

ISSUE 2006/03  
APRIL 2006


# bruegel policy brief

## WELCOME TO EUROPE

by **Jakob von Weizsäcker**

Research Fellow at Bruegel  
jvw@bruegel.org

**SUMMARY** Many more people would like to migrate to the EU than the EU is ready to absorb. But who should be allowed to enter and who should not? The economic effects of high-skilled immigration are generally positive for the receiving country while low-skilled migration has more ambiguous effects. **The economic and political complexity of low-skilled migration must not be used as an excuse for procrastination. The EU has already fallen behind in attracting high-skilled migrants.** By contrast, Australia, Canada and Switzerland are particularly successful in attracting foreign graduates through “points” based immigration systems. Europe should follow suit to position itself in the global competition for talent.



Source: see Table 1

### POLICY CHALLENGE

The EU should open up to skilled immigrants through a points system via a “Blue Card” granting access to its entire labour market. This European version of the Green Card could become a powerful complement to any national effort to attract top talent. In addition, students graduating with a Masters degree or equivalent from European universities or from top universities abroad should be automatically eligible for a Blue Card. This “Blue Diploma” would help attract young talent early. Finally, in future rounds of EU enlargement, higher-skilled workers should be welcome immediately, provided they reach an earnings threshold: the “External Minimum Wage”.



*The Governor of She asked Confucius about government. The Master said, "Make the local people happy and attract migrants from afar."*  
**The Analects, Confucius**

**ECONOMIC** historians have shown that migration contributed more to the convergence of income across the globe than trade did in the 19th century. However, in more recent years it has been strangely neglected as a major economic force and re-emerged only with accelerated globalisation in the aftermath of the disappearance of the iron curtain.

Over the coming years, migration rates and migration pressures might well increase further. Globalisation is rapidly "shrinking" the world without shrinking worldwide income differences quite as fast. In particular, the near neighbourhood of Europe has around 500m inhabitants, many keen to migrate to Europe. There certainly are many more potential migrants than Europe seems willing to absorb.

The argument of this brief is that significantly more high-skilled immigration would be a boon for Europe. The economic and political complexity of the issue of low-skilled immigration, which has much more ambiguous effects, must not be used as a pretext to procrastinate.

Instead, Europe should attract highly-skilled migrants at a greatly accelerated rate to position itself in the global competition for talent. The time has come to tell those bright young graduates of the world: Welcome to Europe!

In Section 1, the basic facts of migration, its skill content, and the increasing supply of skills worldwide will be examined. In Section 2 the basic efficiency and distribution arguments for and against high and low-skilled migration are analysed. The impact of emigration - "brawn drain" and "brain drain" - on developing source countries is also discussed. Finally, Section 3 proposes potential policy options for Europe.

## 1. MIGRATION AND THE GLOBAL SUPPLY OF SKILLS

Immigration rates in the EU-15 and the US remained at relatively moderate levels during the 1960s, 1970s, and most of the 1980s, as shown in Chart 1. Migration rates only shot up in the late eighties and early nineties. They rose again substantially in the early 2000s in Europe in particular, driven by immigration to the EU-15 from Eastern Europe. In addition, there is significant illegal immigration.

There are concerns in Europe over this influx of immigrants, and low-skilled immigrants in particular. At the same

*"Europe will need to become much better at attracting talent from the rest of the world."*

time, to become a competitive and dynamic knowledge-driven economy as spelled out in the Lisbon agenda, Europe will need to become much bet-


ter at attracting talent from the rest of the world. The European Commission has accordingly become active in this area (Box 1).

However, progress has been slow because many relevant stakeholders still use problematic concepts to discuss migration, most importantly the "lump-of-labour" fallacy according to which the number of jobs in an economy is fixed. This policy brief argues that the issue of economic migration should instead be framed in terms of the skill level of immigrants.

The differences in both the extent and the skill composition of migration, among developed countries, are striking. In particular, the percentage of highly-skilled foreign-born in the entire population varies widely, as highlighted by Table 1, in which green indicates a high percentage, yellow a mid-range percentage and red a low percentage of high-skilled foreign-born in the population.

Australia, Canada, and Switzerland have been phenomenally successful in attracting large numbers of migrants with a strong bias towards high-skilled immigration. All three countries have a points-based system for attracting high-skilled immigrants (Box 2).

In mid-range immigration countries, the picture is much more varied. Germany, for example, has attracted



Source: Eurostat, US Office of Imm. Statistics, US Census Bureau.



