


European Dialogue

THE MAGAZINE FOR EUROPEAN INTEGRATION

JANUARY 1997




Mapping a Common Foreign and Security Policy

- Building an effective policy
- EU and Nato options
- Security organisations
- What the EU treaty says
- Changes the Commission wants
- Joint actions
- Common positions



PUBLISHED BY THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION
 ENGLISH EDITION : FOR COMMISSION INTERNAL USE ONLY





■ **EDITOR**

Margie Lindsay

■ **PUBLISHER**

European Commission
(Directorate-General for Information)

■ **PRODUCTION**

Cartermill International

■ **EDITORIAL BOARD**

Gérard Legris, Chairman, and
George Cunningham
(Directorate-General for Information),
Per Vinther and Helen Campbell
(Directorate-General for External Relations),
Joan Pearce (Directorate-General for
Economic and Financial Affairs).

■ **EDITORIAL ENQUIRIES**

Margie Lindsay
Tel : +44 (181) 546 9245
Fax : +44 (181) 287 1725

■ **SUBSCRIPTION ENQUIRIES**

Cartermill International
26 Rue de la Loi (B1)
1040 Brussels / Belgium
Tel: +32 (2) 280 17 37
Fax: +32 (2) 280 17 49

■ **ADVERTISING ENQUIRIES**

Media Network Europe
Tel: +44 (171) 834 7676
Fax: +44 (171) 973 0076

© 1997 European Commission

■ The magazine is a forum for discussion, and therefore its contents do not necessarily reflect the policies or views of the EU institutions or of the member states. Readers' reactions are welcome and wherever possible will be published.

Letters to the Editor should be addressed to:

The Editor of *European Dialogue*
c/o Gérard Legris
(Directorate-General for Information)
European Commission
200 rue de la Loi - 1049 Brussels / Belgium
Tel: +32 (2) 299 94 06 - Fax: +32 (2) 299 92 88

■ **COVER PICTURE**

Jean-Pierre Gabriel

■ **TYPESET / LAYOUT & DESIGN**


TPP Brussels

■ **PRINTED BY**


Formator

English edition
For Commission internal use only

This publication is available in Bulgarian,
Czech, Estonian, Hungarian, Latvian,
Lithuanian, Polish, Romanian, Slovak
and Slovenian



Contents



3 **EU POLICY POSITIONS**

These are challenging times for the European Union with its development of a common foreign and security policy. This article explores the reasons behind the EU's quest for a common policy and why many in the Union see it as a necessary part of the EU's functions.

7 **NATO AND EU OPTIONS**

For the organisations most closely involved with the structure of European security, 1996 proved to be a busy year. This article looks at the options facing the main players in the European security and defence arena.

12 **SECURITY ORGANISATIONS**

An overview of the various security organisations and who belongs to what.

14 **MAASTRICHT TREATY**

A look at the provisions in the Maastricht Treaty (Title V) dealing with the Common Foreign and Security Policy.

IGC POSITION

16

An extract from the European Commission's submission to the Inter-Governmental Conference (IGC) giving the Commission's view on how common foreign and security policy should change.

JOINT ACTIONS


18


A list of joint actions adopted by the Council since the entry into force of the Treaty on European Union (November 1993-September 1996)

COMMON POSITIONS

19

A list of common positions adopted by the Council since the entry into force of the treaty on European Union (November 1993-September 1996)





EU tries to build an effective CFSP

These are confusing times for anyone trying to work out whether the European Union (EU) has any prospect of developing a common foreign and security policy (CFSP) worth the name. When the CFSP was established, it was in answer to a range of internal and external challenges. Internally, the completion of the Single Market and the drive towards economic and monetary union (EMU) necessitated corresponding moves towards political union, of which CFSP was a central element. Externally Europe was expected to use its economic weight to achieve more political influence and ensure stability around its borders.

The 1991 Maastricht negotiations to establish the treaty on European Union took place in the midst of a geopolitical earthquake which hit Europe following the collapse of communism and failed to take into account, let alone attempt to meet, the enormous challenges posed by the unification of Germany, the sweeping changes in central Europe and the disintegration of the Soviet Union.


There were high expectations for the CFSP which superseded the previous light framework of European Political Cooperation (EPC). The European Council became directly involved, not only through the single institutional structure, but also as the body to issue mandates for joint actions.

Title V included a number of improvements, such as the ending of taboo areas (one could now discuss issues having military implications), the provision for joint actions (Article J.3), and even for majority voting, albeit only on the implementation of joint actions, common positions (Article J.2) and the inclusion of security and defence (Article J.4) with the WEU designated "an integral part of the development of the European Union".

The final text of the treaty represented a compromise between the advocates of a

community approach (eight member states led by Germany) and those in favour of an inter-governmental approach (four member states led by Britain and France). Given the need for unanimity at the IGC, the minority in favour of an intergovernmental approach were able to carry the day.

A pillar structure was thus established which involved different arrangements for CFSP (inter-governmental: also for the third pillar covering Justice/Internal Affairs) than used for the first, or community pillar. Jacques Delors considered the changes a recipe for confusion. Regrettably,



his forecast has been proved all too accurate with numerous EU disputes over competencies between the different pillars.

The treaty text also papered over a dispute between the so-called Atlanticists and Europeans as regards the question of common defence. It was agreed to review the defence aspect and the institutional working of CFSP at the IGC in 1996. Since Maastricht, three countries (Austria, Sweden and Finland) have joined the EU, one of which has a 1200 km border with Russia.

There are now 10 central European and Baltic

states who have made it crystal clear that EU membership is a top priority. Cyprus is also waiting to start accession negotiations after the Inter-Government Conference (IGC), while it should not be forgotten that Turkey and Switzerland still have applications on the table. Malta froze its application in November 1996 after its recent change of government.

In short, it is not difficult to imagine a much larger EU within the next decade. One of the issues which should have been centre stage at the IGC is —what are the implications of such an enlargement for CFSP?

I NEED FOR AN EFFECTIVE CFSP

To begin, it is important to answer the question why we need a CFSP. The answer is fourfold. First, the voice of Europe will only be heard in world affairs if there is a single voice. Otherwise, it will not be heard at all, and that is against our common interest.

Second, the end of the Cold War has dramatically changed the European Union's strategic situation. The Soviet threat has disappeared, but many different new risks have appeared. These include local conflicts, with the potential to spill-over to neighbouring states or to escalate, terrorism, extremism, fundamentalism, international crime and arms trafficking, including the illegal sale of nuclear materials. It is clear that member states acting together will have far greater influence than acting alone.

Third, the US has reduced its presence in Europe substantially and Europe will have to take on more responsibility for its own security.

Fourth, the treaty contains a binding commitment for the Union to develop a CFSP. After all, this is a legal commitment which all member states have accepted and are bound to respect.

For all these reasons the EU needs to develop a CFSP which is able to meet the challenges of our times. With nearly 380m people, with a combined GNP ahead of the US, with the largest single market in the world, as the most important player in international trade, as the



main source of development assistance and humanitarian aid, the EU cannot avoid taking increased responsibility in world affairs.

I CFSP IN OPERATION

Although the CFSP only has been in operation for three years, it has been widely criticised for its cumbersome procedures and lack of effectiveness. Henry Kissinger's question in the early 1970s, "who do we call in Europe?", remains unanswered. An earnest debate on how to improve the CFSP is gathering pace at a time when the EU's three biggest diplomatic players — Germany, France and Britain — have been struggling hard to maintain a minimum of consensus over some of the biggest foreign policy challenges they face, such as the conflict in former Yugoslavia.

Throughout much of the Bosnian drama, Germany displayed more sympathy with US attitudes than those of her EU partners. On policy towards Iraq, the alignment is different: Britain backs the US tough stance, while France and Germany take a softer line. In respect to Cuba and Iran, however, the Europeans are united in their opposition to the US big stick approach.

These difficulties do not mean the quest for a more effective CFSP should be abandoned. The main argument in favour of such a policy is worth repeating: in most parts of the world, the EU will either speak with one voice, or its voice will not be heard at all.

This also applies in Washington where US officials, unlike the situation in 1991, have made clear their preference for a single European voice in international affairs. Indeed the Clinton Administration is perhaps the strongest supporter of the need to create an European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI).

At the Berlin Nato meeting in June 1996, there was agreement on the need to establish ESDI and to make operational the concept of Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTF).

Discussions are currently taking place between WEU and Nato on fulfilling this mandate but it is unlikely that there will be any agreement on the details until after the conclusion of the IGC at which a review of CFSP in operation and the defence dimension are high on the agenda.

An initial assessment of the CFSP in operation is rather disappointing. Certainly there has been a vast increase in the number of meetings and a

considerable reorganisation of the various bureaucracies involved. The European Commission has established a separate Directorate General (DGIA) to cover CFSP, under the mixed authority of President Jacques Santer and Hans van den Broek. The Council has also established a new Directorate to deal with CFSP, headed by a British diplomat, and the WEU's Secretariat has moved from London to Brussels. Since the treaty came into operation on November 1 1993, the EU has agreed a number of joint actions including:

- monitoring elections in Russia and in South Africa
- providing humanitarian assistance in former Yugoslavia and establishing an administration for Mostar
- supporting the Middle East Peace Process
- lobbying for the extension of the NPT
- agreeing export guidelines for the use of dual use goods
- agreement on policy towards export and control of anti-personnel mines
- promoting the Stability Pact to tackle problems concerned with borders/minorities in central Europe and the Baltic States

In addition to these "joint actions", a number of "common positions" (i.e. alignment of policies but not necessarily taking action together or committing resources) have been adopted on Libya, Sudan, Haiti, Rwanda, Ukraine and Burundi.

Joint actions have been useful (particularly the Stability Pact with its mixture of diplomatic pressure and community assistance) in concert with the positions of member states on some key issues, but they have not led to increased EU visibility or really decisive action.

The scope has been modest and the added value of CFSP not always apparent. The most



visible failures have been in Yugoslavia and, to a lesser extent, in Rwanda.

