because the new member states were considered sufficiently integrated into the system by 1998 to begin holding the presidency in that year.

Additional Union Institutions and Activity

Action by the Commission has no direct effect on the probability of cooperation. This is generally expected, since the Commission activity variable captures a host of different kinds of actions including refugee aid, humanitarian aid, project aid, and more. Oddly, the variable is inconsistently signed but almost always marginally significant ($p < 0.2$). This is perplexing; hopefully further analysis, perhaps with disaggregated forms of Commission activity, will clarify this relationship.[44]

Perhaps most surprisingly, the coefficient on EP action is always positive, always substantively large, and always highly significant, even across dozens of robustness checks. The EP's foreign policy activity may seem frivolous at times, but by and large, the data suggest that action by the EP is strongly related to action by the Council. The dataset is unable to distinguish a causal effect – it includes EP actions both before and after any Council action – but the relationship is clear and unambiguous. If the EP acts on an issue, the probability of the Council acting as well increases by 41.5%, from 25.3% to 66.8%. The EP is acting on issues that are important enough to the Union for the Council to act on them as well – even if it does spend additional time on minor and trivial matters like the source of FIFA footballs. **H18** is thus soundly rejected.

Issue Area

As remarked above, the issue area of security is never statistically significant though it is in the predicted direction; **H1** has no support here. Issues of democratization, including elections, constitutional revision, and installation of civilian governments, are likewise insignificant though

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[44] Commission activity may be insignificant because much related variance is being absorbed by the consistently-significant *Humanitarian* issue area variable. The two are highly correlated; an interaction term for Commission activity on humanitarian issues was too collinear to include in the analysis. This is unfortunate as it would have begun to allow investigation of the inconsistent signing on the Commission variable. I am investigating alternatives.

it too is correctly signed. Regional integration (**H5**), on contrast, is negatively signed (instead of the predicted positive) but insignificant.

Several issue areas do consistently produce significant coefficients. Humanitarian issues are correctly signed and statistically significant, suggesting a clear pattern of delegation to the Commission. Indeed, an interaction term indicating humanitarian issues with Commission activity was too collinear to include in any models.

Human rights issues, in contrast, are significant but in the *opposite* direction than predicted in **H3**. According to the base model, a human rights issue is 24.2% less likely to see cooperation than other issues. This effect is mitigated over time, though, as suggested by **H4**. The interaction of human rights issues and time is positive and significant, suggesting that, all else equal, a human rights issue in 2000 (the seventh year of CFSP existence) is 57.98% more likely to receive a response than one in 1996 (the third year of CFSP).

Unfortunately, though, the data provide no support for **H7**, on the effect of democratization and human rights issues in the EU's 'Neighborhood.' Neither interaction term is significant; in the case of human rights, the sign is incorrect. Various robustness checks, including aggregating human rights and democratization issues into a single variable, and disaggregating the Neighborhood into its constituent regions, also fail to produce any significant results. The Union may talk a strong line on the importance of human rights observance and democratization in the then-candidate countries, but in practice, it does not appear to apply more emphasis to these issues than to others.

Alternative Conceptions of Cooperation: Ordered Models

The set of models presented above treats the dependent variable as dichotomous: did any form of cooperation occur, or not? Two alternative conceptions of the phenomenon of interest exist. The first examines the extent of cooperation: how many different instruments did the EU use? Unfortunately, no additional theory exists to help us understand when more is better or is more likely to occur. The only expectation, then, is that an ordered probit model using a count of number of different types of instruments adopted should produce stronger coefficients than the standard probit model. Exploiting the additional information of how many instrument types the EU uses should increase the efficiency of the model and allow for smaller standard errors. The highest number of instrument types adopted is three; a number of cases received both statements and declarations, but no case received both a common position and a joint action.[45]

The second conception of the dependent variable involves a theoretically more sophisticated question about the adoption of "higher" or deeper forms of cooperation. Joint actions and common positions involve changing or initiating behavior; they are legally binding in ways that declarations or statements are not. The combination of legally binding agreements and commitment of resources or actions means that cooperation carries costs, which increases its credibility, and/or that a state (or the Union) incurs specific reputational costs for backing down or defecting from the agreement. Invoking these costs (or at least their risks) moves the depth of cooperation beyond cost-free declarations and statements.

