Changing Value Systems in the new European Union

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Abstract

This working paper examines changing value systems in the new European Union with a special focus on religiosity and tolerance. We found that few of the new E.U. members brought particularly intense religiosity into the Union. However, two that did, Poland and Romania, and the accession state Turkey, are all fairly large states. Post-materialist values and tolerance have both plateaued in early E.U. members, but newer members continue to align attitudes with E.U. policies promoting tolerance and diversity.

Introduction

Eastern enlargement has brought a new dimension to the European Union.† The secular regional European integration process of extending and securing peace among democracies of Western Europe now faces new challenges. As Peter Katzenstein (2006:4-5) explains this last enlargement injected religious values (Catholicism, Eastern Orthodoxy, Protestantism, and to some extent Islam) into the heart of debate over what are European values and future of the Union. That is, enlargement has brought back into the center of the EU what had been peripheral – renewed attention to how one might cope with secular and religious politics. He further argues that EU integration has failed to create a common European culture (p. 24-25) and that the best way to account for this experiment of half a century is through multiple modernities. Andrew Greely (2003) agrees with this observation and describes how enlargement revitalized religion as a political force in the EU.

These observations certainly hand some support to the clash of civilizations argument of Samuel Huntington (1996) as the EU struggles to bring harmony and peace to 500 million people. Huntington's main premise is that the end of the cold war ended one form of an ideological conflict and revealed the existence of another in the form of civilizations.

On another level, eastern enlargement has brought together a mix of countries that fall into different categories of states on the cultural map of the World Values Survey (values, economic development and traditions, Figures 1 and 2 in Inglehart et al 2004: 12 and 14). What will be the impact of this mix on future value systems of the EU?

The EU, to its credit, continues to push ahead with policies aimed at promoting and promoting diversity, multiculturalism, tolerance. This has been in line with the doctrine and practice of state neutrality on religious matters (Madeley and Enyedi 2003, Norris and Inglehart 2005). The Maastricht treaty outlines the principles of fundamental rights of EU citizens.† Article Six of the Treaty states that:

> 1. The Union is founded on the principle of liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms and the rule of law, principles which are common to the Member States.
> 2. The Union shall respect fundamental rights, as guaranteed by the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms signed in Rome on 4

> November 1950 and as they result from the constitutional traditions common to the Member States, as general principles of Community law.
> 3. The Union shall respect the national identities of its Member States.
> 4. The Union shall provide itself the means necessary to attain its objectives and carry through its policies.

In the subsequent Article (Article 7), the Treaty continues to introduce a political mechanism in order to prevent violations of the principles mentioned in Article 6 by the Member States.† This clear commitment to harmonization of fundamental rights in the EU, and as internal borders disappeared made it quite evident that the EU needed a genuine Union-wide area of freedom, security and justice for its citizens and residents. That was why EU leaders, in Tampere in October 1999 approved a set of concrete measures for achieving such an ambitious goal.† The key product of this is the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union that brings together all the personal, civic, political, economic and social rights enjoyed by the citizens and residents of the EU. This is the first document of its kind that collects texts of all other relevant documents into a single document and takes the Union into a higher level of conformity in individual rights than found in previous documents like the Social Charter.† However, the Charter is not yet part of EU law as of yet because it is tied to the failed Constitution of the EU.

The EU is aware of these shortcomings and took a bold initiative and declared year 2007 as the European Year of Equal Opportunities for All. The goal is to The to raise public awareness of the substantial Community *acquis* in the field of equality and non-discrimination, and to mobilize everyone concerned in order to drive forward the European Union's new framework strategy on non-discrimination and equal opportunities.

The objectives include: (a) Raising public awareness of the right to equality and non-discrimination, (b) encouraging a debate on ways of strengthening participation in society, (c) celebrating and welcoming diversity, and (d) working towards a more solidarity-based society (European Commission, http://europa.eu/scadplus/ leg/en/cha/c10314.htm). The goal is to increase awareness on equality of everyone regardless of their ethnic, religious, linguistic, and cultural backgrounds. Moreover, the EU will provide modest sum of funds to promote events, information campaigns, and surveys at the community and national level.

The European Commission, in an effort to gain a handle on the problems of ethnic discrimination initiated the European Union Monitoring Center on Racism and Xenophobia on 18 June 2003. Subsequently, on March 1, 2007, the EUMC became the EU Agency on Fundamental Human Rights, the FRA, a permanent body dedicated to goals of understanding and eradicating racism and xenophobia in the E.U. member and accession states (Xenophobia, 2007).