I WEAKNESSES OF CFSP

The first obvious weakness — and the most difficult to overcome — is the lack of political will

to act decisively as a Union. This may be due either to divergent perceptions of national interests, or to unwillingness to accept the political, and sometimes budgetary costs, of firm action.

Most member states seem to accept that they cannot hope to gain as much influence by acting alone, they still seem reluctant to move towards a credible and effective CFSP. This criticism is directed more towards the larger member states (French Middle East policy) but not exclusively (Greece's attitude towards the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and Albania). As a result there is still too much reliance on declamatory diplomacy.

The second weakness has been the lack of any definition of essential common interests of the Union in specific foreign policy situations.

In addition to divergent national perceptions, this can be attributed to a failure to analyse the implications of pursuing, or not pursuing, different courses of action.

A third weakness has been the decision-making procedure which is based on unanimity. This means that the Union's capacity to act may depend on the inclination of its most reluctant member state on any given issue.

A further problem is the rather leisurely pace of Political Committee proceedings (usually monthly) compared to the continuous activity in the committee of permanent representatives of member states to the EU (known as Coreper) with weekly meetings.

Fourth, present financing arrangements for joint actions are inadequate. There is confusion over the relationship between CFSP budget line as such, and budget lines for the Community activities which may support actions under the CFSP.

Other weaknesses can be cited such as the lack

of a legal personality, the lack of coherence between and confusion over the pillars which operate under different rules and procedures, ambiguity concerning the respective roles of the presidency and the Commission (disputes over the interpretation of "fully associated") and the form of the Union's external representation. Some foreign ministers holding the presidency

seem to have difficulty in making any distinction between representing a national position and an EU position. In many capitals outside Europe, the presence of the EU is conspicuous by its absence.

I NEED FOR IMPROVEMENTS

Given the prospect of a substantially enlarged Union in the not too distant future, an increasingly unstable international environment and encouragement from the US to achieve a credible CFSP, it is imperative that the IGC results in an enhanced and effective CFSP.

Although an absence of political will cannot itself be tackled through procedural improvements, such improvements, taken together, may reinforce the sense of common objectives and common interests, leading to a greater propensity to act together.


There are a number of proposals already on the table, some of which have been aired in Mr Westendorp's Reflection Group. These include :

* Policy planning: An awareness of common European interests can be increased by partially pooling the Union's capacity for policy analysis. This already takes place to some extent through the exchange of information on the EU telegraphic COREU network and by joint meetings of policy planning staff from the member states and the Union's institutions. Such co-operation is limited, however, and could be enhanced by establishing a joint structure for the evaluation of information, policy analysis and preparation of policy actions. There is broad agreement on the need for such a body but little agreement on what mandate it should have, what size it should be and what access it should have to confidential information.

* Objectives and priorities: The treaty and European Council conclusions provide only a general guide to the objectives and priorities of the CFSP. This hampers decisive action when situations arise requiring preventive diplomacy, crisis management or conflict resolution.

The Union's capacity for action could be enhanced if it were to produce an annual report and guidelines for the Union's external relations. This could be a task for the Policy Planners mentioned above.

The Council would then debate the guidelines, having first sought the views of the European Parliament. After Parliament had given its opinion, the guidelines could be reviewed by the



Council and then transmitted to the European Council for approval.

These guidelines would then create the parameters for EU decision-making on external policy during the course of the year.

An alternative approach might be to write priority areas, such as relations with the associated countries, Russia and the CIS, the Balkans, Mediterranean and Middle East, into the treaty to ensure the necessary commitment from all member states to common action.

I DECISION-MAKING

Until now unanimity has been required for joint action under the CFSP although, in principle, the treaty allows for decision by qualified majority on the details of implementing measures.

This means that the Union's capacity for action can be limited by the reluctance of a single member state. Respecting national prerogatives on matters of vital interest in fundamental areas of foreign and security policy, decision-making rules could be changed to permit member states wishing to take action together, to do so within the framework of the treaty.

Such actions would only be agreed if they fell within the broad guidelines approved by the European Council.

Other member states, though not necessarily participating directly, would not be able to prevent the joint action from taking place.

Such an approach, which will be even more desirable in an enlarged EU, finds its origin in the declaration attached to the treaty concerning the CFSP, which aims at preventing the blockage of unanimity where a qualified majority exists.

Obviously there needs to be a reform of the voting system to allow for a greater correlation

with population size.

Ministers also need to discuss issues working from a similar information basis; and the CFSP infrastructure (working groups, planners, political committee), must prepare options for ministerial decision.

There is a strong case for a permanent political meeting in Brussels, perhaps at deputy level.

I EXTERNAL REPRESENTATION

Under the treaty, the presidency was given an increased role as regards external representation of the Union. The Commission was also tasked, together with the Council, with ensuring coherence between the pillars. It is doubtful, however, whether the present six-monthly rotation system can be maintained in an enlarged Union.

It is increasingly difficult for the small states to run the Presidency. Even with adjustments to the troika rotation, one cannot escape the fact that future enlargements will concern mainly small states.

The most appropriate solution is not a directorate nor a new body — a Mr/Ms CFSP — to oversee CFSP, but rather a strengthening of the Community institutions.

As far as the Commission's role is concerned, it is fully associated with the implementation of the CFSP and has the right of initiative, a right shared with the Presidency and other member states.

The Commission is well placed to provide the European perspective and has demonstrated this in the past two years by preparing numerous papers covering EU policy towards central Europe, Russia, Ukraine, the Baltic states, the Mediterranean, Asia, Japan, Mercosur, etc. Member states inevitably approach problems from a national perspective whilst the Council has neither the experience nor the critical mass of officials to undertake new tasks in CFSP.

The Commission is an institution which provides continuity through changing presidencies and troikas. On the whole the Presidency-Commission form of external representation is more coherent than the somewhat unwieldy troika formula.


In the long term, under the impact of enlargement, there is a strong case for the European Commission to act, under a Council mandate, in the whole range of external policies. One could envisage a senior Vice-President for foreign affairs (rather like the US trade



negotiator) who would speak for, and represent the Union in areas agreed upon by the Council.

An alternative proposal which has been suggested would involve an independent CFSP secretariat, roughly modelled on Nato. But it is difficult to see how this would improve coherence or reduce confusion as to who speaks for Europe. One could, however,

envisage ad hoc special representatives being mandated to deal with specific issues — rather like Carl Bildt in former Yugoslavia.



I SECURITY AND DEFENCE

The Maastricht Treaty provides for the possibility of a common defence policy, which might in time lead to a common defence. In the past three years little progress has been made towards achieving this goal.

The relationship between the WEU and Nato is indeed more highly developed than that between the WEU and the EU. WEU was supposed to complement CFSP by providing a military component, but apart from its involvement in Mostar, there has been no operational tasking by the EU.

The relationship between the WEU, which is according to the treaty "an integral part of the development of the European Union", the EU itself and Nato, which is today the principal framework for ensuring the defence of its members, is a sensitive area and the IGC will wish to consider various options: whether to maintain the status quo, whether to enhance the capability of the WEU but leaving it outside the EU, or whether to bring it within the single institutional framework of the EU, albeit perhaps as a separate pillar.

At present it is difficult to envisage agreement to bring the WEU into the EU framework in the near future but it is important not to relinquish this as an EU goal. Obviously the extent of any changes will depend on outside developments,

particularly in Russia and the US, as well as EU internal dynamics.

Meanwhile, there are moves on a more mundane level to harmonise presidencies and to improve the exchange of documents and cross-participation in meetings.

Working towards a consensus on the future division of responsibilities between the WEU and Nato, the EU is gradually attempting to create a European intervention force, under the WEU umbrella, for use in the framework of joint actions under the CFSP.

There is increasing awareness that one of the most glaring lessons of the Yugoslav crisis is that the lack of a credible military instrument severely handicaps diplomatic efforts.

One of the most significant changes since 1991 has been the change in the US position as regards a European security and defence identity (ESDI).

There is a strong argument that the future health of the transatlantic relationship depends on the EU developing an effective CFSP, including a defence dimension. Talk of a new transatlantic treaty is premature, however, at least until the Union demonstrates that it is capable of an effective foreign and security policy.

I DEBATE WITHIN THE EU

There have been a wealth of position papers submitted by member states, the European Institutions and other bodies to the Reflection Group and to the IGC. Most recognise the need to strengthen the CFSP but there is still remarkably little consensus on the details.

Germany and the Benelux have consistently been one of the strongest supporters of a communautaire approach to CFSP. Britain has rejected any moves to weaken the present inter-governmental structures, whilst France is prepared to consider some modifications in an effort to improve efficiency. Interestingly Sweden and Finland, two of the new member states and both "neutral", have introduced papers allowing for the EU to take over responsibility for some WEU actions in the humanitarian and crisis management fields.

I CONCLUSION

Former EU President Jacques Delors used to pose three questions about foreign policy to member states of the EU, "What are our essential common interests? Are we prepared

to act together to defend these interests? If so, with what resources?"

These questions remain valid today and will become even more valid in light of the subsequent enlargement of the Union.

No one doubts that developing a credible and effective CFSP will take time and will require familiarity, practice and confidence.


Time is not on the Union's side since the need for an effective CFSP, recognised by public opinion in the member states, is even greater now than it was at the time of Maastricht. The end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union have been accompanied by the appearance of new risks to European security.

There can be no effective CFSP without the wholehearted participation of all member states. The British (and to a lesser extent the French) seem incapable of overcoming their ideological hostility to the community approach in foreign policy.

They certainly have an argument concerning the sensitive issue of distribution of votes in the Council. But even if they were to receive a larger number of votes, it seems unlikely that they would agree to drop their veto in CFSP. Nor do they seem willing to accord the Commission a greater role in representing the EU to the outside world.

At present, the British and French governments take the view that only minor adjustments are required and that the CFSP must remain firmly on an inter-governmental basis. It must be doubtful, however, whether an enlarged EU with many more member states can operate an effective CFSP purely on an inter-governmental basis. ★

Fraser Cameron, Foreign Policy Adviser, DGIA, European Commission, is writing in a personal capacity



Security concerns remain a priority in a changing Europe



Why this sudden bewilderment? This confusion? Why are the streets and squares emptying so rapidly, everyone going home, lost in thought? Because night has fallen, and the Barbarians have not come!