**TABLE 1**  
**INTERNATIONAL COMPARISONS OF THE EXTENT AND SKILL COMPOSITION OF MIGRATION**

COUNTRY	% FOREIGN-BORN	% WITH TERTIARY EDUCATION AMONG:		HIGH-SKILLED FOREIGN-BORN [% TOTAL POP.]	POINTS SYSTEM TO ATTRACT HIGH-SKILLED AS OF:
		NATIVES	FOREIGN-BORN		
POLAND	2.1	10.4	11.9	0.2	N/A
SPAIN	5.3	19.4	21.8	1.2	N/A
PORTUGAL	6.3	7.7	19.3	1.2	N/A
DENMARK	6.8	18.8	19.5	1.3	N/A
UK	8.3	20.1	34.8	2.9	2007*
FRANCE	10.0	16.9	18.1	1.8	N/A
NETHERLANDS	10.1	19.5	17.6	1.8	N/A
BELGIUM	10.7	22.9	21.6	2.3	N/A
SWEDEN	12.0	22.8	24.2	2.9	N/A
US	12.3	26.9	25.9	3.2	N/A
GERMANY	12.5	19.5	15.5	1.9	N/A
CANADA	19.3	31.5	38.0	7.3	1967
SWITZERLAND	22.4	18.1	23.7	5.3	1996
AUSTRALIA	23.0	38.6	42.9	9.9	1984

Source: Dumont and Lemaître (2004)

\*Expected date following announcement by UK Home Office in March 2006

disproportionate numbers of low-skilled immigrants, consistent with its historically large guest worker programme. English-speaking countries may have a distinct advantage in attracting high-skilled migrants, not least through their universities. But contrary to popular perception, the US does not follow this pattern. This is the result of a large influx of low-skilled immigrants from Mexico.

But what if many more countries followed the examples of Canada, Switzerland, and Australia? Would those other countries simply be competing for the same scarce international supply of skilled labour? Chart 2 comprehensively dispels this concern. Over the last 15 years, the number of students in tertiary education has increased dramatically.

Today, the share of students in the population is in fact lower in the old EU member states (EU-15) than in the new member states (EU-10) or the wider EU neighbourhood (EU Neighbourhood Policy Countries + Russia). Turkey is also catching up rapidly.

#### BOX 1: EU-Level Activity on Economic Migration

A recent *Policy Plan on Legal Migration*<sup>1</sup> outlines the initiatives the European Commission intends to take over the 2006-09 period. This plan is based on the Green Paper, "On an EU Approach to Managing Economic Migration", of January 2005, and the wide consultation that followed.

In particular, a framework directive is planned in order to define a common set of basic rights granted to migrant workers. Furthermore, four specific directives would be designed to discipline the entry and residence of particular types of immigrants, namely highly-skilled and seasonal workers, intra-corporate transferees and remunerated trainees.

One of the main objectives is to make the EU more attractive to high-skilled migrants. Whether this could be achieved through an EU work permit, similar to the Blue Card proposed in the brief, is under discussion.

#### BOX 2: The Canadian Example of a Points-Based Immigration System

The points system for immigration was pioneered by Canada in 1967 and its skills bias was reinforced in 2001. Under the current rules, a foreign applicant must have previous work experience as a skilled worker to be eligible for treatment under the points system. Then, to be able to become established in Canada, a minimum of 67 points out of 96 have to be awarded on the basis of the following factors:

- Education (up to 25 pts)
- Proficiency in the official languages (up to 20 pts)
- Experience (up to 21 pts)
- Age with more points for younger migrants (up to 10 pts)
- Arranged employment (up to 10 pts)
- Adaptability including family ties to Canada (up to 10 pts)

These factors aim at capturing not only the economic potential but also the likelihood of a successful integration.

<sup>1</sup>European Commission (2005).



Even more striking is the increasing supply of skill among the Pop-10<sup>2</sup>, the 10 most populous economies outside the US and Europe. Over the last 15 years, the Pop-10 have collectively increased their numbers of students by 156%. As a result, they now have more students than the enlarged EU and the US combined.


Overall, tertiary education rates have been converging much faster than incomes. As a result, no shortage of young and high-skilled migrants is to be expected any time soon. If Europe wants to welcome more high-skilled migrants, it can.

## 2. EFFICIENCY REASONS FOR MIGRATION: A PRIMER

Economic migration can loosely be defined as any cross-border migration that occurs to take on a better paid job. If pay is broadly in line with productivity, a move to a better paid job thus increases global economic output. This is the fundamental efficiency argument in favour of migration.