The European Commission, through the FRA will coordinate policy between member states, EFTA/EEA countries and Council of Europe member countries to promote the goals of the commission.

The EU's ambitious project for harmonious relations between its citizens is found in the draft constitution that brings all previous declarations under a single document. Michael Emerson (2007:9-15) summarizes "EU values" found in the draft constitution as the 10 Commandments of the Union:

"1. Thou shalt be truly democratic and respectful of human rights and the rule of law.
2. Thou shalt guarantee the four freedoms of movement (goods, services, capital, and labor)
3. Thou shalt provide for social cohesion between people regions and states.
4. Thou shalt ensure sustainable economic development for the benefit of future generations.
5. Thou shalt reject nationalism and favor the multiple identity of citizens.
6. Thou shalt assure federative multi-tier governance
7. Thou shalt assure secular governance and favor multicultural pluralism in society.
8. Thou shalt promote multilateral order in international affairs.
9. Thou shalt abstain from threatening or using force against others without just cause.
10. Thou shalt be open, inclusive and integrative toward neighbors that adhere to the above.

Given this emphasis on harmonious relations, respect for all, diversity, and tolerance what does the present nature of the EU look in terms of religion and secular politics? Is clash of civilizations a valid argument and concern for future of the Union? Or is the EU immune to religious biases due to its successful secular politics of half a century?

This paper addresses values in the new EU with a focus on religiosity and tolerance as a start of discussion for a larger set of variable in future studies.† Our focus is based on five older members of the EU (France, Italy, Germany, the Netherlands, and the UK), five recent members of eastern enlargement (Czech Republic, Hungary, Estonia, Poland, and Slovakia) two most recent members (Bulgaria and Romania), and Turkey (accession country with so much controversy surrounding its candidacy). Our choice of countries is determined by availability of data through the World Values Survey waves which includes the current 5th wave (2005-2007). Unfortunately, the 2005 wave has not been completed and our analysis is limited by how many country data sets have been released to primary investigators.

Model of Analysis

The specific relationship between religion and intolerance has been widely proposed in studies of right-wing authoritarianism, in popular discourse, and because religion is one of the main markers of ethnic identity for many cultures. A number of studies have explored potential relationships in religiosity and values of tolerance in Europe, observing and testing a variety of explanatory hypothesis.

One study tested the effect of religiosity on anti-Semitism to see if anti-Semitism in the Netherlands was a product of exclusionary doctrine of Christianity. The authors found that there was a positive, albeit somewhat weak relationship between Christian religiosity and religious anti-Semitism (Konig *et al.*, 2000). However, the authors found that Catholic religiosity had a link to secular anti-Semitism while membership in the Protestant sects did not differ from average Netherlanders. The authors found a much more powerful secular predictor of effect on

anti-Semitism. They found that a variable on perspective, "narrow perspective," accounted for 52% of the relationship between Christian beliefs and religious anti-Semitism while religious beliefs accounted for less than 15%. They also found that secular anti-Semitism was also largely a product of a narrow perspective, with 70% of the variance in secular anti-Semitism correlated with. The implication of their analysis was that the relationship between Christian religiosity and anti-Semitism was driven by the third factor, narrow perspective. While the authors documented a positive and significant relationship between Christian beliefs and anti-Semitism, they established that the relationship was more of narrow perspective mediated slightly by values of a Christian religiosity. Their analysis notes the relationship between fundamentalist religiosity and authoritarian personalities, and narrow worldview that contribute towards antipathy for out groups (Konig et al., 2000).

Another study which was conducted on the Netherlands, hypothesized that religiosity should have a non-linear negative effect on intolerance. The authors theorized that those who, "live" their faith will reject ethnic bias, while only those who claim an affiliation without being a core believer, or adhere to a particularistic faith will show positive correlations with intolerance (Scheepers *et al.*, 2002). The authors conducted a multi-level regression analysis of types of religious beliefs and behaviors as well as protestant and catholic sects of Christianity. Their conclusions were that Christians tended to show more support for prejudice then non-religious people or persons of other faiths (however in the predominately Christian countries studied, other groups are the outgroups). They also found that ethnic intolerance was positively associated with religious attendance. However, they found a strong indication that the kind of religiosity practiced mattered. They found a negative relationship between intolerance and doctrinal beliefs and the importance of religion in respondents' lives, but a positive relationship between intolerance and religious particularism. The results seem to support a commonsense notion that those who practice a religion that values tolerance, will be more tolerant, but those who adhere to an exclusionary interpretation of their faith, will tend to be less tolerant (Scheepers et al., 2002).