And some of our men, just in from the border, Say there are no Barbarians any longer.

Now what's going to happen to us without the Barbarians? They were, those people, after all, A kind of solution.

Thucydides's account of the Peloponnesian war

For the organisations most closely involved with the structure of European security, 1996 proved to be a busy year.

Not only are these bodies adapting internally, they are also fast approaching the point where they take on new members.

For the European Union (EU) the big event for 1996 (and much of 1997) continues to be the Inter-Governmental Conference (IGC) launched in Turin in March 1996.

One part of the review will try to improve the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). CFSP grew out of the wish to give some substance to a post-cold war European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI).

In a form of words which some took to be a challenge to Nato, the Maastricht Treaty included in its mandate for CFSP "all questions related to the security of the Union, including the eventual framing of a common defence policy which might in time lead to a common defence".

It remains to be seen how much, if any, progress can be made by the IGC towards such a policy and a common defence.

Nato is also on the verge of deciding which countries to admit as new members and when following publication of its enlargement study in December 1995.

The December 1996 session of the North Atlantic Council had been expected to be the point at which invitations would be sent out (most likely to Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic), but the long-awaited decision has been postponed to summer 1997.

I ASSESSMENT

The alliance has also been reassessing its likely missions and reorganising its military structure. Nato is anxious as well to have any reforms more or less complete with the 16 current members before enlargement takes place.

Another player on the European security scene is the Western European Union (WEU). The WEU has drawn up contingency plans and lists of Forces Answerable to WEU (FAWEU) which could be deployed on the humanitarian, peace-keeping and crisis management tasks described in the WEU Council's Petersberg Declaration of June 19 1992.

So far the WEU's main role has been to act as a bridge between Nato and the EU. In the declaration attached to the Maastricht Treaty, WEU member states described the organisation "as the defence component of the European Union and as the means to strengthen the European pillar of the Atlantic alliance".

I TOO MANY QUESTIONS

How and why did the European security debate develop as it did in 1996? As the key institutions move closer to admitting new members, what precisely is the European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI) which will be on offer to both old and new members?

The defining moment in the development of a post-cold war European security order may prove to be Nato's North Atlantic Council meeting in June 1996 in Berlin, where the idea

was finally accepted of establishing ESDI within Nato and where further development of the Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) mechanism was authorised.

The Berlin meeting was the latest, but not the last, stage in a long process of often bitter bargaining across the Atlantic, both as far as fundamental political questions were concerned, and on the finer details of military co-operation. Even during the cold war, when perceptions of a common military threat helped to cement US-European relations, the trans-Atlantic partnership had some uneven moments.

The burden-sharing debate, and the constant search for a more equitable and efficient way to distribute the risks and responsibilities of western security, was a perennial feature of Nato politics.

After 1989, with mounting pressure for a Continentalist (rather than Atlanticist) approach to European security, and with deep disagreements over the Yugoslav crisis, the partnership looked for a while to be on its last legs. In March 1991 US Under-Secretary of State Reginald Bartholomew sent a note to European capitals in which he made it plain that while the US would welcome a European voice in Nato, it was uneasy about the prospect of a European security caucus within the alliance, possibly based on the WEU, which could browbeat the US. The Americans would prefer their European allies to come to North Atlantic Council meetings negotiating as individuals rather than as a collective body.

The trans-Atlantic partnership took its biggest nose-dive in November 1994, when the Clinton administration announced it would no longer help to enforce the UN arms embargo on the Bosnian government. But by mid-1996 the debate seemed to be reaching a conclusion.

I FRANCE'S RAPPROCHEMENT

France's partial rapprochement with Nato is one explanation for the new mood. In December 1995, following Nato's decision to send a 60,000-strong force to Bosnia-Herzegovina, the French defence minister announced his country's intention to improve relations with Nato. France would take part in Nato's Military



Committee, improve its relations with the alliance's military staff and work more closely with Nato's military command. Full re-admission to the alliance, which would include renewed membership of the integrated military structure and co-operation in nuclear planning, remains off the agenda — at least for the present.

The steps taken by France have certainly electrified the alliance. By endorsing the new dynamism of Nato's involvement in Bosnia, and keen for domestic reasons to restructure its armed forces and reduce defence spending, France has acknowledged that the best hope for a well-organised, meaningful and cost-effective European security structure lies in Nato, rather than in some exclusively European institution or formation such as Eurocorps. Nevertheless, the French government still hankers for a more Continentalist solution, even if only as a long-term objective. At a WEU parliamentary assembly session in February 1996, for example, France joined Germany in reiterating the call for an eventual merger of the WEU with the European Union (EU) — anathema to Britain and, less directly, to the US. What sets recent events apart is that Nato has also been taking a few steps of its own. France was not merely moving closer to Nato, it was meeting a reforming Nato half-way. Some might say France moved with such alacrity simply to be in a position to influence Nato's dramatic reform process more favourably from within. For this meeting of minds to be harmonious and constructive, an elaborate diplomatic formula would be necessary. This was precisely the outcome of the meeting of Nato's foreign ministers in Berlin in early June 1996.

I NATO'S IDEAS

The final communiqué of the Berlin meeting sets out Nato's contribution to the new European security framework. According to the communiqué the alliance will continue to be a trans-Atlantic partnership, but will incorporate a functioning European Security and Defence Identity. This formula will enable "all European allies to make a more coherent and effective contribution to the missions and activities of the alliance as an expression of our shared responsibilities; to act themselves as required; and to reinforce the trans-Atlantic partnership".

The alliance will also continue to adapt itself to be able to carry out the full range of missions from humanitarian aid to collective self-defence. To carry out crisis management and peace-keeping operations better, and to give strength and meaning to European Security and Defence Identity, the communiqué endorses the steady development of the Combined Joint Task Force idea.

The document also addresses other important issues confronting the alliance — in particular outreach to former adversaries and, ultimately, enlargement. The Combined Joint Task Force scheme is still several months from completion, but the Berlin communiqué does indicate what might be involved.

The first point to note is that, as a style of military co-operation, Combined Joint Task Force is by no means a new idea.

Nato's defence ministers met in Brussels on June 13 1996 (with France's defence minister taking part for the first time since the late 1960s) and defined CJTF a "multinational and multi-service formation established for specific contingency operations". Using Nato's definition and a little imagination, Thucydides's account of the Peloponnesian war in the fifth century BC could be said to contain plenty of evidence on the use of CJTF.

It is clear from the Berlin communiqué that Nato has ambitions to be a crisis manager and peace-keeper in its own right, with the appropriate mandate from the United Nations (UN) or the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE).

The original, autumn 1993 version of the CJTF concept envisaged something rather different. Nato forces and command structures would be



earmarked for use by European members of the alliance in crises and operations below the level of collective self-defence, which would remain Nato's core task and rationale.

Certain Nato assets — described as "separable but not separate" — would by some means be lent to the European allies (and possibly others) via the WEU.

The foundations for this arrangement had already been laid in the Oslo communiqué of June 4 1992, which was broadly supportive of an enhanced operational capacity for the WEU. Nato soon became aware it might be creating a monster. The alliance also realised it should have some means to carry out these supplementary, "non-Article 5" or "out of area" missions (those actions taken outside the geographical area of Europe in which Nato operates).

International legitimacy and public approval of military activities are more readily available for peace-keeping and crisis management tasks than for defence against some notional threat.

The North Atlantic Council tried repeatedly to position Nato as an organisation for crisis management and in doing so rejected any neat division of labour between Nato and the WEU, with the former responsible for collective defence and the latter for non-Article 5 operations. In September 1993 Nato Secretary General Manfred Wörner destroyed any remaining illusions by declaring that non-Article 5 missions were no longer to be considered the exclusive preserve of the WEU.

So CJTF has become a mechanism for Nato crisis management as well as a means to satisfy demands for a European identity. The June 13 Nato defence ministers communiqué shows exactly where the alliance's priorities lie in setting up the CJTF scheme: "an exercise should be conducted as soon as practicable, based on the deployment of a CJTF for a Nato-led contingency operation. We also invite the WEU to work with Nato on the preparation for a subsequent CJTF exercise based on a WEU-led operation."

I NATO RESTRUCTURING

CJTF must also be placed in the context of the progressive restructuring of Nato. Shortly after the January 1994 Brussels summit at which the CJTF idea was formally endorsed, Nato's Secretary-General Wörner described the scheme as "the next logical step" in adapting Nato's force structures, a process which had



been underway since the London Declaration of July 1990 and the launch of the alliance's new strategic concept in November 1991.

Adaptation of the alliance's command and force structure continued after the 1994 summit. The military implications of the Partnership for Peace (PFP) scheme, the CJTF idea and the

plan to improve Nato's relations with WEU would all require a great deal of complex staff work.

A new set of Nato force goals were to be developed and work would continue on revamping the whole of the European command structure. The initial recommendations of the command structure study were made in late November 1996.

With the alliance anticipating diffuse security risks rather than a clear military threat, political and military reasoning suggests that mobility, flexibility and rapid response will be vital. Yet Nato cannot dedicate itself to preparing exclusively for non-Article 5 crises.


However unlikely at present, the possibility of massive instability in Europe in the future, and even of an attack on the territory of the allies, means Nato must remain able to conduct meaningful collective self-defence.

During the cold war Nato strategy was built around vast, standing, peacetime military forces. This would now be considered an unnecessary luxury in many countries, and so a new military framework is needed.

The challenge is to reconstruct the alliance in such a way that it can meet all its commitments and responsibilities — from collective self-defence to crisis management — within the constraints of what is now politically acceptable, financially and demographically possible and strategically fashionable.

The solution is a military structure which will be able to deploy conventional, multinational (combined) flexible, inter-service (joint) force combinations (task forces) across the full range of contingencies. In other words, the original 1993 CJTF concept has been developed and broadened one step further.