For this second ordered analysis, the dependent variable takes the value of 1 if a form of 'low' cooperation occurred (statement or declaration); it takes the value of 2 if a joint action or common position occurred. The dependent variable's value thus reflects the highest form of

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[45] Figure A1 in the appendix displays the frequency count for all values of this dependent variable.

cooperation adopted for that event or issue.[46] Data limitations, though, may complicate the analysis, since only twelve cases achieved any form of higher cooperation. All results from this model should be interpreted with that caveat in mind.

[Table 5 About Here]

Table 5 shows the results of both types of probit model. Model 1 shows the analysis of total number of instrument types adopted, under the heading of 'total activity.' As before, time and a general post-enlargement indicator fail to register significant results. The model of enlargement as a shock to the system, though, again produces a significant result, albeit of weaker significance than the standard probit models of Table 4. The European Parliament continues to produce a strong positive coefficient, though the coefficient on Commission activity falls substantially short of its previous significance values. In issue areas, humanitarian concerns still receive the predicted negative and significant coefficient; the interaction of human rights and time remains significant in the predicted direction though human rights in itself is insignificant. Security concerns, democratization, and regional integration remain insignificant. In an odd twist, though, the interaction of democratization and neighborhood (central Europe and the former Soviet Union) is significant while neither of its components are.

In short, though, beyond this odd result involving democratization (but not human rights) in nearby regions, this form of analysis appears to add no additional value to our understanding of CFSP cooperation. If anything, we appear to lose some traction on the question by analyzing

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[46] At least two alternative models for this data exist. The first is a polychotomous probit, where the categories of "declaration or statement" and "common position or joint action" are interpreted as simply different rather than ordered (i.e., the dependent variable is categorical rather than ordinal). Robustness checks using this type of model show no substantively different results than the ordered probit model presented here, though the theoretical understanding of the results of course differs. The second alternative model is a seemingly unrelated probit (SUP) approach, where the use of each instrument constitutes a model of its own but the models themselves are not independent and are linked through the error terms. This allows the instruments to be treated both as different from, and as complements or substitutes for, one another. The small number of joint action and common position cases in this dataset makes the SUP approach infeasible here.

the data in this form; the relatively small percentage of events obtaining any cooperation means that the same small amount of variance is now distributed over even more outcome categories.

The second conception of cooperation, analyzing the adoption of "higher" and "lower" forms of cooperation, also fails to add to our understanding of CFSP activity. Patterns of significant coefficients and signs are similar to those of previous models. Overall, neither ordered model makes any substantial improvement in fit. This could in part be a result of the small number of cases obtaining the higher value; one should note though that in all the ordered models, the cutpoints for going from one instrument to two or more, or from low cooperation to high cooperation, are statistically significant.

Evaluating Hypotheses About State Characteristics

Table 6 shows the results of probit models of any cooperation. Model 1 includes only presidency state characteristics, time/enlargement, and other EU institutions, while model 2 introduces the issue area variables (and issue area interactions) from above. Model 3 is the complete model, including presidency characteristics, time/enlargement, issue area, and all relevant interaction terms; this model is the focus of the discussion below.

The results are rather damning. The single most prominent finding in the entire model is not a significant coefficient, but is instead the *lack* of significance on the coefficients of *any* presidency-related variable in *any* model.[47] The contribution of these variable's to the model's fit are moderate in absolute size but still fairly important in relative terms, though, so we cannot discount the importance of these factors in predicting behavior. The net result of the failure of all of these characteristics to predict is support, though the back door, for a reasonably strong and

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[47] This includes several robustness checks not reported here using other codings of colonial powers.

reasonably effective norm of presidency neutrality and defense of Union interests, at least in CFSP.

Of interest for further exploration, though, are the negative coefficients on both small-state and 'Big 5' presidencies. The small state coefficient is the reverse of the one predicted above in *H11*, though the footnote does discuss that perhaps bureaucratic capacity is a factor here. The expansion of the Council secretariat during this time period for these purposes, though, and other developments in staffing and structure make this result somewhat puzzling, particularly in light of the negative sign on Big 5 presidencies. Big 5 presidencies were hypothesized to have the necessary resources, bureaucratic, political, diplomatic, and otherwise, to use CFSP frequently and effectively for either their own or the Union's interests. The negative sign is puzzling here as well, though future analysis about the use of alternative institutions may help to shed light on this subject.