Their study showed the importance of using a multi-dimensional factor for religiosity, as the type of religiosity and the manner in which it is practiced changes the sign of the association with intolerance. The authors do caution that the non-Christian religious individuals in their study of European countries are members of outgroups, and therefore unlikely to express intolerance towards the minority group to which they belong, a problem that persists in our study as well as minority religious respondents seemed to not answer the religious denomination questions on the survey. Finally, and significantly to this study, the authors found that the religious heterogeneity of the countries in the study had a strong positive effect on prejudice, as did economic conditions. Questions about ethnic bias may be more salient to those with outgroups toward whom misanthropic feelings can be directed.

The findings of the multilevel study by Scheepers et al. Partially refute and partially support earlier studies on religiosity and bias in Europe. A 1990 study of racism and religiosity in Holland found that their was some association with prejudice among casual church members and those who attended frequently but that the trend reversed among individuals who participated in church functions and associations. They also found that the positive association between nationalism and religious participation almost completely suppressed the relationship between faith and bias (Eisinga *et al.*, 1990). A 1999 follow-on study that extended the investigation to a

cross-state comparisons concluded that nationalism had a much more powerful effect on bias, and that the relationship between religion and bias may be spurious to that of nationalism and prejudice(Eisinga & Billiet, 1999; Eisinga et al., 1990).

In order to investigate the change in values over the several waves of the World Values Survey and potential relationships between Religiosity and Tolerance, a series of indicators are constructed using responses from the surveys as observed indicators. The changes in Post-materialist values, tolerance, and religiosity are examined individually then as part of regression models to try and isolate the partial correlations between religion and intolerance while controlling for individual demographics and changes between waves 4 and 5 of the World Values Survey.

Intolerance

Variable selection for the Tolerance scale was driven by a number of factors. First, the need to capture a broad sense of what it is to be tolerant, including elements of intolerance that are based in both racial ethnic and lifestyle dimensions. Factor analysis of the Pearson correlations of the variables listed in the dendrogram above identified factor groupings similar to those illustrated above. The dendrogram shows the nearest combinations of different variables. Clusters formed around resistance to neighbors of Different Race, Different Religion, or Immigrant. The second cluster illustrates how respondents grouped AIDS sufferers and Homosexuals together with Drug users.

Figure 0–1: Tolerance Indicators



Because so few surveys include question V39 (Different Religion) and it is correlated with V35 and V37, at .57 and .51 respectively, it was dropped from the scale in order to be able to compare more states and more waves. The scale tested for reliability with an alpha of .734, near the cutoff of .70 but judged worthwhile because it covered the different dimensions of intolerance that include ethnic, sexual, and general "undesirables" like drug addicts. The range of the scale

is left intact so that a "perfectly" tolerant respondent would score a 0, and an entirely intolerant individual would resist having all five potential neighbors.

Religiosity

Religiosity scale is composed of four questions regarding religious practice and attitudes towards God and the Church. Cronbach's of .87 after scaling all the indicators to z-scores and coding to make low scores reflective of low religiosity.

Factor analysis showed that the responses to questions on religion tended to cluster around two concepts of religiosity, one of confidence in churches and attendance of religious ceremonies; the other cluster around the importance of religion and the importance of God in personal life. However, the limitations imposed by developing factors in SPSS using categorical data, combined with the need to find data spanning as many states for as many waves as possible, led us to settle on the four variables of religiosity in the table below.

The Religiosity variable is simply an additive scale of the four variables z-score standardized re-oriented to all align low scores to low religiosity and high scores to high religiosity. Despite the realization in other work or the importance of multiple dimensions of religiosity in understanding the relationships between religion and tolerance, the data limitations, combined with the regression model structure narrowed the concept down to a single factor composed of the scale of variables below.

Correlations: Standardized Religion Variables

	Confidence: Churches	How often do you attend religious services	Religion important in life	How Important God (Reverse Coded)
Confidence: Churches	1	.563(**)	.626(**)	.575(**)
How often do you attend religious services	.563(**)	1	.612(**)	.532(**)
Religion important in life	.626(**)	.612(**)	1	.629(**)
How Important God (Reverse Coded)	.575(**)	.532(**)	.629(**)	1

***=p<.01*

Table 1 Correlations Among Standardized Religion Variables

Demographic Indicators and Tolerance

Using data from wave 4 of the World Values Survey ending in 2001, we include a brief review of the main demographic characteristics of individuals to be included in the regression models. The charts below provide easy visual reference for relationships that may persist in a regression model of the relationship between religiosity and tolerance. One caveat is that the tables below use a slightly different tolerance scale than used in the Wave 4 and Wave 5 regression models below. The tolerance scale below is additive but contains more religion-based ethnic identifiers

for potential undesirable neighbors and not AIDS sufferers or drug users as discussed in a previous section.