Writing in *Nato Review* in March 1996, the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) insisted that Nato restructuring be comprehensive and include all types of Article 5 and non-Article 5 missions. Confirming that the alliance is not to be split between Article 5 and non-Article 5 command arrangements, the



Berlin communiqué refers to a "renovated single multinational command structure".

I WHAT CJTF MEANS

CJTF is a means, rather than an end in itself. It is simply shorthand for a reorganised and reinvigorated military structure which will be capable of operating effectively across the anticipated spectrum of defence and security related tasks. Rather than say the restructured Nato will be able to produce CJTF, it may be more accurate to say CJTF is the basic pattern for Nato's military restructuring.

CJTF is a complex scheme, and there is much more work to be done. But it is nothing new or spectacular in operational terms. Nor is it simply a politico-military leasing arrangement by which European allies will be able to make off with Nato equipment when needed.

Yet the flavour of both the foreign and defence ministers communiqué is that CJTF will provide ESDI with its teeth. Does this mean ESDI will only have soft, baby teeth? Or will ESDI be toothless and poverty-stricken, only able to chew on something hard when Nato decides to lend a set of dentures?

The June 1996 communiqué both refer frequently to ESDI and appear to take the idea seriously.

But perhaps these references, like those to CJTF, are not what they seem.

France, for instance, had wanted the Berlin communiqué to describe ESDI as a "permanent and visible" part of Nato. This form of words was too much for other delegations to accept.

The visibility of ESDI within Nato continues to be discussed, with particular focus on giving CJTF

— a double-hatted, but discrete, European command and staff element.

This, too, raises more questions than it answer. Does this suggest that visibility is all that is now left of the Continentalist approach to European security? Does Nato really take ESDI seriously? More to the point, does it have to? Or have the Europeanists reduced their expectations to mere concerns about their public image? What effect will the adaptation of Nato have on the position of the EU and the WEU in the overall European security framework?

On the EU side the IGC will look at several proposals for improving and strengthening CFSP. The Maastricht Treaty put movement towards an eventual common defence policy and common defence on the CFSP agenda. Under this item there might be proposals for including the WEU's Petersberg humanitarian and rescue tasks as treaty commitments, and even for a merger of the EU and WEU — although neither suggestion stands much chance of being voted through at the IGC.

The more important question is whether, given all the reforms being made at Nato, the steam has gone out of the argument for an EU-based common defence policy of any description. What are the prospects for the EU in the great European security debate?

I EU AS A DEFENCE STRUCTURE

While it would be premature to airbrush the EU out of the picture, at present the EU's prospects as a defence and security structure are clearly determined by what the WEU can extract from its deal with Nato. This may be too little for those who are keen to make the EU into a fully-fledged defence and security body.

Speaking after the Berlin ministerial meeting, Britain's Foreign Secretary Malcolm Rifkind was of the view the WEU's role "did not include combat missions".

One WEU official thought it inconceivable that political control of even peripheral operations of this sort could be placed wholly in the hands of the EU. It seems most unlikely — at least on the level of public policy, where votes are won and lost — that the champions of European integration could accept a non-combatant defence identity which was about as militarily significant as an air ambulance and over which they had no real political control beyond the ability to request the WEU to carry out a specific action.

Some argue that in time the political control of a



European CJTF should be placed in the hands of the EU Council of Foreign Ministers rather than the WEU and that an EU request should not have to go through a US-friendly, second ministerial filter at the WEU.

One senior European Commission official, uncertain whether the WEU is part of the solution or part of the problem, describes political control by the WEU as "wasteful duplication".

Another official insists that, over time, governments should approve the necessary resources to strengthen DGIA (the Commission directorate-general responsible for CFSP), rather than commit resources to the Council of Foreign Ministers' own, separate policy planning staff. In the still more distant future, and with the various enlargement processes complete, all these turf battles could be resolved by a full congruence in the membership of Nato, the WEU and the EU.

From the central European and Baltic states viewpoint, the initial problem, however, will be how to gain entrance into any or all of these organisations, rather than whether or when they will merge.

I CONTINENTALIST HAPPINESS

The central issue in the near term is how well Continentalist aspirations and potential will be satisfied by the Nato/ESDI/WEU arrangement. The WEU was reinvigorated in 1984 and joined the post-cold war security debate in June 1992 with the publication of its Petersberg Tasks. Yet throughout its existence WEU has been in the shadow of Nato. In the 1990s its main contribution has been as an agent for compromise between the bigger players in European security. So does the WEU now have a convincing discrete political-military role? Or is the WEU about to become a victim of the Euro-Atlantic compromise which it has been so instrumental in bringing about?

The WEU has certainly been busy. It has conducted several military operations and is preparing for more. Regular meetings are held between WEU military chiefs and an operational planning cell has been established in Brussels at WEU headquarters.

WEU military planners are preparing contingency plans, drawing up lists of WEU-earmarked forces and have held their first command exercises (a 12-month/three phased

exercise which began in December 1995, known as Crisex, and ended in December 1996. Political and military relations between WEU and Nato have also improved, with a long-awaited mechanism for classified document exchange being agreed in May 1996. The WEU Secretary General Jose Cutileiro argues that strengthening the organisation's operational ability is essential to WEU's overall development and expects to be ready for Petersberg missions by early 1997. "This is not negligible and has to be reckoned with," Mr Cutileiro told *European Dialogue*.


I QUESTIONS

Although important questions remain about the WEU's relations with Nato (once described by a Nato official as "extremely intense superficially, but very superficial when it comes to these issues"), and about the way a WEU-led CJTF would be equipped, conducted and concluded, the WEU is developing a significant (small-scale), staff operational capability. The organisation also contributes to western outreach through its associate partnership scheme. (The WEU has its own version of PFP, known as the associate partnership scheme. All 10 central European and Baltic candidates for EU membership are associate partners of WEU.) WEU provides a convenient base for the EU's neutral states (Ireland, Austria, Finland and Sweden) as they move tentatively towards joining the European defence and security order. But the main significance of the WEU may lie elsewhere. The WEU has enabled a working compromise to be struck between integrationism and inter-governmentalism, Atlanticism and Europeanism.

Integrationism is something like European unity — bringing everything about Europe under one roof, including the off-limits areas of security and defence, which are still the preserve of governments. When EU member states deal with these issues, they do so on an inter-governmental basis.

This approach does not allow much room for the European Commission or the fledgling CFSP pillar of the EU. As long as member states see security and defence as intimately sovereign matters, best dealt with at a national level, the EU will continue to struggle to form its own credible policy in this area.

At the same time there is also a long-running debate within Europe over where western defence co-operation should lie. Should it be in Europe, as a European effort, or on the Isle of



Rockall, as an Atlantic effort? How much should the US be involved in or lead Europe's defence? While Britain, Portugal and Germany have been supporters of the Atlanticists, France was traditionally a Continentalist — that is until the election of Jacques Chirac as France's president in 1995. Such a change in policy could have — and already has had — a profound impact on the way Europe views its defence interests.

The present compromise will hold only for as long as the WEU is an integral and visible part of it. The dissolution or demotion of the WEU could wreck the compromise and bring disagreements back into public view, both in Europe and in the US.

Without the political and financial support of west European governments, it is hard to envisage the WEU — and ultimately the EU — becoming a coherent, self-contained and militarily effective alliance.

It is equally hard to see such commitments being made while European defence budgets are partly constrained by economic and monetary union (EMU) convergence criteria especially by France and Germany — and while the Nato/ESDI/WEU formula has the potential to give the European allies something like a military capability they can call their own, as well as a sufficiently visible security and defence identity. The Nato/ESDI/WEU formula could prove to be a compromise which is both workable and necessary. But everything might change.

Washington might develop a plan to leave Europe standing on its own feet by the year 2000. The IGC might produce a revised CFSP — dynamic, ambitious and accepted across the EU as a sound basis for a Common Defence Policy (CDP) and Common Defence (CD). At least one highly placed Commission official believes the development of a hard EU defence identity is "extremely unlikely in the near future".



In either circumstance, and providing the awkward matter of declining defence budgets could be addressed, then the WEU might — and might have to — be transformed into a genuine defence and security component of the EU. For the foreseeable future, however, the compromise agreed at the June 1996 Berlin ministerial is likely to prevail.

I UNCLEAR FUTURE

Europe's defence and security requirements are still far from clear. Not only is the nature of any military threat to Europe and its interests difficult to predict, but the shape and size of Europe are changing fundamentally, as are Europe's relations with the US — in defence and in other areas.

It appears Nato holds more security and defence cards in its hand than its competitors. This is the result of several years of reform to the military structure of the alliance. The result is a Nato that will be able — politically and militarily — to carry out the full range of post-cold war tasks including Article 5 collective defence and non-Article 5 crisis management and other missions on behalf of the UN or OSCE or in conjunction with the EU and others.

Reform and adaptation may fail to capture the true extent and impact of the changes to Nato's military structure. It is the political consequence of this military restructuring which is Nato's real trump card.

These reforms have allowed the alliance to reposition itself firmly within the bounds of the post-cold war European security debate, rather than be kept awkwardly at a safe distance. Both

politically, through giving ESDI sufficient visibility and militarily (through CJTF), Nato has played a perfect hand. The opposition has all but collapsed.

In November 1995 EU Commission President Jacques Santer described the WEU as central to a "dialectic whose nature has changed radically in the last three years". A dialectical process, of course, is not meant to go on forever without producing something useful.

The European security dialectic seems to have come closer than ever before to the realisation that the spectres of inefficiency and duplication are to be found not so much in Europeans and Americans building more tanks than are jointly needed, than in sustaining more institutions than are required and in devising ever more complex arrangements to enable these institutions to cooperate.

With uneven political and financial commitment to European progress in this field, the Nato/ESDI/WEU formula at least makes it possible to suspend disbelief as regards the prospects for an effective, coherent and self-contained European security and defence identity, and to avoid the awkward truth that in the competition to design a new architecture of European security the winning blueprint has Nato stamped all over it.

On the other hand confusion in the new security and defence architecture could be a sign of vitality while the blueprint is now certainly less confusing.