Conclusions and Next Steps

The EU's activity in CFSP generally shows only weak trends. Overall quantities of cooperation may have increased, but not significantly. The range of issues addressed appears to have broadened in some respects and become more focused in others, as the interaction of human rights issues and time suggests. Commission activity in humanitarian issues, and to some extent in general, acts as a substitute for Council action through the CFSP. In contrast, activity by the European Parliament is *not* a substitute for CFSP activity. Either the EP's directly elected status gives its resolutions their own legitimacy, so that the Parliament has a weight of its own in international affairs, or the Parliament's non-state status makes its resolutions meaningless and generally ignored by policymakers outside the EU.

Most of the findings contradict expectations from the conventional wisdom, and most are substantively significant in their statistical nonsignificance. Contrary to expectations, events and issues in the EU's 'Neighborhood' do not receive more attention, even when those events/issues are related to the EU's core concerns of democratization and human rights. The 1995 enlargement to three neutral states decreased the probability of cooperation on any issue for several years, but security issues did not appear to be affected more than any other type of issue.

The model, however, is not complete. As noted above, Commission activity as coded here includes a range of actions; separating these to understand the influence of the Commission's actions is a critical component of the research. In addition, issues/events of conflict resolution processes or attempts should be coded as an issue area, and coding for colonial masters is blanket rather than specific to former colonies; data limitations currently prohibit both types of analysis, and these need rectified. How does issue salience matter? Is the model predicting behavior poorly because most of the sample's events are of low or moderate salience? Finally, extensions of this work will consider how much the presence of other potential institutional venues for cooperation affects the extent of cooperation in the EU.

Figure 1. Average Number of Statements Per Month, By Presidency

Average Statements per Month, by Presidency

Figure 2. Average Statements Over Time.

Average Number of Statements Over Time

Figure 3. EU Cooperation Over Time.

Table 1. Statements Per Presidency.

OLS Regression:

Average Number of Statements per Month, by Presidency	Model 1	Model 2
Time (presidency)	0.3834***	0.4045**
	(0.964)	(0.1159)
Post-enlargement		-0.7786
		(2.2268)
Constant	8.1636***	8.6431***
	(1.156)	(1.812)
n	20	20

Standard errors in parentheses. *** p < 0.01 ** p<0.05

Table 2. Share of Events with Cooperation.

OLS Regression:

Percentage of Events With Cooperation	Model 1	Model 2
Time (years since CFSP creation)	0.3642	0.3967
	(0.826)	(1.035)
Post-enlargement		- 0.5944
		(9.096)
Constant	25.146***	25.503**
	(5.123)	(8.081)
n	10	10

Standard errors in parentheses. *** *p* < 0.01 ** *p*<0.05

Table 3. Probit Analysis of Any Cooperation.

Probit: Any Cooperation	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Time	-0.075	0.020	-0.766	-0.025
	(0.556)	(0.026)	(0.55)	(0.037)
Enlargement	0.279	-0.329	0.581	
	(0.542)	(0.457)	(0.461)	
Enlargement2	-1.078**		-1.095**	-0.726
	(0.476)		(0.530)	(0.434)*
Neighborhood	0.080	0.118	0.108	0.125
	(0.228)	(0.195)	(0.198)	(0.196)
Commission	-0.370*	0.3516	-0.362	0.324
	(0.221)	(0.218)	(0.221)	(0.218)
European Parliament	1.121***	1.042***	1.105***	1.101***
	(0.250)	(0.242)	(0.250)	(0.248)
Human Rights	-3.017*	-1.671*	-2.060*	-1.831*
	(2.071)	(0.918)	(1.087)	(0.988)
Democratization	0.089	0.184	0.245	0.245
	(0.324)	(0.269)	(0.278)	(0.276)
Regional Integration	-0.566	-0.554	-0.512	-0.521
	(0.589)	(0.595)	(0.570)	(0.585)
Security	-0.451	-0.393	0.026	-0.014
	(0.569)	(0.565)	(0.220)	(0.327)
Humanitarian	-1.083*	-1.166**	-1.062*	-1.088*
	(0.596)	(0.591)	(0.602)	(0.602)
Security * Enlg	0.536	0.489		
	(0.593)	(0.587)		
Security * Enlg2			0.40	0.072
			(0.622)	(0.615)
Hum Rts * Time	0.332**	0.272**	0.325**	0.291**
	(0.134)	(0.117)	(0.137)	(0.124)
Democratization * Neighborhood	0.509			
	(0.568)			
Hum Rts * Neighborhood	-0.314			
	(0.678)			
Constant		-0.632	0.078**	-0.591**
		(0.428)	(0.334)	(0.293)
N	300	300	300	300
Log Likelihood	-153.985	-157.430	-154.930	-155.735