Income and Tolerance

The chart below shows a persistent inverse relationship between individual wealth and intolerance across the states surveyed. This supports the competition for resources hypothesis, but may also be a spurious relationship caused by correlations between wealth, education and intolerance. It is very possible that there is a non-linear relationship between income and tolerance, and that once an individual or a country has reached some threshold the association weakens.

Figure 0–2: Income and Tolerance



* denotes $p<.05$. Income Scale 1=lowest decile,10= Highest; Tolerance Scale 0=No Neighbors mentioned as undesirable Tolerance value calculated by adding scores from groups mentioned as unwanted neighbors. The following groups were included, Muslims (except Turkey), Homosexuals, Immigrants, Jews, Different Race. Turkey score was multiplied by 1.25 match 0-5 scale.

Education and Tolerance

The correlation between education and tolerance is fairly strong among the countries examined in Wave 4 of the World Values Survey. The Pearson correlations between the indicator for educational attainment and the Tolerance scale are included in the table below. The relationship in all countries is as expected- higher educational attainment is associated with greater tolerance. Examination of scatter plots showed that the relationships in some of the studied countries were non-linear, however the differences from linear relationships are not substantial enough to warrant inclusion in analysis. Analysis of the standardized coefficients for the regression model also indicates that there is no suppression effect of the age of respondents and the relationship between education and tolerance.

Figure 0–3: Education and Tolerance



* denotes p<.05. Education Scale 1=lowest ,8= Some University; Tolerance Scale 0=No Neighbors mentioned as u
Tolerance value calculated by adding scores from groups mentioned as unwanted neighbors. The following groups v
included, Muslims (except Turkey), Homosexuals, Immigrants, Jews, Different Race. Turkey score was multiplied b
match 0-5 scale.

A possible policy recommendation stemming from the observation of the tolerance effect of education is to include tolerance education in the more basic curriculums of the school systems.

Political Self-Assignment and Tolerance

The relationship between political self-assignment and tolerance is behind only age and education in its relationship with tolerance scores for respondents in wave 4 of the WVS. However, as with other demographic indicators, the relationship is certainly not universal among the surveyed states. While most states with a non-random relationship between political orientation and intolerance show a positive relationship between right-wing alignment and intolerance, one of the states in our study shows the reverse relationship, Bulgaria.



Political Scale 1=Left,10= Right; Tolerance Scale 0=No Neighbors mentioned as undesirable, Tolerance value cal
from groups mentioned as unwanted neighbors. The following groups were included, Muslims (except Turkey), H
Jews, Different Race. Turkey score was multiplied by 1.25 to match 0-5 scale.

Other Demographic Variables

Other demographic variables will be introduced in the discussion of the regression analysis results. Many more models were tested than those listed in the tables below. However,

potentially powerful covariates to intolerance, like personal unemployment, and gender had no, or very weak relationships with the dependent variable after the items listed above are included in the model.

Findings

A quick look at the 4-item Post-Materialist Values Index from the World Values Survey indicates a mixed pattern for movement towards Post-Materialist Values for EU member and accession states. Post-Materialist values are those that are thought to rise after basic needs of dietary and physical security are met in a society. The de-emphasis on acquisition of wealth, physical security, and nationalism are captured in the Post-Materialist scale. Of the 13 states examined for the fourth and fifth waves of the World Values Surveys only Turkey out of the recent accession states approached the levels of older member states Germany, France, the Netherlands, Italy and Great Britain. More interesting to our question is the apparent achievement of a plateau in Post-Materialism scores among the earlier EU members between the fourth and fifth waves. There is also no clear trend towards Post-Materialism among new member states. So, while a general association between development and Post-Materialist values exists, the mechanism is certainly universal or linear as the chart below shows several deviations from a simple direct relationship.

Figure 0–4: Post-Materialist Values by Wave



Patterns of Intolerance

Studies for the European Monitoring Centre on Xenophobia and Racism by Coenders, Lubbers and Scheepers (Coenders *et al.*, 2004) were able to make a detailed examination of ethnic exclusionism. They found a variety of concepts that were embedded in notions of intolerance and ethnic exclusionism. The study focused on attitudes towards migration, but the hypothesis suggested in their analysis is still interesting to a broader discussion of tolerance. The summary report discussed the impact of national GDP and competition over resources may have in the level of ethnic exclusionism(Coenders *et al.*, 2005). Subsequent analysis of the European Social Survey 2002-2003, found the country-level characteristics GDP and unemployment rate had a significant relationship to resistance to ethnic diversity. However, their hypothesis regarding competition for resources, was reversed at the national level. Higher national unemployment was associated with lower resistance to diversity rather than higher. Competition for resources, while not borne out at the national level (perhaps the salience of the issue is lower as workers don't tend to flock to other low-employment countries. The results confirming their hypothesis about the relationship between GDP and tolerance are reinforced by a glance at the World Values Survey 2001 wave data below showing the prima facie relationship. The Coenders et al. reports also examined a number of latent indicators of intolerance, beyond the scope of the EVS and the analysis here.