Nato's clarification presents all these three institutions (EU, WEU and Nato) with a new set of problems. While areas of misunderstanding have been removed from the overall enlargement debate for these institutions, by making clear which bit of the western security community the states waiting in the wings could be joining, the old problem of membership by default rears its head. Will membership in the EU by default confer Nato membership and vice-versa for the candidate countries?

I WHERE IT LEAVES THE CANDIDATE COUNTRIES

Nato's enlargement plans have clarified the picture for EU candidate countries without helping them in their bid for EU membership. By removing the confusion, and marking the boundaries between Nato and the EU on defence, the last remaining excuses for not accepting new Nato members has been removed.

Such clarity may push along the enlargement process but if Nato does enlarge to include central Europe and the Baltic states, a new danger may be lurking in Europe. Russia has already expressed its unease over any Nato enlargement that includes these candidate states. Its displeasure could present an enlarged alliance with a more antagonistic Russia with procrastination suiting all the players except the candidate countries. ★


Paul Cornish, Cambridge

LIST OF TERMS

Both the European Union and Nato use a variety of acronyms. These can be confusing. The following is a brief list of the main abbreviations used in this report.

CD:	common defence
CDP:	common defence policy
CFSP:	Common Foreign and Security Policy
CJTF:	Combined Joint Task Force
DGP:	Senior Defence Group on Proliferation
EMU:	Economic and Monetary Union
EPC:	European Political Co-operation
ESDI:	European Security and Defence Identity
EU:	European Union
FAWEU:	Forces Answerable to WEU
IFOR:	Implementation Force
IGC:	Inter-Governmental Conference
IPP:	Individual Partnership Programme
NAC:	North Atlantic Council
NACC:	North Atlantic Co-operation Council
Nato:	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
PARP:	Planning and Review Process
PCG:	Policy Co-ordination Group
PFP:	Partnership for Peace
SACEUR:	Supreme Allied Commander Europe
SGP:	Senior Politico-Military Group on Proliferation
UN:	United Nations
UNPROFOR:	UN protection force
WEU:	Western European Union





Security organisations

I NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANISATION (NATO)

The North Atlantic Treaty establishing Nato was signed in Washington in April 1949 by 12 foreign ministers (Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Britain and the US).

Greece and Turkey acceded to the treaty in 1952, Germany (west) in 1955 and Spain in 1982.

The treaty created an alliance for collective defence as defined in article 51 of the United Nations Charter and led to the formation of Nato. The organisation now links 16 independent nations in a voluntary security system in which roles, risks and responsibilities are shared.

Key changes and innovations undertaken by Nato since 1989 include the adoption of a new strategic concept. This increased co-ordination and co-operation with other international organisations such as the UN, OSCE, WEU and the EU.

Nato contributes to international peacekeeping operations (notably in support of UN initiatives designed to restore peace in former Yugoslavia).

The new concept also established the North Atlantic Co-operation Council in December 1991 and expanded and intensified political and military co-operation in Europe through the Partnership for Peace programme, launched in January 1994. The concept combines a broad approach to security based on dialogue and co-operation with the maintenance of Nato's collective defence capability. It brings together political and military elements of Nato's security policy and establishes co-operation with new partners in central Europe and the Baltic states as well as in the former Soviet republics.

It provides for reduced dependence on nuclear weapons and introduces major changes in Nato's integrated military forces, including substantial reductions in their size and readiness; improvements in mobility, flexibility and adaptability to different contingencies; increased use of multinational formations; creation of a multinational rapid reaction corps; and adaptation of defence planning arrangements and procedures. A report on the possibility of expanding Nato to include more members was published in 1996.

I PARTNERSHIP FOR PEACE (PFP)

This is a major initiative by Nato directed at increasing confidence and co-operation and reinforcing security. States participating in NACC as well as OSCE countries are able to contribute to this programme. They have been invited to join the Nato member states in this partnership.

Partner states are invited by NACC to participate in political and military bodies at Nato headquarters concerning partnership activities. The partnership is aimed at expanding and intensifying political and military co-operation throughout Europe, increasing stability, diminishing threats to peace and building strengthened relationships by promoting practical co-operation and commitment to democratic principles.

I NORTH ATLANTIC CO-OPERATION COUNCIL (NACC)

NACC is a forum for dialogue and consultation on political and security-related issues and for partnership in practical co-operation activities in areas

of Nato competence. The council was created as a result of an initiative by the heads of state and government of Nato members in November 1991.

The 40-member council includes all 16 Nato member states, plus all former members of the Warsaw Pact. Austria, Finland, Sweden and Switzerland are observers.

I WESTERN EUROPEAN UNION (WEU)

WEU aims, under the Hague platform on European security interests agreed in October 1987 are to "develop a more cohesive European defence identity which will translate more effectively into practice the obligations of solidarity" to which members are committed in the framework of WEU and Nato.

In 1997 the WEU council will present a report to the European Council, including a report on progress of the group so far. The secretariat of the WEU has been transferred to Brussels and its secretary general attends meetings at ministerial level of the North Atlantic Council.

The Nato secretary general is invited to all WEU ministerial meetings. Practical measures of co-operation include joint meetings of the councils of Nato and WEU, meetings of the secretaries general and regular contacts at working level. The country which holds the WEU presidency keeps members of the North Atlantic Alliance informed of developments.

I EUROCORPS

In January 1988 the governments of Germany (west) and France set up a joint security council and formed a joint Franco-German army brigade consisting of around 4,000 troops. This brigade became operational in October 1990. The basis for a Eurocorps was increased military co-operation.

The mission of the European Corps includes: common defence of allies, peacekeeping and peace enforcement; and the provision of humanitarian aid. Other European countries have been invited to participate. An agreement forming Eurocorps was concluded in May 1992 and provisional headquarters are in Strasbourg.

In December 1992 an agreement was concluded between the French and German authorities and Nato's Supreme Allied Commander Europe (Saceur) on the relationship between Eurocorps and Nato and the deployment of the corps for operations under Nato command. In May 1993 Eurocorps' role as a multinational force under the auspices of WEU was confirmed by governments and in November 1993 agreement was reached on the manner of its future employment.

Belgium announced participation in the corps in June 1993 and in May 1994 Luxembourg also said it would take part. The Netherlands and Spain have also expressed interest in participating.

Eurocorps became operational in 1996 and consists at present of a Franco-German brigade and a number of smaller permanent elements. German, French and Belgian formations of division size have been



identified for possible assignment to the Eurocorps in future.

I ORGANISATION ON SECURITY AND CO-OPERATION IN EUROPE

(OSCE; formerly known as CSCE, the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe.)

OSCE is a political consultative process involving 55 participating states from Europe, Central Asia and North America. Launched in 1972 the former CSCE led to the adoption of the Helsinki Final Act in 1975. This document encompassed a wide range of commitments on principles governing relations between participating states, on measures designed to build confidence between them, on respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms and on co-operation in economic, cultural, technical and scientific fields. ★

OSCE = ORGANISATION ON SECURITY AND CO-OPERATION IN EUROPE

NACC = NORTH ATLANTIC CO-OPERATION COUNCIL

NATO = NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANISATION

PFP = NATO PARTNERSHIP FOR PEACE


WEU = WESTERN EUROPEAN UNION

EU = EUROPEAN UNION

- (1) WEU observers
- (2) WEU associate members (non-EU members of Nato)
- (3) WEU associate partners
- (4) Observers of NACC
- * Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia
- ** Suspended from OSCE

Security framework in Europe

OSCE	NACC	NATO	PFP	WEU	EU
ALBANIA	•		•		
ANDORRA					
ARMENIA	•		•		
AUSTRIA (1, 4)			•		•
AZERBAIJAN	•		•		
BELARUS	•		•		
BELGIUM	•	•		•	•
BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA					
BULGARIA (3)	•		•		
CANADA	•	•			
CROATIA					
CYPRUS					
CZECH REPUBLIC (3)	•		•		
DENMARK (1)	•	•			•
ESTONIA (3)	•		•		
FINLAND (1, 4)			•		•
FRANCE	•	•		•	•
FYROM*	•		•		
GEORGIA	•		•		
GERMANY	•	•		•	•
GREECE	•	•		•	•
HOLY SEE					
HUNGARY (3)	•		•		
ICELAND (2)	•	•			
IRELAND (1)					•
ITALY	•	•		•	•
KAZAKHSTAN	•		•		
KYRGYZSTAN	•		•		
LATVIA (3)	•		•		
LIECHTENSTEIN					
LITHUANIA (3)	•		•		
LUXEMBOURG	•	•		•	•
MALTA					
MOLDOVA	•		•		
MONACO					
NETHERLANDS	•	•		•	•
NORWAY (2)	•	•			
POLAND (3)	•		•		
PORTUGAL	•	•		•	•
ROMANIA (3)	•		•		
RUSSIA	•		•		
SAN MARINO					
SLOVAKIA (3)	•		•		
SLOVENIA (3)	•		•		
SPAIN	•	•		•	•
SWEDEN (1, 4)			•		•
SWITZERLAND (4)			•		
TAJIKISTAN	•				
TURKEY (2)	•	•			
TURKMENISTAN	•		•		
UNITED KINGDOM	•	•		•	•
UNITED STATES	•	•			
UKRAINE	•		•		
UZBEKISTAN	•		•		
YUGOSLAVIA**					
TOTALS: 55	40	16	27	10	15



Maastricht Treaty Title V : Provisions on a Common Foreign and Security Policy

Article J

A common foreign and security policy is hereby established which shall be governed by the following provisions.

I ARTICLE J.1

1. The Union and its member states shall define and implement a common foreign and security policy, governed by the provisions of this Title and covering all areas of foreign and security policy.

2. The objectives of the common foreign and security policy shall be to:

* safeguard the common values, fundamental interests and independence of the Union

* strengthen the security of the Union and its member states in all ways

* preserve peace and strengthen international security, in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter as well as the principles of the Helsinki Final Act and the objectives of the Paris Charter

* promote international co-operation

* develop and consolidate democracy and the rule of law, and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms.

3. The Union shall pursue these objectives by:

* establishing systematic co-operation between member states in the conduct of policy, in accordance with Article J.2

* gradually implementing, in accordance with Article J.3, joint action in the areas in which the member states have important interests in common.