But most people would prefer to stay at home if it wasn't for the money. Therefore, why not upgrade productivity where the people currently are instead of having people chase more productive jobs abroad? International trade and cross-border movement of capital are helping to do just that. According to the classic factor price equalisation theorem of trade theory, wages might in principle be equalised internationally through the trade of goods alone! However, there are important reasons why migration pressures are likely to persist even under free trade, full mobility of capital, and flexible labour markets domestically.

**First**, many poor countries suffer from an inferior "production function" because of poor institutions. Despite recent development success stories, upgrading poor institutions is a slow process. In the meantime, workers in many developing countries will continue to suffer from inferior wages. Migration can short-circuit this devel-



Source: Edstats (World Bank)

Nearest available year used when student data missing for 1990 or 2004.

\*Bosnia & Herzegovina, Armenia, Palestinian Authority, and Syria not included in EU & Proximity due to missing data.

opment problem by allowing workers move to locations with a better "production function" immediately.

**Second**, agglomeration effects are an important rationale for migration. For example, France and the UK are large countries with fairly uniform institutions, free trade and free movement of capital. Nevertheless, workers continue to migrate to extremely expensive and crowded places like London or Paris. The reason is, people become more productive by virtue of geographic concentration. By moving to a large agglomeration, often in a foreign country, they can also hope to greatly improve the match between their skill and their job, thus boosting their productivity.

In summary, important factors driving migration today include good institutions and agglomeration effects. In both areas, Europe is well positioned.

In view of these important efficiency arguments<sup>3</sup> for migration, why is free migration such a remote prospect? Besides non-economic factors, distributional concerns are the main reason.

The basic argument is easily understood: Almost by definition, the migrant himself or herself derives benefits from a higher wage abroad. In the host country, wages of workers with labour market characteristics similar to those of the migrant can be expected to marginally decline while the income of those with different skills increases. Beneficiaries typically include people with different skills and owners of capital and land. In the

<sup>2</sup>China, India, Indonesia, Brazil, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Nigeria, Mexico, Vietnam, Philippines.

<sup>3</sup>Strictly speaking, agglomeration effects need not improve overall efficiency. [See Charlott et al, 2006]



source country, the wage impact will be a mirror image: the wage prospects of workers similar to the emigrant are set to improve while those with complementary factors of production would tend to suffer somewhat.

On that basis, low-skilled immigrants will tend to increase income inequality among the native population in the host country as the already below-average wages of low-skilled natives will come under additional pressure. By analogous arguments, high-skilled migration has a benign distributional impact in the host country and an adverse distributional impact in the source country. Ultimately, these opposing effects between different skill groups and different countries are likely to be at the core of any economic controversy over migration.

However, while this theoretical argument is simple and compelling, it has been surprisingly difficult to find convincing empirical evidence to support it. In their analysis of empirical surveys, Longhi et al. (2005, 2006) find only a minute “consensus estimate” of the distributional impact: a one per cent increase in immigration only leads to a 0.12% decline in wages within the relevant skill segment and a 0.024% decline in employment.

If this were true, it would be wonderful news. Essentially, one could stop worrying about the distributional implications of migration altogether. However, as Borjas (2003) has pointed out, most of the empirical studies that fail to find a significant distributional impact of migration focus on the impact of immigration on wages in small geographic areas. But such an approach fails to control for the endogeneity of migration. Migrants tend to be attracted to locations that have the most vibrant local economies and therefore typically the most attractive wages. Hence, any

negative wage impact of immigration might be hidden by above-average wages in areas that manage to attract the largest numbers of migrants.

*“High-skilled immigration is likely to increase welfare in the host country since both efficiency and equity are likely to be improved.”*

By applying an econometric approach immune to this particular concern, Borjas (2003) and Aydemir and Borjas (2006) obtain substantially higher estimates of the wage impact of migration for the US, Canada, and Mexico. According to these studies, immigration of 1% reduces wages at the respective skill-level by between 0.3 and 0.4% and migration could explain up to one third of the increase in the wage gap between low-skilled and high-skilled wages in the US over recent decades. Furthermore, Borjas finds in a simulation that any efficiency gains may well be tiny compared to these adverse distribution effects.

But those findings are unlikely to mark the end of the empirical debate. Bonin (2005) applies Borjas’ methodology to German data and finds much smaller effects. Also, questions remain as to why the wage effects of classic natural experiments like the Miami Boatlift and the mass emigration from the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) countries have not been more marked. Finally, Ottaviano and Peri (2006) find significant complementarity of native and foreign workers within the same skill group and they argue that only the least skilled group of natives in the US are likely to experience a negative wage impact due to migration.