Examining the scores for the Intolerance scale in the chart below, the apparent relationship between level of development and intolerance towards minority groups is striking. The five older, more developed EU members, show lower intolerance levels than the newest accession states and much lower than the very high intolerance scores of Turkey. The one, very noteworthy exception to this observation is the resurgence of latent intolerance in French society during 2005. Survey documentation hadn't been uploaded as of May 11, 2007, but it is possible the survey was conducted during the 2005 riots in France. However, riots in largely Muslim neighborhoods, does not explain the concomitant rise in anti-gay and anti-addict attitudes in France. During the same period, France's Post-Materialist values actually increased from the previous wave, confounding expected correlations between insecurity and post-materialist values, or intolerance.

Figure 0–1:Intolerance by Country and Wave



Religiosity by Country and Waves

In contrast to Katzenstein et al's claims to the contrary, the countries in our study are not showing a clear trend towards a religious resurgence. Of the Post-Communist states only Poland, Romania and Slovakia rise above the average score of all 13 states. The only other very

religious states are Turkey and Italy. As for a resurgence, Religiosity in Poland has declined since 1991, but rebounded somewhat between 2001 and 2005. Romania, Bulgaria and Slovakia have all increased in Religiosity in recent waves, but of those, again, only Romania and Slovakia are even above average in very secular Europe. Poland, as the most populous recent addition to the EU also has fairly high religious observance so does represent some shift, along with Orthodox Romania to a more religious Europe, but on different lines than those conceived by Huntington.

In the countries with strong religiosity, in the most recent waves, Turkey, Romania, Poland and

Figure 0–2: Religiosity by Country and Wave



Significant correlations between religiosity and intolerance are especially intense in the case of the more religious countries, Turkey, Poland, and Romania. Two less religious but more established E.U. countries with significant relationships are France and the Netherlands.

Correlations between Religiosity and Intolerance by country and wave show no clear pattern distinguishing established E.U. states and the newer accession or candidate states other than that there is generally a positive relationship between religiosity and intolerance. One notable exception to this pattern is France in wave 5(2005) where religiosity and intolerance have a strong *negative* relationship during a period of rampant intolerance in France, possibly because more devout French are Muslim immigrants themselves. The relationship between religiosity and intolerance in the Netherlands, while it didn't flip the way France's had, declines dramatically

between waves 4 and 5 of the survey eliminating what had been the strongest relationship between Intolerance and Religiosity outside of Turkey. Also, as Bulgaria becomes more religious, it is also becoming more tolerant, with the only other inverse relationship between Religiosity and Intolerance after France.

This first look at the relationship suggest some merit to concerns that a more religious Europe might also mean a bigger challenge to meeting the Commission's goals on Tolerance with Turkey, Romania and Poland all showing observant populations and a strong association between religion and intolerance.

Figure 0–3:Religiosity and Intolerance



Regression Models: Religiosity and Tolerance

The two tables below containing the model fit statistics and standardized coefficients from regression models that attempt to identify variance components of intolerance. The tables show that, with the exception of Great Britain, there is a relationship between religion and intolerance that persists only in the most religiously observant countries when demographic and national characteristics are considered. The regression models offer only a very weak, individual-level, explanation of Intolerance. The best adjusted R-squared from Wave 4 was 27% of variance in intolerance for Turkey was accounted for, then in the 2005 wave, wave 5, the model accounts for 14% of variance in France. Judging from the observations in the charts above, a multi-level model including state-level information might account for significantly more variance.

The two most consistently significant indicators of intolerance are education and age, the first inversely and the second directly correlated to intolerance. In Wave 4, 1999-2001, the coefficients indicate that Bulgaria, Estonia and Slovakia, three of the newest members, had no significant partial correlation between education and intolerance. The only other state to show a non-significant relationship was Great Britain, but only because of a strong suppression effect introduced with the inclusion of the Post-Materialism scale. By the 2005 wave, Bulgaria has a strong relationship indicating that increased education reduces intolerance.