4. The member states shall support the union's external and security policy actively and unreservedly in a spirit of loyalty and mutual solidarity. They shall refrain from any action which is contrary to the interests of the Union or likely to impair its effectiveness as a cohesive force in international relations. The Council shall ensure that these principles are complied with.

I ARTICLE J.2

1. Member states shall inform and consult one another within the Council on any matter of

foreign and security policy of general interest in order to ensure that their combined influence is exerted as effectively as possible by means of concerted and convergent action.

2. Whenever it deems it necessary, the Council shall define a common position.

Member states shall ensure that their national policies conform to the common positions.

3. Member states shall co-ordinate their action in international organisations and at international conferences. They shall uphold the common positions in such fora.

In international organisations and at international conferences where not all the member states participate, those which do take part shall uphold the common positions.

I ARTICLE J.3

The procedure for adopting joint action in matters covered by foreign and security policy shall be the following:

1. The Council shall decide, on the basis of general guidelines from the European Council, that a matter should be the subject of joint action.

Whenever the Council decides on the principle of joint action, it shall lay down the specific scope, the Union's general and specific objectives in carrying out such action, if necessary its duration, and the means, procedures and conditions for its implementation.

2. The Council shall, when adopting the joint action and at any stage during its development, define those matters on which decisions are to be taken by a qualified majority.

Where the Council is required to act by a qualified majority pursuant to the preceding subparagraph, the votes of its members shall be weighted in accordance with Article 148(2) of the Treaty establishing the European Community, and for their adoption, acts of the Council shall

require at least 62 votes in favour, cast by at least ten members.

3. If there is a change in circumstances having a substantial effect on a question subject to joint action, the Council shall review the principles and objectives of that action and take the necessary decisions. As long as the Council has not acted, the joint action shall stand.

4. Joint actions shall commit the member states in the positions they adopt and in the conduct of their activity.

5. Whenever there is any plan to adopt a national position or take national action pursuant to a joint action, information shall be provided in time to allow, if necessary, for prior consultations within the Council. The obligation to provide prior information shall not apply to measures which are merely a national transposition of Council decisions.

6. In cases of imperative need arising from changes in the situation and failing a Council decision, member states may take the necessary measures as a matter of urgency having regard to the general objectives of the joint action. The member state concerned shall inform the Council immediately of any such measures.

7. Should there be any major difficulties in implementing a joint action, a member states shall refer them to the Council which shall discuss them and seek appropriate solutions. Such solutions shall not run counter to the objectives of the joint action or impair its effectiveness.

I ARTICLE J.4

1. The common foreign and security policy shall include all questions related to the security of the Union, including the eventual framing of a common defence policy, which might in time lead to a common defence.

2. The Union requests the Western European Union (WEU), which is an integral part of the development of the Union to elaborate and implement decisions and actions of the Union which have defence implications. The Council shall, in agreement with the institutions of the WEU, adopt the necessary practical arrangements.

3. Issues having defence implications dealt with under this article shall not be subject to the procedures set out in Article J.3.



4. The policy of the Union in accordance with this article shall not prejudice the specific character of the security and defence policy of certain member states and shall respect the obligations of certain member states under the North Atlantic Treaty and be compatible with the common security and defence policy established within that framework.

5. The provisions of this article shall not prevent the development of closer co-operation between two or more member states on a bilateral level, in the framework of the WEU and the Atlantic Alliance, provided such co-operation does not run counter to or impede that provided for in this title.

6. With a view to furthering the objective of this treaty, and having in view the date of 1998 in the context of Article XII of the Brussels Treaty, the provisions of this article may be revised as provided for in Article N(2) on the basis of a report to be presented in 1996 by the Council to the European Council, which shall include an evaluation of the progress made and the experience gained until then.

I ARTICLE J.5

1. The presidency shall represent the Union in matters coming within the common foreign and security policy.

2. The presidency shall be responsible for the implementation of common measures; in that capacity it shall in principle express the position of the Union in international organisations and international conferences.

3. In the tasks referred to in paragraphs one and two, the presidency shall be assisted if need be by the previous and next member states to hold the presidency. The Commission shall be fully associated in these tasks.

4. Without prejudice to Article J.2(3) and Article J.3(4), member states represented in international organisations or international conferences where not all the member states participate shall keep the latter informed of any matter of common interest.

Member states which are also members of the United Nations Security Council will concert and keep the other member states fully informed. Member states which are permanent members of the Security Council will, in the execution of their functions, ensure the defence of the positions and the interests of the Union, without prejudice to their responsibilities under the provisions of the United Nations Charter.

I ARTICLE J.6

The diplomatic and consular missions of the member states and the Commission delegations in third countries and international conferences, and their representations to international organisations, shall co-operate in ensuring that the common positions and common measures adopted by the Council are complied with an implemented.

They shall step up co-operation by exchanging information, carrying out joint assessments and contributing to the implementation of the provisions referred to in Article 8c of the treaty establishing the European Community.

I ARTICLE J.7

The presidency shall consult the European Parliament on the main aspects and the basic choices of the common foreign and security policy and shall ensure that the views of the European Parliament are duly taken into consideration. The European Parliament shall be kept regularly informed by the presidency and the Commission of the development of the Union's foreign and security policy.

The European Parliament may ask questions of the Council or make recommendations to it. It shall hold an annual debate on progress in implementing the common foreign and security policy.

I ARTICLE J.8

1. The European Council shall define the principles of and general guidelines for the common foreign and security policy.

2. The Council shall take the decisions necessary for defining and implementing the common foreign and security policy on the basis of the general guidelines adopted by the European Council. It shall ensure the unity, consistency and effectiveness of action by the Union.

The Council shall act unanimously, except for procedural questions and in the case referred to in Article J.3(2).

3. Any member states or the Commission may refer to the Council any question relating to the common foreign and security policy and may submit proposals to the Council.

4. In cases requiring a rapid decision, the presidency, of its own motion, or at the request of the Commission or a member state, shall convene an extraordinary Council meeting within 48 hours or, in an emergency, within a shorter period.

5. Without prejudice to Article 151 of the treaty establishing the European Community, a political

committee consisting of the political directors shall monitor the international situation in the areas covered by common foreign and security policy and contribute to the definition of policies by delivering opinions to the Council at the request of the Council or on its own initiative. It shall also monitor the implementation of agreed policies, without prejudice to the responsibility of the presidency and the Commission.

I ARTICLE J.9

The Commission shall be fully associated with the work carried out in the common foreign and security policy field.

I ARTICLE J.10

On the occasion of any review of the security provisions under Article J.4, the conference which is convened to that effect shall also examine whether any other amendments need to be made to provisions relating to the common foreign and security policy.

I ARTICLE J.11

1. The provisions referred to in Articles 137, 138, 139 to 142, 146, 147, 150 to 153, 157 to 163 and 217 of the treaty establishing the European Community shall apply to the provisions relating to the areas referred to in this title.

2. Administrative expenditure which the provisions relating to the areas referred to in this title entail for the institutions shall be charged to the budget of the European Communities.

The Council may also:

* either decide unanimously that operational expenditure to which the implementation of those provisions gives rise is to be charged to the budget of the European Communities; in that event, the budgetary procedure laid down in the treaty establishing the European Community shall be applicable

* or determine that such expenditure shall be charged to the member states, where appropriate in accordance with a scale to be decided. ★



Commission opinion: reinforcing political union and preparing for enlargement

The following is extracted from the European Commission's submission to the Intergovernmental Conference (IGC) giving the Commission's opinion on common foreign and security policy.

I CHAPTER II: A CLEAR IDENTITY ON THE WORLD SCENE

The treaty on European Union calls on the Union to "assert its identity on the international scene". In practice, however, the additional influence that the member states were to have achieved by acting together has eluded them. Their efforts have often been poorly focused and are liable to be even more so after enlargement.

The conference should have a clear and simple aim: to empower the Union to act rather than react, the better to defend the interests of its people.

In some areas, such as trade policy, economic assistance, development aid and humanitarian action, there is already a coherent single policy towards the outside world, though to varying degrees. Other areas, such as the common foreign and security policy, are still at an early stage in their development.

The prime objectives of the conference should therefore be to:

- * bring together the various strands comprising foreign relations into a single effective whole, with structures and procedures designed to enhance consistency and continuity
- * improve the common foreign and security policy at all stages of its operation
- * establish a proper European identity with regard to security and defence, as an integral part of the common foreign and security policy.

I GREATER CONSISTENCY IN FOREIGN POLICY

The Union must be able to present a united front. Its foreign policy as a whole will not be effective until there is proper co-ordination between its various components, for which responsibility is shared among different institutions.

The treaty already requires the Council and the Commission to pursue a consistent foreign policy. But this has not happened under the

treaty as it stands and the institutions' duties in this respect should be reinforced.

The Council presidency and the Commission should ensure effective co-operation between the two institutions which are responsible for various aspects of foreign policy. This would considerably enhance the continuity and efficacy of the Union's foreign policy.

I MORE EFFECTIVE COMMUNITY ACTION

There are three areas which need to be examined.

Trade policy

The treaty should be updated to take account of the radical changes in the structure of the world economy, in which services, intellectual property and direct foreign investment play an increasingly important role. These developments are reflected in the increased responsibilities given to the World Trade Organisation.

The Community's powers in these areas are poorly defined, leading to needless procedural wrangles. This detracts from the Community's ability to defend the interests of the member states and their businesses.

The Commission believes that the common commercial policy should be clarified accordingly.

The Union's role in international organisations

Under the present treaty the Union is ill-equipped to conduct negotiations in international organisations and take part in their activities, as it is increasingly called upon to do. Difficulties arise when responsibility for the various aspects is split between the Community and the individual member states. Attempts to co-ordinate the member states' positions are made more complicated and, as a result, less successful; the Union's

negotiating position is weakened in many cases.

The Commission considers that the treaty should include provisions explicitly designed to enable the Union to speak with one voice and thus defend all the relevant interests more effectively.