But one thing is clear: the empirical literature has not been able to comprehensively dispel the distributional

*“The net fiscal impact of a high-skilled immigrant tends to be more favourable.”*

concerns that come with low-skilled migration, at this stage.

Assuming a welfare function that is inequality averse, the efficiency and distributional findings can now be brought together. High-skilled immigration is likely to increase welfare among the host country population since both efficiency and equity are likely to be improved. By contrast, low-skilled immigration has an ambiguous welfare effect in the host country. It increases efficiency from the perspective of the native population provided that there is sufficient adjustment in the capital stock while widening the income gap between rich and poor in the host country.

The welfare argument in favour of high-skilled immigration and the welfare ambiguity of low-skilled immigration are reinforced by a number of additional aspects that have so far been neglected:

**(i) The Fiscal Impact of Migration in a Welfare State.**

Obviously, the net fiscal impact of a high-skilled immigrant tends to be substantially more favourable than the net fiscal impact of a low-skilled migrant. However, even low-skilled immigrants can make a positive net contribution to the welfare state since pay-as-you-go pensions impose a large burden on young migrants.

**(ii) Migration and Inflexible Labour Markets.**

Low-skilled workers are typically more affected by poorly functioning labour markets than high-skilled workers. Chart 3 shows that the unemployment rate of low-skilled workers in Europe is systematically higher than for high-skilled workers. On average, the former stands at 10% in the EU while the latter is only 5% and can primarily be explained by frictional unemployment. This suggests that the labour market will be able to absorb high-skilled migrants more readily than low-skilled migrants.<sup>4</sup>

<sup>4</sup>However, if the low-skilled unemployment is due to centralised wage setting coupled with low mobility, additional low-skilled immigration might actually reduce unemployment by reducing the marginal productivity differentials between regions, as explained in Boeri and Brücker (2005).



(iii) Dangers of an Ethnic Underclass

There are signs that certain immigrant communities in Europe are developing into an ethnic underclass. It is clear that much better education and improved economic opportunities for the children of low-skilled migrants already in Europe, need to be provided. Migration policies can usefully complement such integration measures by creating a high-skill bias among fresh immigrants. Low-skilled immigrants already in Europe are the closest labour market substitutes to new low-skill immigrants. Hence, by reducing the inflow of additional low-skilled immigrants, the economic prospects of existing low-skilled immigrant communities could probably be improved.

For the source country, low-skilled emigration or "brawn drain" typically improves welfare as it improves both efficiency and redistribution. This positive impact of low-skilled emigration is reinforced by remittances. Low-skilled emigrants will often help to support poor relatives in the source country with their higher earnings abroad.


By contrast, the welfare impact of high-skilled emigration or "brain drain" is ambiguous.

The source country may suffer from an adverse efficiency and distributional impact as a result of the brain drain. There will be fiscal loss since high-skilled emigrants will no longer pay taxes in their home country. And just as high-skilled migrants help to uplift their ethnic communities abroad, they could have made notable contributions to public life had they stayed at home.

But a brain drain is not all bad for the source country. The option to emigrate may substantially increase the expected returns to education, thereby improving education incentive. Finally, if migrants return to their country of origin, and many of them do, the skills and savings they have acquired abroad become a powerful force of development. Therefore, moderate levels of brain drain may actually be beneficial for the source country as, for example, argued in Beine et al. (2003).


The findings of the previous sections are summarised in Figure 1: High-skilled migration tends to improve the welfare of the host country while the welfare impact of migration on the source country is ambiguous. By contrast, low-skilled migration has an ambiguous welfare impact on the host country while generally improving wel-

fare of the source country. Hence, there need not be a conflict of interest between source and host country but there may well be. This raises the question how could the positions of host and source country be reconciled, if indeed there were a conflict?



Unlike trade, migration will generally require international compensating transfers instead of purely national ones if efficiency gains are in part to be used to compensate the losers. In particular, it will typically be necessary for a rich host country to share some of the gains from high-skilled migration, including the gains from the immigrants, with the poor source country. Perhaps the most prominent proposal in this respect is the Bhagwati tax, a special income tax on the high-skilled immigrant the proceeds of which are to be transferred back to the source country in compensation for the migratory move.