France, in the 2005 wave is anomalous. It has a strong *positive* association between intolerance and education (.103) and a strong negative correlation between religiosity and intolerance—the reverse of all other associations. Again, it is possible that the relatively high religiosity and low education of immigrants, combined with the interactions among lower class workers of different races might contribute to this inversion of expected relationships.

Country Wave	Model	Adj. R^2	(Constant)	Size of town	Scale of incomes	Highest educational level attained	Age	Religiosity	Self positioning in political scale	Religion by Politics	Post-Materialist index 4-item
	1	0.041	2.910	-0.147*	-0.072	-0.047	0.046				
	2	0.040	2.912	-0.148*	-0.070	-0.045	0.046	0.020			
	3	0.040	3.068	-0.145*	-0.065	-0.042	0.040	0.029	-0.043		
	4	0.041	3.057	-0.144*	-0.065	-0.040	0.044	0.029	-0.045	-0.053	
Bulgaria (4)	5	0.040	2.989	-0.144*	-0.066	-0.045	0.045	0.028	-0.046	-0.053	0.021
	1	0.045	1.288	-0.027	0.012	-0.146*	0.172*				
	2	0.044	1.244	-0.028	0.011	-0.145*	0.178*	-0.026			
	3	0.044	1.353	-0.026	0.016	-0.143*	0.172*	-0.018	-0.032		
	4	0.043	1.358	-0.027	0.015	-0.143*	0.174*	-0.016	-0.033	-0.022	
Czech Republic (4)	5	0.058	1.736	-0.023	0.018	-0.122*	0.169*	-0.019	-0.008	-0.020	-0.132*
	1	0.039	1.648	0.025	-0.047	-0.046	0.181*				
	2	0.037	1.640	0.025	-0.047	-0.046	0.182*	-0.006			
	3	0.035	1.596	0.025	-0.049	-0.045	0.182*	-0.006	0.010		
	4	0.037	1.611	0.025	-0.048	-0.045	0.18*	-0.005	0.008	0.055	
Estonia (4)	5	0.035	1.688	0.024	-0.048	-0.042	0.179*	-0.005	0.010	0.055	-0.023
	1	0.060	1.091	-0.064	-0.054	-0.145*	0.121*				
	2	0.068	1.242	-0.070	-0.050	-0.145*	0.098*	0.101*			
	3	0.080	0.894	-0.062	-0.055	-0.14*	0.097*	0.068	0.117*		
	4	0.078	0.900	-0.063	-0.055	-0.141*	0.096*	0.068	0.117*	0.010	
France (4)	5	0.096	1.399	-0.054	-0.042	-0.114*	0.083*	0.054	0.097*	0.014	-0.148*
	1	0.042	1.428	-0.054	-0.030	-0.174*	0.057				
	2	0.041	1.422	-0.054	-0.029	-0.174*	0.058	-0.005			
	3	0.052	1.040	-0.050	-0.033	-0.164*	0.051	-0.025	0.118*		
	4	0.052	1.048	-0.051	-0.030	-0.167*	0.047	-0.026	0.117*	0.037	
Germany (4)	5	0.075	1.583	-0.041	-0.033	-0.142*	0.015	-0.017	0.109*	0.043	-0.165*
	1	0.085	1.606	0.006	-0.040	-0.207*	0.124*				
	2	0.084	1.585	0.010	-0.038	-0.206*	0.12*	0.026			
	3	0.095	1.187	0.013	-0.043	-0.204*	0.122*	0.001	0.111*		
	4	0.094	1.199	0.014	-0.043	-0.203*	0.124*	-0.003	0.108*	-0.022	
Italy (4)	5	0.102	1.719	0.011	-0.042	-0.179*	0.116*	-0.010	0.101*	-0.018	-0.106*
	1	0.058	0.793	-0.013	0.002	-0.115*	0.2*				
	2	0.062	0.827	-0.006	0.008	-0.115*	0.181*	0.074*			
	3	0.080	0.420	0.005	-0.018	-0.091*	0.185*	0.045	0.145*		
	4	0.085	0.395	0.006	-0.014	-0.09*	0.181*	0.033	0.146*	0.075*	
Netherlands (4)	5	0.099	0.736	0.012	-0.005	-0.068	0.187*	0.023	0.129*	0.077*	-0.127*
	1	0.131	1.548	-0.069	0.053	-0.198*	0.276*				
	2	0.133	1.447	-0.062	0.053	-0.19*	0.271*	0.052			
	3	0.133	1.553	-0.057	0.059	-0.19*	0.272*	0.067	-0.046		
	4	0.132	1.556	-0.056	0.060	-0.191*	0.27*	0.071	-0.048	0.012	
Poland (4)	5	0.134	1.344	-0.053	0.054	-0.198*	0.27*	0.08*	-0.051	0.010	0.056
	1	0.111	2.982	-0.071	-0.091	-0.207*	0.113*				
	2	0.118	2.816	-0.057	-0.084	-0.2*	0.096*	0.099*			
	3	0.117	2.671	-0.055	-0.084	-0.198*	0.101*	0.098*	0.030		
	4	0.115	2.652	-0.053	-0.082	-0.199*	0.1*	0.099*	0.032	0.015	
Romania (4)	5	0.117	2.822	-0.045	-0.079	-0.19*	0.1*	0.092*	0.036	0.008	-0.059
	1	-0.001	2.080	0.007	-0.023	-0.020	0.043				
	2	0.001	2.057	0.016	-0.020	-0.015	0.030	0.065			
	3	0.000	2.122	0.017	-0.018	-0.014	0.029	0.071	-0.020		
	4	-0.001	2.108	0.018	-0.018	-0.014	0.031	0.070	-0.018	-0.015	
Slovakia (4)	5	0.001	2.295	0.021	-0.015	-0.008	0.024	0.069	-0.010	-0.013	-0.059
	1	0.216	4.789	-0.163*	-0.191*	-0.248*	0.001				
	2	0.260	4.346	-0.131*	-0.159*	-0.213*	-0.029	0.228*			
	3	0.265	4.136	-0.124*	-0.165*	-0.205*	-0.035	0.197*	0.083*		
	4	0.270	4.246	-0.129*	-0.167*	-0.205*	-0.028	0.155*	0.078*	-0.088*	
Turkey (4)	5	0.269	4.270	-0.129*	-0.167*	-0.204*	-0.028	0.155*	0.077*	-0.087*	-0.005
	1	0.050	1.663	-0.085	0.086	-0.152*	0.129*				
	2	0.049	1.606	-0.083	0.088	-0.15*	0.134*	-0.023			
	3	0.058	1.251	-0.082	0.085	-0.153*	0.119*	-0.034	0.103*		
Great Britain (4)	4	0.056	1.251	-0.082	0.085	-0.154*	0.119*	-0.034	0.104*	0.005	