Standard errors in parentheses. *** $p<0.01$ ** $p<0.05$ * $p<0.1$

Table 4. The Effect of Enlargement on the Probability of Cooperation

Year	Enlargement	Enlargement2	Time	Pr(cooperation)
1994	0	0	1	29.53%
1995	1	1	2	8.58%
1996	1	0.5	3	16.79%
1997	1	0.25	4	21.82%
1998	1	0	5	27.82%
1999	1	0	6	25.30%

Predicted probabilities generated in Stata 8.2 using the Clarify 2.0 routine. All variables are held at their medians (0) unless reported here.

Table 5. Ordered Probit Models.

Ordered Probit	Total Activity	"Highest" Activity	"Highest" Activity (2)
Time	-0.061	-0.078	-0.080
	(0.053)	(0.054)	(0.054)
Enlargement	0.213	0.065	0.182
	(0.524)	(0.519)	(0.502)
Enlargement2	-0.871*	-0.654	-0.770*
	(0.446)	(0.432)	(0.427)
Neighborhood	0.083	0.153	0.174
	(0.216)	(0.216)	(0.212)
Commission	0.302	0.427**	0.369*
	(0.207)	(0.206)	(0.199)
European Parliament	1.174***	1.121***	1.080***
	(0.222)	(0.228)	(0.222)
Human Rights	-1.773	-1.828*	-1.717*
	(1.004)	(0.977)	(0.994)
Democratization	0.068	0.076	0.189
	(0.311)	(0.306)	(0.303)
Regional Integration	-0.567	-0.777	-0.649
	(0.584)	(0.586)	(0.581)
Security	-0.226	-0.166	0.035
	(0.543)	(0.525)	(0.508)
Humanitarian	-1.140*	-8.966	
	(0.599)	(2.31e+07)	
Security * Enlg	0.284	0.078	-0.013
	(0.564)	(0.549)	(0.534)
Hum Rts * Time	0.275**	0.285**	0.281*
	(0.123)	(0.122)	(0.124)
Democratization *	0.853*	0.838	0.798
Neighborhood	(0.512)	(0.515)	(0.513)
		(p<0.104)	
Hum Rts * Neighborhood	-0.208	-0.770	-0.792
	(0.638)	(0.712)	(0.711)
Cut 1	0.547	0.266	0.436
	(0.425)	(0.412)	(0.386)
Cut 2	1.843	1.738	1.875
	(0.444)	(0.436)	(0.412)
Cut 3	2.522		
	(0.483)		
N	300	300	300
Log Likelihood	-195.835	-184.359	-190.349