Co-ordination between member states' policies and that of the Community

Generally speaking, in fields where responsibility is shared, such as development, transport and the environment, the member states' policies should be better integrated - by means of appropriate mechanisms - with that of the Community.

I A FIRMER BASIS FOR THE COMMON FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY

It needs first of all to be emphasised that the common foreign and security policy cannot develop without real political resolves on the part of the member states, together with clearly defined objectives.

The presidency and the Commission should together ensure the visibility of the common foreign and security policy. In any event this requires a series of improvements, from the preparation of decisions through to their adoption and implementation. During the whole process it is vital that the presidency-Commission tandem operate coherently and efficiently. Within this overall context, the Commission, for its part, will strengthen its international organisation with this in mind. The conference should consider ways and means of strengthening the presidency, with support from the Council secretariat.

I PREPARATION OF DECISIONS

The quality of analysis on which decisions are based must be improved. It is also important that all member states share the same analysis.

To this end a "joint analysis unit" should be set up, composed of experts from the member states and the Commission. It would be a joint service, possibly with a contribution from the Western European Union. Its analyses would be useful for the presidency and the Commission when drawing up and making more consistent their proposals. The location of this unit is less important.



The formulation of foreign policy would be facilitated by the incorporation of a permanent political committee into the Council's existing machinery for preparing decisions in Brussels.

I ADOPTION OF DECISIONS

The treaty introduced the concepts of "common position" and "joint action" in connection with the common foreign and security policy. In practice the distinction between these two instruments has become blurred and a source of contention.

The Commission considers that clarification of their respective functions is necessary.

The need for unanimity makes decision-making difficult, regardless of which instrument is used.

The Commission takes the view that qualified majority voting should be the norm for the common foreign and security policy. Specific rules would apply for decisions involving military matters.

There are also times when some, but not all, of the member states wish to take action on a specific matter. It should be possible for such initiatives to have the status of Union measures, as long as they are not against the general interests of the Union and provided that the latter is duly represented.

I IMPLEMENTATION OF DECISIONS

Representing the Union aboard and implementing its decisions involves many diverse tasks, because of the role of member states and the various elements of foreign policy. The only constant is the single institutional framework: whatever the field, whether it be a matter for the Community or for inter-governmental co-operation, the decisions are taken by the Council.

Primary responsibility for implementation should lie with the presidency and the Commission. But this clearly should not prevent certain tasks being allocated to specific personalities designated on an ad hoc basis.

The current procedure for common foreign and security policy decisions involving expenditure is both opaque and inefficient; separate negotiations have to be held for each decision. The Commission proposes that expenditure incurred in implementing the common foreign

and security policy be included in the Community budget, unless an express decision to the contrary is taken.

I A EUROPEAN IDENTITY FOR SECURITY AND DEFENCE

The Union's foreign policy suffers from its inability to project credible military force. Events in recent years have made this abundantly clear. A genuine European identity in the security and defence field is indispensable. It requires clear political will on the part of member states.


Nato remains at the centre of Europe's defence arrangements and a European pillar should be developed within it. In this context, the WEU plays a key role as already set out in the Treaty. As matters stand, member states do not, however, have the same defence commitments in relation to Nato and the WEU.

The Commission believes that a proper common foreign and security policy has to extend to common defence.

Accordingly the conference should:

- * allow Union commitments to missions aimed at restoring or keeping peace to be written into the treaty ("Petersberg missions")
- * reinforce the Union's security capability by providing for defence ministers to play an appropriate role in the Council
- * review the role of the WEU with a view to incorporating it into the Union according to a settled timetable.

In this context the Commission would recall that the security and defence of the Union are dependent on the existence of a solid industrial base performing credibly. This requires better integration of the armaments industry into the



general treaty rules, greater solidarity and co-operation including the establishment of an armaments agency, and a consistent approach to foreign trade. ★



List of joint actions adopted by the Council since the entry into force of the Treaty on European Union (November 1993-September 1996)

I FORMER YUGOSLAVIA

- Council decision of August 9 1996 fixing a date on which the effect of the common action 96/442/CFSP adopted by the Council on July

15 1996 comes into affect.

Date: 9.8.96

Decision number: 96/508/CFSP

Official Journal reference: L212 (21.8.96)

- Common action adopted by the Council on July 26 1996 relating to the intermediary arrangements concerning the progressive ending of the administration by the EU of Mostar.

Date: 26/7/96

Decision number: 96/1/6/CFSP

Official Journal reference: L195(6.8.96)

- Common action adopted by the Council on the basis of Article J.3 of the European Union Treaty relating to the nomination of a special EU envoy for the city of Mostar.

Date: 15.7.96

Decision number: 96/442/CFSP

Official Journal reference: L186 (24.7.96)

- Common action adopted by the Council on the basis of Article J.3 of the Treaty on European Union relating to the nomination of the EU special envoy to Mostar.

Date: 15.7.96

Decision number: 96/CFSP

- Common action adopted and based on Article J.3 of the Treaty on European Union concerning the action of the EU in the process of elections in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Date: 10.6.96

Decision number: 96/406/CFSP

Official Journal reference: L168 (6.7.96)

- Council decision supplementing decision 95/517/CFSP concerning the joint action, adopted by the Council on the basis of Article J.3 of the Treaty on European Union, on continued support for European Union administration of the town of Mostar.

Date: 19.12.95

Decision number: 95/552/CFSP

Official Journal reference: L313 (27.12.95)

- Council decision concerning the joint action, adopted by the Council on the basis of Article J.3 of the Treaty on European Union, with regard to the participation of the European Union in the implementing structures of the peace plan for Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Date: 11.12.95

Decision number: 95/545/CFSP

Official Journal reference: L309 (21.12.95)

- Council decision concerning the joint action, adopted by the Council on the basis of Article J.3 of the Treaty on European Union, on continued support for European Union administration of the town of Mostar.

Date: 4.12.95

Decision number: 95/517/CFSP

Official Journal reference: L298 (11.12.95)

- Council decision adapting and extending the application of decision 93/603/CFSP concerning the joint action decided on by the Council on the support for the conveying of humanitarian aid in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Date: 4.12.95

Decision number: 95/516/CFSP

Official Journal reference: L298 (11.12.95)

- Council decision supplementing decision 94/790/CFSP concerning the joint action, adopted by the Council on the basis of Article J.3 of the Treaty on European Union, on continued support for European Union administration of the town of Mostar.

Date: 6.2.95

Decision number: 95/23/CFSP

Official Journal reference: L33 (13.2.95)

- Council decision supplementing decision 94/790/CFSP concerning the joint action, adopted by the Council on the basis of Article J.3 of the Treaty on European Union on continued support for European Union administration of the town of Mostar.

Date: 12.12.94

Decision number: 94/790/CFSP

Official Journal reference: L33 (13.12.94)

- Supplementing decision concerning the joint action decided on by the Council on the basis of Article J.3 of the treaty on European Union on support for the conveying of humanitarian aid in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Date: 27.7.94

Decision number: 94/510/CFSP

Official Journal reference: L25 (8.8.94)

- Council decision adapting and extending the

application of decision 93.603/CFSP concerning the joint action decided on by the Council on the basis of Article J.3 of conveying of humanitarian aid in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Date: 16.5.94

Decision number: 94/308/CFSP

Official Journal reference: L134 (30.5.94)

- Council decision extending the application of decision 93.603/CFSP concerning the joint action decided on by the Council on the basis of Article J.3 of the treaty on European Union on support for the conveying of humanitarian aid in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Date: 7.3.94

Decision number: 94/158/CFSP

Official Journal reference: L70 (12.3.94)

- Council decision supplementing the joint action for the conveying of humanitarian aid in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Date: 20.12.93

Decision number: 93/729/CFSP

Official Journal reference: L339 (31.12.93)

- Council decision concerning the joint action decided on by the Council on the basis of Article J.3 of the treaty on European Union on support for the conveying of humanitarian aid in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Date: 8.11.93

Decision number: 93/603/CFSP

Official Journal reference: L286 (20.11.93)

I SOUTH AFRICA

- Council decision on a joint action adopted by the Council on the basis of Article J.3 of the treaty on European Union concerning support for the transition towards a democratic and multi-racial South Africa.

Date: 6.12.93

Decision number: 93/678/CFSP

Official Journal reference: L316 (17.12.93)

I GREAT LAKES REGION (AFRICA)

- Council decision relating to the financial incidences of the prorogation of the mandate of the special envoy for the Great Lakes region, named by the common action 96/250/CFSP.

Date: 1.10.96

Decision number: 96/589/CFSP

Official Journal reference: L260 (12.10.96)

- Council decision prorogating the application for the common action 96/250/CFSP adopted by the Council on the basis of Article J.3 of the European Union Treaty relating to the designation of a special EU envoy for the Great Lakes region.

Date: 16.7.96

Decision number: 96/222/CFSP

Official Journal reference: L185 (24.7.96)

- Council decision propagating an application for common action 96/250/CFSP adopted by the Council on the bases of Article J.3 of the Treaty of European Union relating to the appointment of a special envoy for the Great Lakes region in Africa.

Date: 15.7.96

- Common action adopted by the Council on the basis of Article J.3 of the Treaty of European Union relating to the nomination of a special EU envoy for the Great Lakes region.

Date: 25.3.96

Decision number: 96/25/0/CFSP

Official Journal reference: L887 (4.4.96)

I STABILITY PACT

- Council decision on the continuation of the joint action adopted by the Council on the basis of Article J.3 of the treaty on European Union on the inaugural conference on the stability pact.

Date: 14.6.94

Decision number: 94/367/CFSP

Official Journal reference: L165 (1.7.94)

- Council decision concerning the joint action by the Council on the basis of Article J.3 of treaty on European Union on the inaugural conference on the



stability pact.
Date: 20.12.93
Decision number: 93/728/CFSP
Official Journal reference: L339 (31.12.93)

I MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS

● Council decision supplementing decision 94.276/CFSP on a joint action adopted by the Council on the basis of Article J.3 of the treaty on European Union, in support of the Middle East peace process, concerning the observation of elections to the Palestinian Council and the co-ordination of the international operation for observing the elections.