Table 2: Coefficients for Wave 4

In both waves, self-assigned political alignment was a much bigger indicator of intolerance than religiosity by itself. In only Turkey and Romania does the significant effect of religiosity remain bigger than that of self-assigned alignment, however by wave 5, Romania no longer shows a significant relationship between intolerance and religiosity or self-assigned political alignment.

France, in wave 5, returns scores that are completely anomalous. Education is associated with increased intolerance, age associated with more tolerant outlooks, religiosity is significantly inversely correlated with intolerance, and right-wingers are associated with more tolerant attitudes.

Country	Model	Adjusted R^2	Intercept	Size of town	Scale of incomes	Highest educational level attained	Age	Religiosity	Self positioning in political scale	Religion by Politics	Post-Materialist index 12-item
Bulgaria	1	0.028	2.015	0.071	0.019	-0.151*	0.112*				
Bulgaria	2	0.031	2.063	0.072	0.015	-0.158*	0.108*	-0.069			
Bulgaria	3	0.03	1.971	0.068	0.010	-0.159*	0.113*	-0.072	0.031		
Bulgaria	4	0.029	1.972	0.068	0.010	-0.16*	0.113*	-0.072	0.031	0.008	
Bulgaria	5	0.028	2.026	0.070	0.012	-0.157*	0.109*	-0.073	0.033	0.007	-0.033
France	1	0.092	3.58	-0.037	0.005	0.172*	-0.199*				
France	2	0.102	3.405	-0.034	0.005	0.172*	-0.179*	-0.105*			
France	3	0.117	3.856	-0.033	0.017	0.164*	-0.174*	-0.076*	-0.132*		
France	4	0.117	3.872	-0.031	0.015	0.161*	-0.18*	-0.076*	-0.131*	0.036	
France	5	0.139	3.465	-0.036	0.011	0.103*	-0.185*	-0.073*	-0.108*	0.021	0.164*
Germany	1	0.043	0.901	0.093*	-0.026	-0.139*	0.114*				
Germany	2	0.042	0.875	0.093*	-0.023	-0.141*	0.118*	-0.017			
Germany	3	0.064	0.376	0.103*	-0.027	-0.115*	0.117*	-0.030	0.156*		
Germany	4	0.063	0.377	0.103*	-0.027	-0.114*	0.118*	-0.030	0.156*	-0.005	
Germany	5	0.082	0.87	0.09*	-0.035	-0.082*	0.099*	-0.032	0.136*	-0.009	-0.151*
Italy	1	0.065	1.066	0.007	-0.054	-0.12*	0.184*				
Italy	2	0.065	1.062	0.008	-0.051	-0.121*	0.174*	0.045			
Italy	3	0.096	0.561	0.025	-0.085	-0.108*	0.172*	-0.007	0.19*		
Italy	4	0.094	0.563	0.025	-0.085	-0.108*	0.173*	-0.008	0.188*	-0.008	
Italy	5	0.117	1.062	0.014	-0.076	-0.076	0.161*	0.009	0.142*	-0.008	-0.169*
Netherlands	1	0.029	1.544	-0.024	-0.08	-0.14*	0.025				
Netherlands	2	0.029	1.511	-0.026	-0.081	-0.137*	0.032	-0.04			
Netherlands	3	0.073	0.963	-0.013	-0.118*	-0.103*	0.04	-0.078*	0.221*		
Netherlands	4	0.076	0.971	-0.013	-0.115*	-0.106*	0.047	-0.066	0.218*	-0.069	
Netherlands	5	0.085	1.18	-0.01	-0.114*	-0.086*	0.046	-0.071	0.191*	-0.055	-0.106*
Poland	1	0.063	2.045	0.040	-0.050	-0.181*	0.135*				
Poland	2	0.066	2.045	0.060	-0.046	-0.183*	0.125*	0.070			
Poland	3	0.07	1.925	0.047	-0.048	-0.173*	0.128*	0.039	0.08*		
Poland	4	0.07	1.686	0.048	-0.048	-0.174*	0.132*	0.031	0.078	-0.036	
Poland	5	0.074	1.706	0.051	-0.049	-0.171*	0.115*	0.037	0.073	-0.030	-0.074