This tax may be difficult to implement in practice because of international cooperation, and some forms of tax discrimination based on the place of birth may not be constitutional under all circumstances, but Europe could certainly go a long way towards gaining the moral high ground simply by fulfilling last year's commitments to



Source: Eurostat

\*Unemployment rates for worked aged 25 and over (Q2 of 2005). "High-Skilled" = Tertiary education; "Low-Skilled" = Primary and Lower Secondary only.



significantly increase development aid as a percentage of GDP. More specifically, the EU could make a point of subsidising education systems as an increasing function of the net inflow from any particular source country. Alternatively, rich countries could allocate more work permits for low-skilled workers, since a mixed strategy between high-skilled and low-skilled migration could also overcome the potential conflict of interest depicted in Figure 1. Additional possibilities are discussed in the next section.

### 3. POLICY PROPOSALS

If the potential distributional problems with the source countries can be fairly resolved, how should Europe go about attracting high-skilled migrants? Before answering this question, the term “high-skilled” migrant needs a better practical definition.

Perhaps the most obvious definition of skill would be based on formal qualifications. This also makes some economic sense since formal qualifications tend to be a fairly good predictor of future earnings potential. This is relevant since most migrants move in their 20s or early 30s when their current earnings are only a relatively poor predictor of future earnings potential.

However, from an economic perspective, a definition of skill ought to go beyond formal qualifications. As long as an immigrant is likely to achieve high earnings in the host country, he could be argued to have sufficiently rare talent so as to be regarded as highly skilled. This is the salary-based definition of skill. It is a highly flexible definition, capturing all kinds of professional excellence, including sports such as football and creative professions, which are difficult to standardise.

#### (i) An EU-wide Blue Card for high-skilled migrants.

In a points system of immigration, both definitions of skill can simply be used in parallel. In view of the high flexibility of points systems and their success in attracting high-skilled migrants, it seems likely that many European countries will adopt them over the coming years.

This raises the question whether there is any room for European involvement regarding high-skilled migration. High-skilled migrants could give rise to positive cross-border externalities within the EU similar to research and development. In principle, this argument might even be used to justify subsidies for attracting high-skilled migrants, perhaps in the form of a centrally financed Erasmus style programme to attract third country nationals.

However, before going down the route of explicit subsidies, the attractiveness of Europe could be increased for free by providing third country nationals immediate access to the entire EU labour market. This will be more valuable from the perspective of the migrant than access to any national labour market due to the option value of the additional markets. Also, such an EU wide immigration regime would provide much greater visibility, predictability, and transparency than 25 different national systems

Therefore, it is recommended to introduce a “Blue Card”, a European Green Card that would provide highly skilled third country nationals with instant access to the entire European labour market. This Blue Card would be allocated on the basis of skill through a Europe wide points system. Overall, such a system should make it significantly easier

for Europe to compete for top talent with countries like the US or Canada. By contrast, the positive spill-over of low-skilled immigration is likely to be limited. Therefore, low-skilled migration could remain the responsibility of the member states for the time being, unless significant negative spill-over effects are discovered in specific areas that would need to be addressed collectively.

#### (ii) Blue Diplomas for Foreign Graduates

As one particular variant of the Blue Card, an entirely qualification-based “Blue Diploma” could be introduced. Any graduate of a Masters programme (or equivalent) from a participating university could be made eligible for a Blue card by virtue of his or her degree. Such a comprehensive and predictable arrangement would greatly help to attract foreign talent to European universities and to the European labour market afterwards. In principle, it would make sense to extend Blue Diplomas to universities outside Europe also. For a start, the top 100 non-European universities, as measured by academic excellence, should also be included in the scheme.

Even from a development perspective, the Blue Diploma could turn out to be beneficial. By providing guaranteed access to the European labour market without requiring a permanent presence, circular migration in the spirit of the proposal by Weil (2006) would be encouraged. The Blue Card would in effect act as an insurance policy for graduates from developing countries in case they would like to take the risk of going back home. They could always return to Europe for a second chance.

#### (iii) An External Minimum Wage

It turns out that the skills-based approach of migration also has an interesting application to EU enlargement. For new rounds of EU enlargement (Bulgaria, Rumania, eventually Turkey), the question arises of how to manage the transition to full labour mobility.

*“The Blue Card would act as an insurance policy for graduates from developing countries.”*



As with immigration from third countries, the old member states will typically be more readily persuaded to open up their labour markets for high-skilled than for low-skilled workers from new member states. Furthermore, due to the strictly limited duration of the transition process to full labour mobility, the dangers of abuse are less pronounced than they would otherwise be. Hence, a simple salary-based approach can be used to introduce full mobility for high-skilled workers while delaying access for low-skilled workers.