Standard errors in parentheses. *** $p<0.01$ ** $p<0.05$ * $p<0.1$

Table 6. Evaluating Hypotheses About State Characteristics

Probit: Any Cooperation	(1)	(2)	(3)
Time	-0.041	-0.073	-0.084
	(0.058)	(0.062)	(0.063)
Enlargement	0.668	0.316	0.359
	(0.560)	(0.652)	(0.662)
Enlargement2	-0.088*	-1.045**	-1.158**
	(0.464)	(0.499)	(0.537)
Commission	0.277	0.373*	0.366
	(0.209)	(0.223)	(0.224)
European Parliament	1.128***	1.124***	1.100***
	(0.245)	(0.254)	(0.256)
Small Presidency	-0.188	-0.080	-0.065
	(0.286)	(0.298)	(0.299)
Big 5 Presidency	-0.171	-0.076	-0.082
	(0.241)	(0.252)	(0.254)
Great Power Presidency	0.097	0.095	0.0284
	(0.277)	(0.289)	(0.356)
Colonial Presidency	-0.104	-0.033	-0.011
	(0.234)	(0.243)	(0.244)
Neutral Presidency	-0.118	0.0003	0.096
	(0.245)	(0.254)	(0.275)
Neighborhood		0.080	0.085
		(0.231)	(0.232)
Human Rights		-2.013*	-2.068*
		(1.081)	(1.108)
Democratization		0.100	0.107
		(0.329)	(0.329)
Regional Integration		-0.547	-0.560
		(0.592)	(0.594)
Security		-0.446	-0.440
		(0.570)	(0.570)
Humanitarian		-1.075*	-1.069*
		(0.600)	(0.596)
Security * Enlargement		0.5379	0.620
		(0.594)	(0.620)
Hum Rights * Time		0.329**	0.338**
		(0.136)	(0.139)
Democratization *		0.511	0.498
Neighborhood		(0.570)	(0.571)
Human Rights *		-0.295	-0.284
Neighborhood		(0.684)	(0.687)
Neutral Presidency *			-0.524
Security			(0.510)
Great Power Presidency *			0.164
Security			(0.558)
Constant	-0.877	-0.513	-0.498
	(0.289)	(0.435)	(0.436)
N	300	300	300
Log Likelihood	-162.4876	-153.88453	-153.17154

Standard errors in parentheses. *** $p<0.01$ ** $p<0.05$ * $p<0.1$

Appendix 1: Descriptive Statistics

The Cases
Cases are drawn from 1994-2003, by the double random sample method described in the paper
and presented in further detail at http://www-personal.umich.edu/~lpowner/.

Table A1.

Year	Number of Cases	Percent
1994	27	9.00
1995	30	10.00
1996	28	9.33
1997	28	9.33
1998	31	10.33
1999	30	10.00
2000	25	8.33
2001	33	11.00
2002	31	10.33
2003	37	12.33
Total	300	100%

2003 appears to be a bit over-represented, and 2000 a bit under-represented; in robustness checks
and other tests not reported here, though, neither year appears to exert any exceptional influence
on the findings.

The Issues
Issues are coded initially into 21 categories, which are then grouped as relevant for further
analysis. The finer-grained codings will be used for future analysis.

Table A2.

Issue	Number of Cases	Percent
Human Rights	29	9.67
Security	83	27.67
Humanitarian Crises	15	5.00
Democratization	34	11.33
Regional Integration	9	3.00
All Others	130	43.33

The category of security includes all cases of inter-state and intra-state conflict, states of
heightened security-based tension (e.g., Chinese military exercises in the Taiwan Straits in early
1995 which nearly led to war, Venezuela-Colombia tensions in 2003 after alleged border
violations), and international military intervention. In this rendition, it does *not* include cases of
conflict resolution or attempts at conflict resolution as this complicates interpretation of the
coefficients. Democratization issues include elections, issues identified as advances in
democratization (e.g., the creation of a Truth and Reconciliation Commission in Afghanistan in
2002, constitutional reform in the Dominican Republic in 2002, indigenous rights legislation in
Mexico in 2001), and issues identified as retrenchment of democracy (e.g., the Argentine

legislature's attempt to impeach an independent Supreme Court for exercising that independence in 2002, Tajikistan's banning of religious political parties in 1998). Humanitarian crises include refugee issues, natural disasters including famines, earthquakes, and hurricanes/cyclones, and manmade disasters including major air and sea disasters and environmental catastrophes.

The Dependent Variable

The dependent variable used here captures whether any form of CFSP cooperation occurs on an issue. This includes the issuing of a Presidency or European Union statement, the issuing of a conclusion from a Council meeting (including the European Council), or the adoption of a joint action or common position (including decisions extending or modifying an existing joint action or common position on a relevant topic). For reference, the Commission's and EP's activity is shown here as well.

Table A3. Distribution of Acts

Act	Number of Cases	Percent
Statement	58	19.33
Conclusion	31	10.33
Joint Action	5	1.67
Common Position	7	2.33
Commission	55	18.33
European Parliament	36	12.00

Figure A1. Number of Acts per Case

The 101 instances of CFSP cooperation observed in the dataset cover 83 observations: Some observations (events or issues) receive multiple forms of cooperation. As Figure A1 above indicates, four cases (1.333%) had a statement, a conclusion, and either a joint action or common position adopted. No case received all four forms. Seven cases (3.333%) had two forms of cooperation, usually a statement and a conclusion, and the remaining cases received one type of cooperation (virtually always a statement or a conclusion).

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