Romania	1	0.046	1.97	-0.103*	-0.005	-0.074	0.152*				
Romania	2	0.048	1.995	-0.098	-0.005	-0.060	0.146*	0.069			
Romania	3	0.046	1.822	-0.098	-0.005	-0.059	0.144*	0.069	-0.018		
Romania	4	0.044	1.886	-0.099	-0.005	-0.060	0.144*	0.067	-0.018	0.021	
Romania	5	0.061	1.898	-0.089	-0.003	-0.041	0.134*	0.060	-0.008	0.016	-0.141*
Great Britain	1	0.066	2.141	0.011	-0.026	-0.153*	0.178*				
Great Britain	2	0.065	1.259	0.009	-0.024	-0.155*	0.176*	0.015			
Great Britain	3	0.067	1.274	0.011	-0.032	-0.149*	0.17*	0.007	0.057		
Great Britain	4	0.068	1.123	0.006	-0.028	-0.151*	0.174*	0.003	0.059	0.057	
Great Britain	5	0.094	1.12	0.010	-0.028	-0.124*	0.171*	0.011	0.017	0.059	

Table 3: Wave 5, Regression Coefficients

Conclusions

This study provides an initial attempt to understand the role of religiosity in new European Union. In light of differing views on this subject explained above, we attempted to look at how religiosity affects other values in older and newer members of the EU. Much needs to be done to futher examine this subject in a more in-depth fashion. However, our analysis shows some important findings based on solid survey data. First we found weak support for assertion of resurgent religion in expanded EU. We did find that more religious countries like Poland, Romania and Turkey have stronger correlations between Religiosity and Intolerance. Once demographics and political self-assignment are included, effects are moderated except for Romania, Turkey and Britain in Wave 4, and France in the WVS wave 5. France's intolerance spiked during wave 5. All coefficients for the French are reverse of expectations in wave 5. Possibly because of the very high intercept of the France Wave 5 regression model. Implications of our findings for public policy can be summarized as:

• The show of correlations between education and tolerance indicates that the strength of intolerance may continue to moderate as accession states develop along a more EU-focused education policy.

• Intolerance among right-wing political self-identifiers may lead to an opportunity for education to establish a cultural unacceptability of intolerance and reduce the likelihood of "anti-system" activism by right-wing politicians.
• In light of the difference in French results between the 2001 and 2005 waves, the causes of that change need to be understood in order to be anticipated. During the same period as the French experienced their riots, England suffered the subway attacks, yet British intolerance levels declined, particularly towards immigrants. Is this a result of political leadership, or greater latent authoritarianism in France?
• Political parties that integrate religious markers as part of their in-group identity need to be monitored and countered for peddling intolerance as ideology.

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