Date: 25.9.95
Decision number: 95/403/CFSP

Official Journal reference: L238 (6.10.95)

● Council decision on the joint action adopted by the Council on the basis of Article J.3 of the treaty on European Union in support of the Middle East peace process.

Date: 1.6.95
Decision number: 95.205/CFSP
Official Journal reference: L130 (14.6.95)

● Council decision on a joint action adopted by the Council on the basis of Article J(3) of the treaty on European Union, in support of the Middle East peace process.

Date: 19.4.94
Decision number: 94/276/CFSP
Official Journal reference: L119 (7.5.94)

I NON-PROLIFERATION

● Council decision concerning the joint action adopted by the Council on the basis of Article J.3 of the treaty on European Union regarding preparation for the 1995 conference on the states parties to the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.

Date: 25.7.94
Decision number: 94/509/CFSP
Official Journal reference: L205 (8.8.94)

I RUSSIAN PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS

● Council decision concerning the joint action decided on by the Council on the basis of Article J.3 of the treaty on European Union concerning the dispatch of a team of observers for the parliamentary elections in Russia.

Date: 9.11.93
Decision number: 93/604/CFSP
Official Journal reference: L286 (20.11.93)

I ANTI-PERSONNEL MINES

● Council decision relating to the common action adopted by the Council based on Article J.3 of the European Union Treaty relating anti-personnel land mines.

Date: 1.10.96
Decision number: 96/688/CFSP
Official Journal reference: L260 (12.10.96)

● Council decision complementing decision 95/170/CFSP relating to the common action adopted by the Council on the basis of Article J.3 of the Treaty of European Union relating to anti-personnel mines.

Date: 25.3.96
Decision number: 96/251/CFSP
Official Journal reference: L87 (4.4.96)

● Council decision concerning the joint action adopted by the Council on the basis of Article J.3 of the treaty on European Union on anti-personnel mines.

Date: 12.5.95
Decision number: 95/170/CFSP
Official Journal reference: L115 (22.5.95)

I SOUTH KOREA

● Common action adopted by the Council on the basis of Article J.3 of the Treaty of European Union relating to the participation of the EU and the organisation for the development of energy in South Korea.

Date: 5.3.96
Decision number: 96/195/CFSP
Official Journal reference: L63 (13.3.96)

I DUAL-USE GOODS

● Council decision modifying decision 94/942/CFSP relating to a common action adopted by the Council on the basis of Article J.3 of the Treaty of European Union concerning the control and export of dual-use goods.

Date: 27.6.96
Decision number: 96/423/CFSP
Official Journal reference: L176 (13.7.96)

● Council decision modifying decision 94/942/CFSP relating to a common action adopted by the Council on the basis of Article J.3 of the Treaty of European Union concerning the control and export of dual-use goods plus Amendment.

Date: 16.2.96
Decision number: 96/173/CFSP
Official Journal reference: L52 (1.3.96)

● Council decision amending decision 94.942/CFSP on the joint action adopted by the Council on the basis of Article J.3 of the treaty on European Union concerning the control of exports of dual-use goods.

Date: 10.4.95
Decision number: 95.127/CFSP
Official Journal reference: L90 (21.4.95)

● Council decision on the joint action adopted by the Council on the basis of Article J.3 of the treaty on European Union concerning the control of exports of dual-use goods.

Date: 19.12.94
Decision number: 94/942/CFSP
Official Journal reference: L367 (31.12.94)

★

List of common positions adopted by the Council since the entry into force of the treaty on European Union (November 1993-September 1996)

I FORMER YUGOSLAVIA

Common position defined by the Council on the basis of Article J.2 of the Treaty on European Union relating to the export of arms to former Yugoslavia.

Date: 26.2.96
Decision number: 96/184/CFSP
Official Journal reference: L58 (7.3.96)

● Common position defined by the Council on the basis of Article J.2 of the treaty on European Union with regard to the suspension of the restrictions on trade with the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) and with the Bosnian Serbs.

Date: 4.12.95
Decision number: 95/511/CFSP
Official Journal reference: L297 (9.12.95)

● Common position defined by the Council on the basis of Article J.2 of the Treaty on European Union with regard to the extension of the suspension of

certain restrictions on trade with the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro).

Date: 19.9.95
Decision number: 95/378/CFSP
Official Journal reference: L227 (22.9.95)

● Common position defined by the Council on the basis of Article J.2 of the Treaty on European Union with regard to the extension of the suspension of certain restrictions on trade with the Federal republic of Yugoslavia

(Serbia and Montenegro).

Date: 7.7.95
Decision number: 95/254/CFSP
Official Journal reference: L160 (11.7.95)

● Common position defined by the Council on the basis of Article J.2 of the Treaty on European Union on the suspension of certain restrictions on trade with the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro).

Date: 12.6.95
Decision number: 95/213/CFSP
Official Journal reference: L138 (21.6.95)

● Common position defined by the Council on the basis of Article J.2 of the Treaty on European Union with regard to the extension of the suspension of certain restrictions on trade with the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro).

Date: 28.4.95
Decision number: 95/150/CFSP



Official Journal reference: L99 (29.4.95)

● Common position defined by the Council on the basis of Article J.2 of the Treaty on European Union and concerning the prorogation of the suspension of certain trade restrictions with the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro).

Date: 23.1.95

Decision number: 95/11/CFSP

Official Journal reference: L20 (27.1.95)

● Common position defined by the Council on the basis of Article J.2 of the Treaty on European Union and concerning the reduction of economic and financial relations with those parts of the territory of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina under the control of the Bosnian Serb forces.

Date: 10.10.94

Decision number: 94/672/CFSP

Official Journal reference: L266 (15.10.94)

● Council decision on the common position defined by the Council on the basis of Article J.2 of the Treaty on European Union concerning prohibition of the satisfaction of the claims referred to in paragraph 9 of the UN Security Council Resolution 757 (1992).

Date: 13.6.94

Decision number: 94/366/CFSP

Official Journal reference: L165 (1.7.94)

I UKRAINE

● Common position defined by the Council on the basis of Article J.2 of the Treaty on European Union on the objectives and priorities of the European Union towards Ukraine.

Date: 28.11.94

Decision number: 94/779/CFSP

Official Journal reference: L313 (6.12.94)

I HAITI

● Common position defined by the Council on the basis of Article J.2 of the Treaty on European Union on European Union regarding the termination of the reduction of economic relations with Haiti.

Date: 14.10.94

Decision number: 94/681/CFSP

Official Journal reference: L271 (21.10.94)

● Council decision concerning the common position defined on the basis of Article J.2 of the Treaty on European Union on European Union regarding the reduction of economic relations with Haiti.

Date: 30.5.94

Decision number: 94/315/CFSP

Official Journal reference: L139 (2.6.94)

I NIGERIA

● Council decision on the common position defined on the basis of Article J.2 of the Treaty on European Union propagating the common position 95/544/CFSP on Nigeria.

Date: 3.6.96

Decision number: 96/361/CFSP

Official Journal reference: L1432 (15.6.96)

● Council decision on the common position defined on the basis of Article J.2 of the Treaty on European Union on Nigeria.

Date: 4.12.95

Decision number: 95/544/CFSP

Official Journal reference: L309 (21.12.95)

● Council decision on the common position defined on the basis of Article J.2 of the treaty on European Union on Nigeria.

Date: 20.11.95

Decision number: 95/515/CFSP

Official Journal reference: L298 (11.12.95)

I RWANDA

● Council decision on the common position adopted by the Council on the basis of Article J.2 of the Treaty on European Union concerning the objectives and priorities of the European Union towards Rwanda.

Date: 24.10.94

Decision number: 94/697/CFSP

Official Journal reference: L283 (29.10.94)

I SUDAN

● Council decision on the common position defined on the basis of Article J.2 of the Treaty on European Union concerning the imposition of an embargo on arms, munitions and military equipment on Sudan.

Date: 15.3.94

Decision number: 94/165/CFSP

Official Journal reference: L75 (17.3.94)

I LIBYA

● Council decision on the common position defined on the basis of Article J.2 of the Treaty on European Union with regard to the reduction of economic relations with Libya.

Date: 2.11.93

Decision number: 93/614/CFSP

Official Journal reference: L295 (30.11.93)

I BURUNDI

● Council decision on the implementation of the common position of March 24 1995 defined by the Council on the basis of Article J.2 of the Treaty on European Union, with regard to Burundi.

Date: 6.6.95

Decision number: 95/206/CFSP

Official Journal reference: L130 (14.6.95)

● Council decision on the common position defined on the basis of Article J.2 of the Treaty on European Union, with regard to Burundi.

Date: 24.3.95

Decision number: 95/91/CFSP

Official Journal reference: L72 (1.4.95)

I ANGOLA

● Council decision on the common position defined on the basis of Article J.2 of the Treaty on European Union, with regard to Angola.

Date: 29.10.95

Decision number: 95/413/CFSP

Official Journal reference: L245 (12.10.95)

I CO-LOCATION OF DIPLOMATIC MISSIONS

● Council decision on the common position defined on the basis of Article J.2 of the Treaty on European Union, with regard to the possible co-location of diplomatic missions.

Date: 6.10.95

Official Journal reference: not published

I BLINDING LASERS

● Council decision on the common position defined on the basis of Article J.2 of the Treaty on European Union, concerning blinding lasers.

Date: 18.9.95

Decision number: 95/379/CFSP

Official Journal reference: L227 (22.9.95)

I BIOLOGICAL AND CHEMICAL WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION

● Defining the common position of the Council based on Article J.2 of the Treaty on European Union relating to the preparation of the fourth conference and revision of the convention on the setting up, building and stockpiling of biological and chemical weapons of mass destruction.

Date: 25.6.96

Decision number: 96/408/CFSP

Official Journal reference: L168 (6.7.96)

I EAST TIMOR

● Defining the common position of the Council on the basis of Article J.2 of the Treaty on European Union relating to East Timor.

Date: 25.6.96

Decision number: 96/407/CFSP

Official Journal reference: L168 (6.7.96)

★