Citizens of new EU member states would be allowed to enter work contracts that pay above an external minimum wage in all old member states. This wage floor could initially be set at the median wage in each old member state. With time, the external minimum wage could be lowered at a jointly agreed minimum pace to reach full free mobility. Of course, any old member state would be allowed to open its labour market faster, or even lift all restrictions immediately, if it chose to do so.

Germany and other countries who have not yet introduced full mobility from the 2002 round of enlargement would be well advised to apply this approach immediately to attract

*“The complex issue of low-skilled migration should not hold us back in finding a better approach to skilled migration.”*

high-skilled workers from the present new member states in Eastern Europe. Germany could introduce an external minimum wage of €30,000 per year for citizens of the new member states in Eastern Europe. For young workers, this threshold could even be set somewhat lower, at €24,000. As a result, the low wage sector in Germany would continue to be protected for the time being while Germany could start enjoying the benefits of skilled migration imme-

diately. Over the next 3 to 5 years, this external minimum wage could then be progressively lowered in order to assure a smooth transition to full worker mobility in 2009 or 2011.

\*\*\*

While Europe would clearly benefit by attracting more talent from abroad, continued low-skilled migration will not necessarily be harmful. In this brief, it has merely been argued that the complex issue of low-skilled migration should not hold us back in finding a better approach to skilled migration.

By the same token, the introduction of better integration policies is a no-brainer that must not be delayed by the continuing complex discussion of how restrictive or liberal migration policies for low-skilled migrants should be.

*The author acknowledges the valuable research assistance of Fulvio Mulatero in the preparation of this policy brief.*

## REFERENCES

- Abdurrahman Aydemir and George Borjas, “A Comparative Analysis of the Labor Market Impact of International Migration: Canada, Mexico, and the United States”, Working Paper, April 2006.
- Michel Beine, Frédéric Docquier, and Hillel Rapoport, “Brain Drain and LDCs’ Growth: Winners and Losers”, IZA Discussion Paper 819, 2003.
- Tito Boeri and Herbert Brücker, “Why are Europeans so tough on migrants?”, Economic Policy – A European Forum, 44, 629-703, 2005.
- Holger Bonin, “Wage and Employment Effects of Immigration to Germany: Evidence from a Skill Group Approach”, IZA Discussion Paper 1875, 2005.
- George Borjas, “The Labor Demand Curve Is Downward Sloping: Re-examining the Impact of Immigration on the Labor Market”, *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 118(4), 1335-1376, 2003.
- Sylvie Charlot, Carl Gaigné, Frédéric Robert-Nicoud, and Jacques-François Thisse, “Agglomeration and welfare: The core-periphery model in the light of Bentham, Kaldor and Rawls”, *Journal of Public Economics*, 90, 325-47, 2006.
- Jean-Christophe Dumont and Georges Lemaître, “Counting Immigrants and Expatriates: A New Perspective”, OECD Social, Employment, and Migration Working Paper, 2004.
- European Commission, “Policy Plan on Legal Migration”, COM(2005) 669 final.
- Simonetta Longhi, Peter Nijkamp, and Jacques Poot, “A Meta-Analytic Assessment of the Effect of Immigration on Wages”, *Journal of Economic Surveys*, 19(3), 451-477, 2005.
- Simonetta Longhi, Peter Nijkamp, and Jacques Poot, “The Impact of Immigration on the Employment of Natives in Regional Labour Markets: A Meta-Analysis”, IZA Discussion Paper 2044, 2006.
- Gianmarco Ottaviano and Giovanni Peri, “Rethinking the Gains from Immigration: Theory and Evidence from the US”, Working Paper, January 2006.
- Patrick Weil, “A Flexible Framework for a Plural Europe”, in *The Hampton Court Agenda: A Social Model for Europe*, Policy Network, 2006.

Bruegel is a European think tank devoted to international economics, which started operations in Brussels in 2005. It is supported by European governments and international corporations. Bruegel’s aim is to contribute to the quality of economic policymaking in Europe through open, fact-based and policy-relevant research, analysis and discussion.

The Bruegel Policy Brief series is published under the editorial responsibility of Jean Pisani-Ferry, Director. Opinions expressed in this publication are those of the author(s) alone.

Visit [www.bruegel.org](http://www.bruegel.org) for information on Bruegel’s activities and publications.

Bruegel - Rue de la Charité 33, B-1210 Brussels - phone (+32) 2 227 4210 [info@bruegel.org](mailto:info@bruegel.org)

